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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Problem statement 
According to the FAO (2008), grasslands occupy 26% of the total land area of the world, and 70% of 
the global agricultural area. They are among the largest ecosystems in the world, contribute to the 
livelihoods of more than 800 million people, and are important as feed sources for livestock, as habitats 
for wildlife, for environmental protection efforts and for the in situ conservation of plant genetic 
resources (FAO, 2008). The sustainable use and management of grasslands have been of great concern 
to academic circles, policy-makers and NGOs, especially in the context of the growing worldwide 
problem of grassland degradation, rapid increases in demand for livestock products and the high level 
of poverty among pastoralists (Suttie et al., 2005; FAO, 2015). As defined by Fernandez-Gimenez and 
Swift (2003), sustainable grassland use and management should maintain the productive and adaptive 
capacity of grassland ecosystems while providing for the wellbeing of human communities. In practice, 
various policy interventions have been made, devoted to balancing the conservation of grasslands, 
production of livestock and the livelihoods of local households in agricultural societies. 
However, the validity of existing policy interventions must be examined in terms of sustainable 
grassland use and management, given that grassland degradation is still ongoing and rural poverty is 
deepening in some pastoral areas (Hua and Squires, 2015). In this regard, research in multiple 
disciplines has found that some government policies accelerate resource destruction (Ostrom, 2009). To 
date, the policy interventions for grassland use and management widely employed by governments 
around the world aim to transform traditional pastoralism, by developing sedentarisation instead of 
nomadism, privatisation1 of grasslands instead of communal tenure, intensification instead of extensive 
grazing, commercialisation of livestock systems instead of subsistence, deterministic stocking rates 
instead of opportunistic strategies with stochastic stocking rates, and so forth (Homewood, 1995; Li and 
Zhang, 2009). Traditional pastoralism is subsistence-oriented and has been perceived as primarily 
mobile, manifesting in such diverse forms as nomadism, transhumance, and migration as well as pasture 
rotation on a large scale (Fernandez-Gimenez and Le Febre, 2006). Widespread sentiments identify 
traditional pastoralism as an irrational, ecologically destructive and economically inefficient system 
(Homewood, 1995; Ho and Azadi, 2010). So, what are the actual outcomes of the government-driven 
                                                 
1 Note that privatisation generally refers to the assignment of property rights over an asset or resource from the public (state) 
to the private sector. In the case of China, formal property rights over grasslands have remained in the public (or collective) 
sector. Hence, when we use the term privatisation for grasslands in the Chinese context we include the transfer of use rights 
over grasslands from the public to the private sector rather than the assignment of formal property rights. 
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transformation of traditional pastoralism? In other words, what are the impacts of the prevailing policy 
interventions on the grassland system2?  
The global tendency of grassland policy in the twentieth century has been toward privatisation (or 
individualisation, subdivision, etc.), which transforms the property rights or use rights over grassland 
resources from communities to individuals (Mwangi, 2007; Li and Zhang, 2009; Li and Huntsinger, 
2011). Since then, grassland privatisation has become the most significant transformation of traditional 
pastoralism, and the result of establishing physical boundaries between grassland parcels has led to a 
series of considerable changes in traditional modes of livestock production and household livelihoods 
(Sheehy et al., 2006; Li and Zhang, 2009). In general, land-ownership regimes other than private 
property are considered by many economists to be inefficient and prone toward the overuse of resources 
(Mwangi, 2007). Particularly, the conventional wisdom based on the concept of “the tragedy of the 
commons” (Hardin, 1968) and the theorem of property rights (Coase, 2013), contends that the open 
access to resources and unclear property rights of traditional pastoralism would inevitably cause overuse 
and increasing grassland degradation (Li et al., 2014). As such, grassland privatisation has been long 
embraced as the solution for achieving the sustainable use and management of grasslands (Mwangi, 
2007; Ybarra, 2009). The development of grassland privatisation has also been influenced by the 
changes in the economy, such as technological innovation, changes in relative factor scarcities 
especially with increasing populations and the creation of new markets (Demsetz, 1967; Mwangi, 2007). 
However, an increasing number of scholars have explored some of the unintended effects of grassland 
privatisation, challenging the conventional wisdom of the “the tragedy of the commons”. 
After the period of implementation of grassland privatisation, various environmental policies and 
programs have been introduced, influenced by growing attention to grassland ecosystems and 
worldwide grassland degradation in recent decades. The policy interventions for grassland conservation 
mainly target at controlling livestock grazing, because overgrazing is believed to be one of the main 
causes of grassland degradation by most of policy makers, such as in South Africa, South American 
Campos, China etc. (Suttie et al., 2005; Miao et al., 2015; Liu et. al., 2016). These environmental 
policies and programs further prompted pastoralists to transform their traditional lifestyles, particularly 
developing the intensification of animal husbandry, in place of extensive, grazing practices (Cao et al., 
2013b). 
Nevertheless, traditional pastoralism had prevailed for centuries. Increasing literature has criticised 
existing policy interventions as impairing the strategies of traditional pastoralism, reducing mobility, 
                                                 
2 The grassland system in this research includes both the grassland condition (grassland area and quality) and livestock 
production. This is an adaptation of the resource system as defined by Ostrom (2009) in her framework of social-
ecological systems.  
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flexibility and reciprocity of grassland use (Fernandez-Gimenez and Le Febre, 2006). It has been 
advocated that the government-driven transformation of traditional pastoralism broke the balance 
between the grassland ecosystem and livestock production, increased vulnerability to natural disasters 
and threatened pastoral livelihoods. In particular, privatisation and enclosure in arid and semi-arid 
pastoral areas seriously threatens the integrity of ecological systems because these areas are 
characterised by temporal variability and spatial heterogeneity (Mwangi, 2007). It is necessary to 
examine whether a tragedy of privatisation may have occurred, rather than the well-known tragedy of 
the commons. In addition, some scholars have implied that grassland degradation as a result of 
overgrazing is not possible in traditional pastoralism, because animals would be moved to new places 
for available forage before the vegetation of one area is significantly impacted by grazing (Li and 
Huntsinger, 2011). Furthermore, the restriction of livestock grazing inevitably causes economic loss to 
herders, which may impede the implementation of the environmental policies and programs. As such, 
the environmental policies and programs do not seem to be effective for preventing grassland 
degradation, especially those focussed on controlling livestock grazing.  
What are the outcomes of these prevailing policy interventions, i.e. the outcomes of the government-
driven transformation of traditional pastoralism? Are they valid in light of the sustainable use and 
management of grasslands? In this dissertation, these questions will be examined by researching the 
following issues: what is the impact of grassland privatisation on grassland condition and livestock 
production? What is the impact of the environmental policies and programs on grassland conservation? 
Although some academic studies and governmental reports have presented the results of policy 
interventions on grassland systems, the existing literature lacks quantitative analysis, based on large-
scale areas and long-term observations, in order to dissect the policy effectiveness, and has thus far 
fallen short of thorough and systematic discussion on the outcomes of government-driven 
transformation of traditional pastoralism (Lu et al., 2015). Therefore, this research employs empirical 
analysis based on panel data involving extensive grasslands of China and spanning several decades, 
with a focus on the effects of the transformation of pastoralism on both grassland condition and livestock 
production. 
1.2 Background information 
1.2.1 Grasslands of China 
China has around 392 million hectares of grasslands, the second largest area in the world after Australia, 
accounting for 12% of the world’s grasslands and 41.7% of the national land area (Fan et al., 2008). 
Nearly 80% of these grasslands are in arid and semi-arid regions, which are characterised as most 
vulnerable to degradation, desertification and salinisation (Feng et al., 2008; National Bureau of 
13 
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1.2 Background information 
1.2.1 Grasslands of China 
China has around 392 million hectares of grasslands, the second largest area in the world after Australia, 
accounting for 12% of the world’s grasslands and 41.7% of the national land area (Fan et al., 2008). 
Nearly 80% of these grasslands are in arid and semi-arid regions, which are characterised as most 
vulnerable to degradation, desertification and salinisation (Feng et al., 2008; National Bureau of 
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Statistics of China, 2009). Approximately 17 million people maintain their livelihoods on the grasslands 
of China (Li et al., 2014). The extensive grasslands of China are concentrated in six provinces and 
autonomous regions: Xinjiang, Tibet, Qinghai, Sichuan, Gansu and Inner Mongolia. They account for 
75% of grasslands and accommodate 70% of the grazing livestock of China (Suttie et al., 2005). These 
areas maintained traditional pastoralism over hundreds of years, before undergoing thorough land tenure 
reform since the 1980s and a series of Ecological Construction Programs since 2000. These policy 
interventions have been implemented widely in favour of transforming traditional pastoral practices. 
 
Figure 1.1 The distribution of grasslands in China 
As shown in Figure 1.1, the grasslands of China are mainly distributed on the Inner Mongolia Plateau, 
the Loess Plateau and the Qinghai-Tibetan Plateau. The extensive grasslands are classified into four 
major types based on the analysis of plant community in phytology (Wu et al., 1980; Kang et al., 2007), 
including meadow steppes, typical steppes, desert steppes and alpine steppes. These four types of 
grasslands have a combined distribution ranging from the northeast plain adjacent to Mongolia to south 
of the Tibetan Plateau (Kang et al., 2007). The meadow steppes and typical steppes are the most 
commonly used grasslands for grazing and other economic activities related to livestock production, 
and most of them are located on the Inner Mongolian Plateau (Kang et al., 2007).  
China’s grasslands play crucial roles in livestock production, household livelihoods and global 
ecosystems (Kang et al., 2007). Northern China contains over 50% of China’s grasslands, which are 
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called the traditional pastoral areas (Ho and Azadi, 2010), and which were home to the world’s largest 
population of sheep and goats and the fourth largest concentration of cattle in the 1990s (Zhang and 
Yang, 1990; National Research Council, 1992; Ho and Azadi, 2010). They are considered to be the 
major areas for livestock production in China, with a long history of producing meat, milk, wool and 
fur. Moreover, local animal husbandry provides livelihoods to millions of people, with a majority 
existing as traditional self-sufficient enterprises and a few commercial grazing businesses (Li et al., 
2014). The ecological function of China’s grasslands is being emphasized increasingly, such as 
biodiversity conservation, carbon sequestration, soil retention, soil fertility maintenance, and catchment 
protection (Suttie et al., 2005). It was shown that the grasslands of northern China significantly impact 
both regional climates and the global carbon cycle (Ni, 2002). In addition, the majority of pastoral areas 
are populated by ethnic minorities, such as Mongolians and Ewenkis, thus protecting the grasslands of 
China also has a social function of maintaining cultural diversity and social stability (Kang et al., 2007). 
These socio-economic and environmental functions of grasslands have invoked the increasing attention 
of central and local governments to adopt policy interventions for sustaining the productivity of—in 
addition to protecting—the grassland ecosystem. 
1.2.2 Grassland degradation in China 
Grassland degradation, a worldwide problem, is particularly severe in China (Ho and Azadi, 2010). 
Grassland degradation can manifest itself in the lowering of grassland productivity, reduction in soil 
fertility, soil compaction, increased presence of unpalatable species of grass, or a combination thereof 
(Li et al., 2013). Although lacking clear documentation and differing in specifics regarding the extent 
of China’s grassland degradation during the last several decades, it is unanimous among herders, 
scholars and governments that the grasslands of China have experienced degradation, with significant 
regional variation (Harris, 2010; Waldron et al., 2010). An often-cited figure is that about 90% of 
China’s grasslands were degraded to various extents by the 2000s (Unkovich and Nan, 2008; Waldron 
et al., 2010), and that degradation was increasing at a rate of two million hectares per year (Ren et al., 
2007; Harris, 2010; Cao et al., 2013b). The grassland areas shrunk significantly by the beginning of the 
twenty-first century. In particular, the northern grassland boundary had moved about 200 km southward 
and the western boundary about 100 km eastward compared to the previous hundred years (Liu 2008; 
Cao et al., 2013b).  
A series of natural disasters in China in the late 1990s are to some extent responsible for degradation 
and desertification of the grasslands in northern China (Kang et al., 2007; Wu et al., 2015), for instance, 
the Yangtze River floods that killed thousands of residents, the Yellow River droughts that cost billions 
of US dollars in economic losses, and the frequent dust-storms and sand-storms that blanketed the sky 
of Beijing and affected the health and economic wellbeing of millions of city-dwellers (Harris, 2010). 
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It has been noticed that grassland degradation does not only impact herders who rely on the grasslands 
for survival and their livelihood, but also threatens the ecological security of the whole country (Harris, 
2010; Huang et al., 2013).  
Plenty of politicians and scholars have raised concerns over the causes of grassland degradation in China. 
Overgrazing and unsuitable grassland reclamation for cultivation have been accepted as the principal 
reasons (Ho, 2001). It was indicated that the total number of livestock in China increased by 594 million 
from 1981 to 2006 (Cao et al., 2013b), and an estimated 67 million hectares of high-quality grasslands 
have been converted to the cultivation of grains since 1949 (Ho and Azadi, 2010). However, other 
scholars have suggested that overgrazing only exists and leads to degradation in specific areas, with 
little evidence from national data to suggest that overgrazing per se has been responsible for widespread 
grassland degradation across China’s pastoral grazing areas (Cao et al., 2013b). As such, one of the 
most controversial and debated aspects of research about grasslands is the existence and extent of 
overgrazing and its impact on grassland degradation (Suttie et al., 2005). Other anthropogenic 
interventions, such as over-excavation of medicinal herbs and mining, are thought to be responsible for 
at least some of the grassland degradation (Ren et al., 2007). Climate-related factors are an ongoing 
concern as a significant driver of grassland degradation in arid and semi-arid areas. For example, the 
distribution of precipitation is discussed as a principle factor of the changes in grassland condition 
(Harris, 2010; Cao et al., 2013b), while temperature is concluded to be a driver for changes in the 
biomass production of grasslands (Piao et al., 2006). Last but not least, the policy interventions that 
attempt to transform traditional pastoralism have been suspected to be significant causes of grassland 
degradation in China (e.g. Li and Zhang, 2009; Harris, 2010; Cao et al., 2013b). 
1.2.3 Livestock production in the pastoral areas of China 
China’s livestock systems can be classified as traditional grazing, industrial production or mixed 
systems (Cao et al., 2013b). Traditional grazing systems are characterised by the direct consumption of 
permanent pastures (Waldron et al., 2007). The majority of production in traditional grazing systems 
provides subsistence to local residents, and therefore their livestock production usually includes several 
species of multipurpose animals—producing meat, milk, hides, fibre, transport, and manure for fuel 
(Suttie et al., 2005). These regions are called pastoral areas, which are geographically vast but sparse in 
population. They are mainly located in the west, north and northwest of China, including the Mongolian 
and Tibetan plateaus and Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (Cao et al., 2013b). Industrial 
production systems aim to produce commodities for market sale, such as milk and meat. Their livestock 
production usually concentrates on one or two species of animals and relies also on crop products and 
sown pastures. Industrial production systems are mainly located in the southeast (Guangdong Province 
and Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region), north (Shanxi Province, Hebei Province and Beijing and 
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Tianjin Municipalities) and northeast (Liaoning Province, Jilin Province and Heilongjiang Province) 
(Cao et al., 2013b). Mixed systems are the interface between traditional grazing and industrial 
production.  
China is a major player in the international livestock sector and has experienced impressive increases 
in livestock production 3  but it has been observed that the increases in livestock production are 
predominantly associated with industrialised, rather than traditional, grazing systems in China (Cao et 
al., 2013b). The intensification of livestock production in China started in the late 1980s and has 
advanced progressively ever since, which resulted in significant changes in livestock production 
structures as well as the geographical distribution and composition of the livestock commodities of 
China (FAO, 2016). In addition, with the increasing environmental concerns about the ecosystem of 
natural grasslands, livestock production increasingly relies on the utilisation of crop stalks, bran, and 
other byproducts of grain, instead of natural pastures (FAO, 2015). In the 1990s, the central government 
called for moving cattle and sheep production from the traditional grazing region to the grain-producing 
provinces, because it was believed that overgrazing of pastoral areas was the main reason for grassland 
degradation. This policy strategy was strengthened after a series of environmental disasters had occurred 
in the 2000s. What followed has been a steady increase in the total livestock outputs in China but a 
decrease in the share of livestock production in the pastoral areas (Li, 2009). In short, the market share 
of livestock products in China has experienced a geographic shift from pastoral areas to crop-farming 
areas, in accordance with changes in production technology and national policy strategies in recent years 
(Li et al., 2008). 
Livestock production in the pastoral areas provides livelihoods to millions of people and has 
considerable capacity to alleviate the increasing stress of livestock product demands that have risen with 
growing population, urbanisation and rising disposable incomes in China (FAO, 2015). Nevertheless, 
few studies have discussed the livestock production of the pastoral areas clearly and thoroughly. One 
important reason is the questionable accuracy of Chinese livestock statistics, especially the data about 
the pastoral areas (Waldron et al., 2007). Statistical data collection on the livestock population is 
extremely difficult in China because small rural households raise livestock at a small scale, and supply 
chains are dominated by countless small traders and processors, unlike the centralised slaughter and 
auction systems that facilitate statistical data collection in developed countries (Waldron et al., 2007). 
China’s method of collecting these data has been a system of bottom-up reporting, which is vulnerable 
                                                 
3 Based on the FAOSTAT database, China’s meat output accounted for 10.8% of the world total in 1980, and the share rose 
to 28.7% in 2004 (Li, 2009). The average growth rate in meat production between 1980 and 2004 was 7% in China, compared 
with only 3% for the world (Waldron et al., 2007). 
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to misreporting from herders and local officials hoping to respond to the policy orientation of higher-
level governments (Waldron et al., 2007). 
1.2.4 The overview of China’s grassland policies 
For a long time, China had no comprehensive long-term policy for grasslands (Ho, 2000). In the past, 
grasslands were owned by princes, lamaseries, landlords, or clans, and remained in common use by 
tenant herders. After that, in the collectivist period of New China, the grassland was owned by the 
production team or People’s commune and the grassland was still managed and used communally by 
all local herders (Hua and Squires, 2015), while local communities had their own institutional structures 
for the use and management of grasslands (Ho, 2000). When the People’s commune was abolished and 
grassland degradation was impending, there was an urgent need to fill the institutional vacuum for 
grassland use and management (Ho, 2000). Subsequently, there are two major policies that have been 
widely employed for the grassland use and management of China, including the land tenure reform 
during the 1980s-1990s and a series of Ecological Construction Programs after 2000. The former aims 
at privatising use rights of grasslands to individual households and displacing traditional common use 
(Banks et al., 2003) and the latter mainly concerns the grassland conservation as well as the maintenance 
of local household livelihoods (Liu et. al., 2016).  
More specifically, land tenure reform started with the Household Production Responsibility System in 
the cropland areas of China in the late 1970s and spread to the pastoral areas in the early 1980s. The 
land tenure reform in the pastoral areas was implemented by local governments through local 
regulations, such as the Double Contracting System (“cao xu shuang cheng bao”) in Inner Mongolia.  
The ownership of livestock was assigned to households on the basis of the size of the household and 
labour force (Banks et al., 2003). The use rights to grasslands were informally allocated to small groups 
of households, and use rights to hayfields and croplands were allocated to individual households. 
Meanwhile, the marketing system for most livestock products was simultaneously liberalised and only 
wool remained under state monopoly control (Banks et al., 2003). The first Grassland Law of China, 
initiated in 1985, stipulated that the property rights over grasslands are owned either by the state or the 
collective but that use rights to the grasslands could be contracted out to either households or collectives. 
Moreover, the users (individual households) of the grasslands are regulated to control their livestock 
numbers according to a stocking rate in order to avoid overuse of grasslands (Ho, 2000). Then, the 
assignment of grassland use rights to individual households was strengthened by Chinese governments 
in the 1990s, which greatly fuelled the progress of grassland privatisation and was regarded as the 
second round of grassland privatisation in China (Li and Zhang 2009). In 2002, the revised Grassland 
Law reaffirmed the shift from state- and collective-oriented land use rights to those of individual 
households (National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China, 2002). The State Council 
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emphasised the specific allocation of the contracted items (e.g. grassland plots, areas, issuing user-right 
certificates) to households to ensure the long-term stability of contract relations in 2011 (Li, 2012). 
According to the current Law on the Contracting of Rural Land, grassland use rights can be contracted 
to individual households for 30 to 50 years.  
Since the severe natural disasters of the late 1990s (Harris, 2010), the central government has hastened 
to engage in ecosystem protection and therefore a series of Ecological Construction Programs have been 
initiated, especially after 2000 (Wu et al., 2015). For example, the Conversion of Cropland to Forest 
and Grassland Program (also known as the Grain for Green Program) was mainly implemented between 
2001 and 2010, and covered 25 provinces of China with a total budget of 225 billion RMB. It involved 
returning sloping or deserted cropland to forest or artificial grassland (Wang and Bennett, 2008; Liu, 
Lu and Yin, 2010). The Returning Grazing to Grassland Program was launched in 2000. It is one of the 
largest environmental programs on the grasslands of China. This program aimed at grassland 
conservation by sowing grass on those grasslands experiencing serious degradation, as well as 
restricting grazing in all program areas, involving grazing bans (either permanently or seasonally), 
rotational grazing and setting a deterministic stocking rate (Li et al., 2014; Hua and Squires, 2015). 
Apart from these two major programs in the 2000s, there were other programs that employed similar 
policy measures for grassland conservation, such as the Program to Combat Desertification around 
Beijing and Tianjin. These Ecological Construction Programs were implemented at household-level, 
with or without some compensation in cash, grain or grass seeds for the herders’ economic loss (Suttie 
et al., 2005). Since 2011, another successive Ecological Construction Program, the Subsidy and 
Incentive System for Grassland Conservation (SISGC), has been initiated in eight pastoral provinces of 
China, including Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang, Tibet, Qinghai, Sichuan, Gansu, Ningxia and Yunnan. It 
aims at conserving the condition of grassland and meanwhile improving local herders’ livelihoods and 
livestock production through intensification (State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2010). 
The central government promised a budget of 13.4 billion RMB per year for its implementation between 
2011 and 2015. The major regulations on grazing still include the permanent grazing ban and the 
deterministic stocking rate, but they are supported with more subsidies or incentives to compensate the 
herders’ economic loss. 
1.2.5 Research region: the pastoral areas of Inner Mongolia 
Inner Mongolia, a province4 located in the arid and semi-arid areas of northern China, has 118.3 million 
hectares of land with a permanent population of 25 million in 2014. It contains 21.7% of the area of 
China’s natural grasslands. Approximately 67% of the total land in Inner Mongolia is classified as 
                                                 
4 The full name is Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region. 
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emphasised the specific allocation of the contracted items (e.g. grassland plots, areas, issuing user-right 
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4 The full name is Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region. 
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grassland (Angerer et al., 2008). (Angerer et al., 2008). It has played an important role in the supply of 
livestock products and the ecosystem of China. Official statistics showed that the animal husbandry of 
Inner Mongolia accounted for 45% of the province’s gross output value of agriculture in 2013. Inner 
Mongolia accounted for 18% of the population of sheep in China in 2013; the mutton output accounted 
for 22% of total output in China; 6% of cattle were raised in Inner Mongolia, and 8% of beef was 
produced there.  
As a traditionally pastoral region populated by Mongolians, the vast majority of local people maintain 
their livelihoods by grazing on the grasslands (Angerer et al., 2008). Inner Mongolia has been the major 
and prior region for implementing the grassland policies in China because of its typical position in 
China’s grassland resource and livestock production (Li and Huntsinger, 2011). However, it was 
reported that 90% of the natural grasslands of Inner Mongolia had been degraded to some extent by 
2000 and grassland degradation remains problematic since (Waldron et al., 2010; Briske et al., 2015). 
With society’s growing attention to the grassland ecosystem and continuing grassland degradation, 
Inner Mongolia has been increasingly emphasised as an ecological barrier of northern China instead of 
the previous status it had as the main production area of livestock products (Wu et al., 2015). Moreover, 
the provincial government of Inner Mongolia has put emphasis on the development of livestock 
production in crop farming areas, rather than the pastoral areas, since 2001. For instance, 70% of 
livestock production in Inner Mongolia was located in the crop farming area in 2007 (Su, 2010). 
According to the current administrative divisions of Inner Mongolia, there are 102 counties, including 
33 pastoral counties, 21 semi-pastoral counties and 48 counties dominated by crop farming or urban 
districts. Pastoral counties are characterised by traditional grazing systems and natural grassland is the 
dominant land type. In semi-pastoral counties, both natural grassland and cropland are the dominant 
land types, while traditional grazing systems exist and mixed crop-livestock systems also occur. The 
pastoral counties and semi-pastoral counties are usually regarded as the pastoral areas of Inner Mongolia 
and represent a typical region to investigate the grasslands of China (e.g. Taylor, 2006; Li and Zhang, 
2009). Figure 1.2 illustrates the location of Inner Mongolia in China and its three types of counties. 
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Figure 1.2 Inner Mongolia and its 102 counties 
1.3 Objectives and research questions 
Given that China’s grasslands are confronted with the challenge of grassland degradation, the increasing 
demand for livestock products and the livelihoods of millions of households, an investigation into the 
sustainability of grassland use and management is urgently needed. Plenty of policies devoted to 
transforming traditional pastoralism have already been implemented to balance the productive and 
ecological functions of grasslands. However, grassland degradation and rural poverty in some pastoral 
areas are still worsening in China and there is no consistency within academic circles regarding how to 
transform traditional pastoralism under contemporary social, economic and political settings. As such, 
the objective of this research is to dissect the outcomes of China’s policy interventions on its grassland 
system and further discuss the government-driven transformation of traditional pastoralism. 
To fulfil this research objective, four research questions will be addressed in four chapters of this 
dissertation: 
Question 1: What are the individual and social optima of rural land allocation by stakeholders: among 
cultivated land, grassland, forest and other rural land? This question is answered in Chapter 2. This 
chapter explores the different desires of stakeholders shaping grassland areas, which mirrors the 
different perceptions of grassland use under government-driven transformation of traditional 
pastoralism. 
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Question 2: What is the impact of land tenure reform on the grassland condition in the pastoral areas of 
China? This question is answered in Chapter 3. Chapter 3 investigates the ecological effect of land 
tenure reform on the grassland system, which presents the ecological outcome of the transformation of 
pastoralism with the abandonment of communal tenure. 
Question 3: What is the impact of land tenure reform on livestock production in the pastoral areas of 
China? This question is answered in Chapter 4. This chapter explores the economic effect of land tenure 
reform on the grassland system, and presents the economic outcome of transforming pastoral areas, in 
terms of livestock changes in population as well as productivity. 
Question 4: What is the impact of Ecological Construction Programs on the grassland condition in the 
pastoral areas of China? This question is answered in Chapter 5. This chapter investigates the effect of 
Ecological Construction Programs on the grassland system, which mirrors the ecological outcome of 
the transformation of pastoralism, through the use of deterministic stocking rates and grazing ban. 
To summarise, the research objective is specifically addressed by evaluating the ecological and 
economic effects of the land tenure reform and Ecological Construction Programs that have been 
employed to intervene in the grassland use and management in China. The aim of this research is to 
contribute to the approach toward sustainable use and management of grasslands in China or other 
regions that have similar circumstances to China’s, by providing empirical evidence for the academic 
arguments on the transformation of traditional pastoralism. 
1.4 Materials and methods 
1.4.1 Conceptual framework 
All resources used by humans are embedded in complex social-ecological systems (SESs). Ostrom 
(2009) introduced a general framework for analysing sustainability of SESs, which integrates the 
different frameworks of different disciplines and provides a common method for dissecting the complex 
SESs. It helps to identify the potentially relevant variables and their subcomponents to design the data 
collection, to conduct the fieldwork, and to perform the analysis of findings about the sustainability of 
complex SESs (Ostrom, 2009). As such, this research employs Ostrom’s framework as the starting point 
for conducting our study of linked SESs of grasslands.  
Figure 1.3 illustrates the conceptual framework adapted from Ostrom’s framework for analysing the 
SESs of grasslands. It shows the four first-level core subsystems of the SESs of grasslands, the 
relationships between subsystems and the link to social, economic, and political settings and related 
ecosystems. The four first-level core subsystems in the SESs of grasslands are identified as: (1) 
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grassland system (e.g. grazing area, water systems, and animal husbandry); (2) grassland resource units 
(e.g. forage, water, and animals); (3) users (e.g. herders, farmers and others); and (4) governance system 
(e.g. government and policy interventions). These four subsystems are relatively separable but interact 
to produce outcomes at the SES level, which in turn affect the subsystems (Ostrom, 2009). This thesis 
aims to reveal the impacts of governance systems upon the grassland systems, resource units and users.  
One of the broad questions this SES framework is used to solve is what impacts are likely to result from 
using particular rules for the governance, ownership, and use of a resource system and resource units in 
a specific technological, socioeconomic, and political environment (Ostrom, 2007). Long-term 
sustainability depends on rules matching the attributes of the resource system, resource units, and users 
(Ostrom, 2009). This study is devoted to examining whether the policy interventions of China are 
beneficial to the grassland system, grassland resource units and users in the long term. 
  
Figure 1.3 Conceptual framework for analysing social-ecological systems of grasslands 
(Adapted from Ostrom’s framework for analysing social-ecological systems (Ostrom, 2009)) 
More specifically, this study focuses on evaluating the ecological and economic impacts of China’s 
policy interventions on grasslands, which essentially reflects the outcomes of governance systems on 
grassland systems under the social, economic and political settings in which said systems are embedded. 
The outcomes for grassland systems are specifically measured by grassland condition and livestock 
production. The social, economic and political settings considered refer to market forces, technological 
development and climate changes among other factors. The governance system relates to the specific 
rules for the use and management of China’s grasslands, including the land tenure reform studied in 
Chapters 3 and 4 and the Ecological Construction Programs studied in Chapter 5. In addition, the 
conflicts of different users over resource units, specifically the grassland area, are investigated in 
Chapter 2.  
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1.4.2 Sampling and data collection 
In Chapter 2, the analysis of optimal land allocation is based on a case study. The sample county, Tai 
Pusi County5, is a semi-pastoral county located in the eco-fragile region of Inner Mongolia, which has 
been characterised by economic backwardness and ecological degradation. The county covers different 
types of rural land and involves a variety of different stakeholders with divergent interests in rural land 
use. It is a typical region to investigate the conflicts of rural land allocation in China, reflected in the 
different preferences for grasslands by different stakeholders. For the data collection, interviews with 
the representatives of different types of stakeholders were conducted face to face to reveal their 
preference on land use, involving cultivated land, grassland, forest land and other rural land. The 
secondary data on socio-economic indicators was collected from statistics and reports from local 
governments.  
Chapters 3, 4 and 5 focus on policy evaluation. Panel data at county-level is used to answer the research 
questions. Policy interventions have occurred over different years and there are differences in the 
process of implementation among counties. These differences within and between counties are 
presented by the panel data. For the analysis of land tenure reform in Chapters 3 and 4, all of the counties 
of Inner Mongolia were considered as possible sample counties. After excluding the counties with 
invalid survey feedback, and after dropping the urbanised counties where changes in the grassland area 
can be attributed mainly to changes in land use types 60 counties are retained as the research sample, 
including 29 pastoral counties, 18 semi-pastoral counties and 13 crop farming counties6. The research 
period covers 1985-2008, spanning the main period for implementing land tenure reform on the 
grasslands of Inner Mongolia. For the analysis of Ecological Construction Programs in Chapter 5, all of 
the counties in the pastoral areas, including 33 pastoral counties and 21 semi-pastoral counties, were 
used   in the research sample. It should be noted that the crop-farming counties and urban districts are 
excluded from the research sample because they are not the typical regions included for the Ecological 
Construction Programs. This research period spans 14 years from 2001 to 2014, involving the years 
before and after the implementation of the specific Ecological Construction Program studied (i.e. the 
Subsidy and Incentive System for Grassland Conservation).  
In terms of the data collection for the policy evaluation, the required dataset includes four categories of 
information: the policy interventions, the grassland condition, the livestock production, and the socio-
economic and climate conditions. The information about policy interventions, such as the progress of 
land tenure reform and Ecological Construction Programs, was gathered based on the statistics and 
                                                 
5 Also named as Tai Pusi Qi in Chinese. 
6 The crop farming counties considered also have grasslands and experienced the same land tenure reform as the pastoral 
area. 
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reports from the provincial government as well as through questionnaires. The questionnaires were sent 
to the Animal Husbandry Bureau of each county and answered by local experts. In the second phase, 
interviews were conducted by telephone to confirm the answers that were received. Apart from the 
questionnaires, interviews were conducted with the officers working in the provincial institutes of 
Animal Husbandry of Inner Mongolia and with local herders to verify the information thoroughly. 
Remote sensing and GIS (geographic information system) were employed to obtain data about the 
grassland condition across extensive grasslands over a long period. The data on livestock production 
and socio-economic and climate factors was collected based on existing statistical data gathered by 
governments. 
1.4.3 Model selection 
In Chapter 2, the model for investigating the optimal land allocation is based on welfare economics, 
specifically utilising the utility function and social welfare function. The utility function presents the 
utilities of different stakeholders for land allocation based on their preference. The Analytic Hierarchy 
Process (AHP) is used to quantify the preference of stakeholders for different types of land. The social 
welfare function is derived based on the utility functions and the weights of stakeholders in land 
allocation, in which three scenarios are employed to estimate the weights. Ultimately, the divergences 
among individual optima derived from the utility functions, the social optimum derived from the social 
welfare function, and actual rural land allocation, illustrate the conflicts in preferences of different 
stakeholders regarding rural land use. 
Chapters 3, 4 and 5 employ panel data to dissect the effectiveness of policy interventions. The fixed 
effects model, which is used to study the causes of changes within an entity over time, is employed to 
conduct an empirical estimation. The fixed effects model has been widely used in economic research 
(e.g., Fergusson et al., 2002; Huan et al., 2006). Compared with the multiple regression model, the 
advantage of the fixed effects model is the control over unobserved fixed factors that could affect the 
estimation (Liu et al., 2010; Verbeek, 2012). Theoretically, the fixed effects model employs within 
transformation to remove all time-invariant (fixed) explanatory variables, i.e. the model is performed in 
deviations from individual means (Verbeek, 2012). As such, it provides a method that takes observable 
explanatory variables as well as unobservable time-invariant variables into account, but the estimation 
does not depend on the value of time-invariant (fixed) variables, such as soil nutrient levels, soil depth, 
slope steepness, geographical positions of grasslands, in the case of this study (Verbeek, 2012). In 
addition, the feasibility of the fixed effects model has been tested using statistical tests based on the 
specific dataset used in each chapter. 
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1.5 Contribution of the dissertation 
In general, given the challenge of grassland degradation and increasing demand on livestock production, 
this research makes a contribution to providing references for improving the policy interventions toward 
more sustainable use and management of grasslands. Moreover, this study provides an empirical 
analysis of SESs of grasslands in China based on the common framework introduced by Ostrom. The 
research findings can be used in other studies that employ the same framework regarding different 
countries and different disciplines. This research hopes to increase the knowledge needed to enhance 
the sustainability of complex SESs of grasslands, as well as the understanding of the transformation of 
traditional pastoralism.  
This research systematically discusses the major policy interventions for the use and management of 
grasslands in China, and further evaluates their effectiveness for the grassland condition and livestock 
production. The policy evaluation essentially presents the outcomes of government-driven 
transformation of traditional pastoralism in China. Although the transformation of pastoralism and the 
specific effects of the policy interventions on grassland systems have been investigated by governments 
and scholars (e.g. Li and Zhang, 2009; Li et al., 2014; Hua and Squires, 2015), there is a lack of studies 
providing quantitative and empirical analysis based on large-scale areas and long-term observation. As 
such, remote sensing and county-level statistics are combined for this research, the dataset of which 
involves the extensive grasslands of Inner Mongolia and spans decades. Economic models are employed 
to evaluate changes in grassland systems, targeting the specific policy interventions. This makes it 
possible to disentangle the policy effectiveness and control for the potential impacts of climate, socio-
economic factors and time trend on the grassland system. This provides an example of the combined 
use of remote sensing and economics for academic research. In addition, the different preferences of 
different stakeholders for grassland use under the existing policy intervention is qualified based on 
utility functions. The specific relevance of each chapter is explained next. 
Chapter 2 presents the preference of different stakeholders for land allocation, and thus mirrors the 
different perceptions on grassland use. The novel contribution is the methodology, which combines 
welfare economics, the method Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) and scenario analysis. Although the 
outcomes are based on a specific case, the methodology is generic and likely to be valid for measuring 
conflicts between stakeholders over land use in other regions. The results provide interesting insights 
that can help to steer future land-use policies considering the different economic and ecological interests 
of different stakeholders.  
Chapter 3 and 4 illustrate the progress of land tenure reform in the pastoral areas of China and investigate 
the results of privatisation of grasslands on grassland condition and livestock production when other 
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factors are controlled for. These chapters provide some references to academic debates over the 
transformation of pastoralism, or grassland privatisation instead of communal tenure. The policy 
evaluation is conducted based on panel data which considers the spatial and temporal differences of 
policy implementation. Moreover, the existing literature about grassland privatisation concentrates on 
impacts on the grassland ecosystem, but there is a lack of research referring to the impact on local 
livestock production, examined here in Chapter 4. In this regard, despite the unreliability of official 
statistics on livestock, these research findings are useful for detecting general trends, if not specific 
numbers. 
Chapter 5 summarises the Ecological Construction Programs in pastoral areas of China, and explains 
why the actual grassland degradation has not been prevented as effectively as expected. Based on the 
research results, this chapter points out the potential for improving grassland conservation policies. 
Moreover, it provides the empirical evidence for the scientific debate about the equilibrium model and 
the non-equilibrium model regarding deterministic or stochastic stocking rates. 
1.6 Organization of the dissertation 
This dissertation has six chapters, including a general introduction (Chapter 1), four research chapters 
that focus on the research objective of this dissertation (Chapter 2, 3, 4 and 5), and a general discussion 
(Chapter 6). The research scheme of the four research chapters is presented in Figure 1.4.  
 
Figure 1.4 The research scheme of the four research chapters 
Under the conceptual framework for analysing SESs of grasslands adapted from Ostrom’s framework, 
the four research chapters elaborate on the outcomes of the governance system over the grassland system 
and its users. Specifically, Chapters 3 and 4 explore the impacts of land tenure reform (grassland 
privatisation) on grassland degradation and livestock production, which presents the outcomes of policy 
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interventions for the grassland system. As previously defined, the grassland system in this research 
includes grassland conditions as well as livestock production. Grassland degradation is presented by 
grassland area and quality. Livestock production is indicated by livestock population and meat output. 
Chapter 5 examines the effectiveness of Ecological Construction Programs on grassland conservation, 
which presents the outcome of particular rules for the use and management of grassland resource units. 
In addition, Chapter 2 focuses on investigating the preference over land use by different users under 
existing social, economic, and political settings. The preference over grassland use is influenced by 
policies as well as by the outcomes of policy interventions over grassland systems, which is indicated 
by dashed lines in Figure 1.4. Another significant question marked by the long dashed lines is the effect 
of Ecological Construction Programs on livestock production, which will not be covered by this research 
but which is an appropriate candidate for future research. It should be noted that the main period for the 
implementation of land tenure reform in China is between the 1980s and 1990s, which predates the wide 
implementation of the Ecological Construction Programs since around 2000. It is assumed that this 
indication allows us to distinguish these two major policies as well as their main impacts by focusing 
on different research periods. 
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2. RURAL LAND ALLOCATION IN ECO-FRAGILE REGIONS OF NORTHERN CHINA7 
 
ABSTRACT: This paper takes a welfare economics perspective to study rural land allocation in eco-
fragile regions of northern China and explores the trade-off between stakeholder preferences over the 
economic and ecological benefits of rural land use. The preference of different stakeholder groups for 
various types of land is quantified by the Analytic Hierarchy Process, and the individual and social 
optimum of the allocation of land are investigated using stakeholder utility functions and the social 
welfare function. Our results show the conflicting views of different stakeholder groups and the 
potential equilibrium in the allocation of rural land under different scenarios. 
KEYWORDS:  rural land allocation, individual optima, social optima 
 
  
                                                 
7 Paper by Min Liu, Wim Heijman, Xueqin Zhu, Liesbeth Dries, and Jikun Huang. Rangeland Journal. doi: 
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2.1 Introduction 
There is increased pressure on rural land use in many parts of the world (Petit, 2009; Williams and 
Schirmer, 2012). As a result of economic development, technological progress, environmental change 
and policy and market forces, the total area of rural land is decreasing worldwide (Liu et al., 2010; 
Verburg et al., 2008). This raises the question of how to efficiently allocate the decreasing amount of 
rural land, particularly for a populous country such as China. As a basic production factor, rural land is 
used for production and subsistence to satisfy immediate human needs for food, fuel, and ecosystem 
services (DeFries et al., 2007; Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2003). On the other hand, its 
multifunctional role has also triggered land use divergence and conflicts because of differing land use 
targets among stakeholders (Barker and Selman, 1990; Rambonilaza and Dachary-Bernard, 2007; Yang 
et al., 2012; Pacione, 2013). This paper investigates the optimal allocation of rural land taking into 
account the ecological and economic benefits for different stakeholders in society. 
Changes in rural land use are not only attributed to micro-level household decisions on land use, but are 
also affected by national or macro-level land use strategies. For example, in China, several national 
programs have been introduced since the 1990s that attempt to steer rural land allocation in order to 
satisfy not only human needs for economic development but also the provision of ecosystem services. 
One of the main programs is the Sloping Land Conversion Program (SLCP, also known as the ‘Grain 
for Green’ program), initiated by the Chinese central government in 2000 in order to convert sloping 
cropland into forest or grassland (Liu et al., 2010). Such national programs that are directed at ecological 
conservation, may constrain the economic activities of local residents, while the majority of rural 
households in China rely on rural land for their livelihoods and economic benefits. As such, rural land 
use change associated with economic development and ecological conservation inevitably results in 
land use conflicts among different stakeholders. 
These problems are particularly severe in eco-fragile regions where ecological issues and collective 
impoverishment are causing serious land use conflicts in the process of rural land use change. This is 
reflected in overgrazing, poor implementation of eco-environmental policies, deforestation, soil erosion 
and ecosystem deterioration. One fifth of the territory of China is identified as eco-fragile regions facing 
such problems (Yuan et al., 2011). In this paper, we therefore focus on land use change and conflicts in 
the farming-grazing transitional zone in the eco-fragile regions in northern China. 
Optimal rural land allocation can be studied either from the macro perspective referring to the global or 
regional social-economic situation, or from the perspective of land use decisions at the rural household 
level. The scientific research on land use and land cover change has received increased attention since 
the 1990s because of prominent problems due to population growth, overuse of natural resources and 
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environmental deterioration (Turner Ii et al., 1993; Qasim et al., 2013). Most research has focused on 
analysing the land cover dynamics using remote sensing data (Turner Ii et al., 1994; Zhan et al., 2007) 
and the driving forces of land use change based on qualitative analysis, econometrics or game theory 
(Angelsen, 2001). Others have tried to determine an optimal landscape (Heijman and Mouche, 2013). 
The current paper will add to the existing literature by using a welfare economics perspective to 
investigate the equilibrium of rural land allocation, taking into account the interplay between ecological 
and economic demand. In other words, we will study the optimal rural land allocation based on the 
trade-offs between economic development and ecological conservation as seen by different stakeholders. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. First, we present a conceptual framework of 
stakeholder interaction in rural land use decisions. Different stakeholder groups are identified based on 
various land use targets. Next, we derive the theoretical model starting with the utility function and 
preferences over desired rural land allocation for each stakeholder group. The optimisation of rural land 
allocation in terms of the benefits to society is explored by deriving the welfare function. This approach 
is in line with other studies that have modelled environmental problems through welfare analysis 
(Gerlagh and Keyzer, 2004; Gerlagha and Keyzer, 2003; Zhu, 2004). In the empirical part of the paper, 
we first describe the data collection methodology. The Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) is used to 
quantify the preference of each stakeholder group for different types of land. The optimal land allocation 
is derived based on these preferences and different scenarios concerning the weights that are assigned 
to each stakeholder group in the social welfare function. The paper concludes with a discussion on the 
differences between existing rural land use policies and the socially optimal allocation as studied in this 
paper.       
2.2 Conceptual framework 
To understand the complex relationships in the process of rural land use allocation, we use the concept 
of social-ecological systems (SESs). SESs represent complex adaptive systems in which social and 
biophysical agents are interacting at multiple temporal and spatial scales (Levin et al., 2013). Ostrom 
(2007; 2010) introduced a diagnostic framework for the study of complex social-ecological systems, 
considering the resource units, resource system, governance system and users as four core subsystems 
to link social, economic and regulatory settings and related ecosystems (Ostrom, 2009). This has 
enabled researchers to develop a common language that crosses social and ecological disciplines to 
analyse how interactions among a variety of factors affect outcomes. On the basis of Ostrom’s 
framework, this paper focuses attention on the influence of the relationship between the governance 
system and users on the outcome of rural land use. Figure 2.1 demonstrates the analytical framework in 
this context. 
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Figure 2.1 The framework for analysing the interaction between different stakeholders8 
In the process of rural land allocation, the governance system is represented by the rules and regulations 
set at the level of the government to regulate rural land management for ecological conservation and 
economic development. Public authorities implement the specific rules related to rural land use. Rural 
households, as the users of the rural land, are affected directly by these rules in terms of land use 
decisions for subsistence, production or recreation. In this paper, we assume that public authorities and 
rural households are the social agents in the social-ecological systems of rural land use. Public 
authorities are divided into public actors with an economic objective (focusing on economic 
development) and public actors with an ecological objective (focusing on the conservation of natural 
resources for current and future generations). This is a simplified representation of reality which 
assumes that these public objectives can be separated. Among the private stakeholders we distinguish 
between farmers, who engage in both crop production and animal husbandry, and herders, who are 
solely dependent on the use of grasslands for livestock production. As such, we divide the social agents 
into four stakeholder groups, namely herders, farmers, ecological public authority and economic public 
authority.  
In the next sections, we investigate the optimal land allocation based on the trade-offs between 
ecological conservation and economic development among different stakeholders. Specifically, we 
analyse the individual and social optimum of rural land allocation. The optimum is based on the different 
                                                 
8  We follow the rural land classification by AQSIQ (General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and 
Quarantine of the People's Republic of China) whereby rural land is divided into cultivated land, forest land, rangeland and 
other rural land (such as land used for raising animals, agricultural facilities, agricultural roads, pit-ponds, fishponds, 
irrigation, drying grains and forming ridges among croplands) according to the functions of land use in 2002. 
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preferences of each stakeholder group as to the rural land value with a combination of diverse land 
functions, such as various degrees of economic function, ecological function and social function from 
the cultivated land, rangeland, forest land and other rural land. We describe the role of each stakeholder 
group in the allocation of rural land as follows: the local ecological public authority aims at protecting 
the regional ecosystem on behalf of the national government and social ecological demand, the 
economic public authority achieves the local government’s targets for local economic development, and 
farmers and herders rely on the land for their agricultural production. The herders graze their animals 
on the rangeland, while the farmers rely primarily on the cultivated land. Section 3 will present the 
theoretical model which formalizes the conceptual framework.  
2.3 Model specification 
According to welfare economics, different agents have different demands on the consumption of various 
goods/services. This has led to the study of individual utility and social welfare optimisation for 
combinations of different goods characteristics (Heijman and Mouche, 2013; Perman et al., 2011). In 
our research context, we consider a hypothetical society consisting of four individuals and four goods. 
More specifically, the four individuals represent the four stakeholder groups (herders, farmers, 
ecological public authority and economic public authority), and the four sets of goods are cultivated 
land, rangeland, forest land and other rural land. The four stakeholder groups derive utility from 
consumption of the four types of land. A Cobb–Douglas form of utility function is used to investigate 
individual utility and social welfare. The Cobb–Douglas utility function has been applied in previous 
research to study the optimal consumption, leisure, investment and voluntary retirement problem for an 
agent (e.g. Koo et al., 2013), the trade-off between goods and leisure (e.g. Train and McFadden, 1978), 
the ecological discount rate (e.g. Gollier, 2010) and a typical low-rent housing lessees' welfare model 
(e.g. Wu et al., 2012). It is an appropriate method to investigate the individual and social optimum in 
utilitarianism, as studied here. 
2.3.1 The utility function of each stakeholder group 
In this section, the individual optimum is derived through the utility function of each stakeholder group. 
As with any resource, the allocation of land may be considered optimal when the aggregate social 
returns from its various uses are maximised (Lopez et al., 1994). Here, we will consider the economic 
and ecological uses of rural land by each stakeholder group in order to investigate their utility. 
Considering that the target of stakeholder group i is to maximise its utility (Ui) subject to land constraints, 
the utility function in the Cobb-Douglas form is, 
௜ܷ ൌ ݈௖௨௟ሺ௜ሻ௔೔ ݈௥௔௡ሺ௜ሻ௕೔ ݈௙௢௥ሺ௜ሻ௖೔ ݈௢௧௛ሺ௜ሻௗ೔ ǡሺͳሻ 
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    ൌ ͳǡ ʹǡ ͵Ͷ  represent the four stakeholder groups: herders, farmers, ecological public 
authority and economic public authority, respectively.  ݈௖௨௟ሺ௜ሻ is the area of the cultivated land which is 
allocated by stakeholder group i for crop production.  ݈௚௥௔ሺ௜ሻ is the area of the rangeland allocated by 
stakeholder group i for grazing animals and fulfilling an ecological protection function. ݈௙௢௥ሺ௜ሻ is the 
area of the forest land demanded by stakeholder group i. ݈௢௧௛ሺ௜ሻ is  the area of the rest of the rural land 
arranged by stakeholder group i. ܽ௜ǡ ܾ௜ǡ ܿ௜ܽ݊݀݀௜ are the utility elasticities of stakeholder group i on 
land allocation among the cultivated land, rangeland, forest land and other rural land. The land 
constraint is as follows: 
݈௖௨௟ሺ௜ሻ ൅ ݈௥௔௡ሺ௜ሻ ൅ ݈௙௢௥ሺ௜ሻ ൅ ݈௢௧௛ሺ௜ሻ ൌ ܮǡሺʹሻ 
ݓ݅ݐ݄݈௖௨௟ሺ௜ሻǡ ݈௥௔௡ሺ௜ሻǡ ݈௙௢௥ሺ௜ሻǡ ݈௢௧௛ሺ௜ሻ ൒ ͲǢ Ͳ ൑ ܽ௜ǡ ܾ௜ǡ ܿ௜ǡ ݀௜ ൑ ͳǢܽ௜ ൅ ܾ௜ ൅ ܿ௜ ൅ ݀௜ ൌ ͳǤ 
where L is the total area of the rural land in the research region. Equation (2) illustrates that the sum of 
the cultivated land, rangeland, forest land and other rural land equals the total area of rural land. To find 
the individual optimum of land allocation, we maximise the utility functions (see Appendix 2-A for the 
detailed derivation). With the help of the Lagrange optimisation procedure this gives: 
݈௖௨௟ሺ௜ሻ଴ ൌ ܽ௜ ൈ ܮǡሺ͵ሻ 
݈௥௔௡ሺ௜ሻ଴ ൌ ܾ௜ ൈ ܮǡሺͶሻ 
݈௙௢௥ሺ௜ሻ଴ ൌ ܿ௜ ൈ ܮǡሺͷሻ 
݈௢௧௛ሺ௜ሻ଴ ൌ ݀௜ ൈ ܮǤሺ͸ሻ 
݈௖௨௟ሺ௜ሻ଴ ǡ ݈௥௔௡ሺ௜ሻ଴ ǡ ݈௙௢௥ሺ௜ሻ଴ ܽ݊݀݈௢௧௛ሺ௜ሻ଴ are the resulting individual optima of stakeholder group i,  indicating 
the individually rational optimum depending on the preference of stakeholder group i for rural land use 
and taking into account land constraints. 
2.3.2 The social welfare function  
Bergson and Samuelson introduced the social welfare function, which sums up the utility functions of 
all the individuals in the society (Pollak, 1979). We assume that the four stakeholder groups represent 
all of the social agents of land use in the eco-fragile regions, therefore our social welfare function is 
presented by the configuration of the four stakeholder groups’ utilities, subject to land constraints. Based 
on the utility functions of each stakeholder group, the Cobb-Douglas form of the social welfare function 
is: 
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preferences of each stakeholder group as to the rural land value with a combination of diverse land 
functions, such as various degrees of economic function, ecological function and social function from 
the cultivated land, rangeland, forest land and other rural land. We describe the role of each stakeholder 
group in the allocation of rural land as follows: the local ecological public authority aims at protecting 
the regional ecosystem on behalf of the national government and social ecological demand, the 
economic public authority achieves the local government’s targets for local economic development, and 
farmers and herders rely on the land for their agricultural production. The herders graze their animals 
on the rangeland, while the farmers rely primarily on the cultivated land. Section 3 will present the 
theoretical model which formalizes the conceptual framework.  
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the ecological discount rate (e.g. Gollier, 2010) and a typical low-rent housing lessees' welfare model 
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utilitarianism, as studied here. 
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Considering that the target of stakeholder group i is to maximise its utility (Ui) subject to land constraints, 
the utility function in the Cobb-Douglas form is, 
௜ܷ ൌ ݈௖௨௟ሺ௜ሻ௔೔ ݈௥௔௡ሺ௜ሻ௕೔ ݈௙௢௥ሺ௜ሻ௖೔ ݈௢௧௛ሺ௜ሻௗ೔ ǡሺͳሻ 
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    ൌ ͳǡ ʹǡ ͵Ͷ  represent the four stakeholder groups: herders, farmers, ecological public 
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݈௖௨௟ሺ௜ሻ ൅ ݈௥௔௡ሺ௜ሻ ൅ ݈௙௢௥ሺ௜ሻ ൅ ݈௢௧௛ሺ௜ሻ ൌ ܮǡሺʹሻ 
ݓ݅ݐ݄݈௖௨௟ሺ௜ሻǡ ݈௥௔௡ሺ௜ሻǡ ݈௙௢௥ሺ௜ሻǡ ݈௢௧௛ሺ௜ሻ ൒ ͲǢ Ͳ ൑ ܽ௜ǡ ܾ௜ǡ ܿ௜ǡ ݀௜ ൑ ͳǢܽ௜ ൅ ܾ௜ ൅ ܿ௜ ൅ ݀௜ ൌ ͳǤ 
where L is the total area of the rural land in the research region. Equation (2) illustrates that the sum of 
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݈௖௨௟ሺ௜ሻ଴ ǡ ݈௥௔௡ሺ௜ሻ଴ ǡ ݈௙௢௥ሺ௜ሻ଴ ܽ݊݀݈௢௧௛ሺ௜ሻ଴ are the resulting individual optima of stakeholder group i,  indicating 
the individually rational optimum depending on the preference of stakeholder group i for rural land use 
and taking into account land constraints. 
2.3.2 The social welfare function  
Bergson and Samuelson introduced the social welfare function, which sums up the utility functions of 
all the individuals in the society (Pollak, 1979). We assume that the four stakeholder groups represent 
all of the social agents of land use in the eco-fragile regions, therefore our social welfare function is 
presented by the configuration of the four stakeholder groups’ utilities, subject to land constraints. Based 
on the utility functions of each stakeholder group, the Cobb-Douglas form of the social welfare function 
is: 
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ܹ ൌෑ ௜ܷఉ೔
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subject to: 
݈௖௨௟ሺ௦ሻ ൅ ݈௥௔௡ሺ௦ሻ ൅ ݈௙௢௥ሺ௦ሻ ൅ ݈௢௧௛ሺ௦ሻ ൌ ܮǡሺͺሻ 
ݓ݅ݐ݄ σ ߚ௜ସ௜ୀଵ ൌ ͳܽ݊݀ߚ௜ ൒ Ͳ , ݈௖௨௟ሺ௦ሻǡ ݈௥௔௡ሺ௦ሻǡ ݈௙௢௥ሺ௦ሻǡ ݈௢௧௛ሺ௦ሻ ൒ Ͳ, 
where W is the social welfare, ݈௖௨௟ሺ௦ሻǡ ݈௥௔௡ሺ௦ሻǡ ݈௙௢௥ሺ௦ሻǡ ݈௢௧௛ሺ௦ሻare the areas of cultivated land, rangeland, 
forestland and other rural land in the society. ଵܷǡ ܷଶǡ ܷଷܽ݊݀ܷସ are the utilities of herders, farmers, 
ecological public authority and economic public authority respectively based on the social land 
allocation. ߚ௜ is the welfare weight of stakeholder group i in the society. 
To find the socially optimal land allocation, we maximise the social welfare function (see Appendix 2-
B for the detailed derivation). This gives: 
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݈௖௨௟ሺ௦ሻכ ǡ ݈௥௔௡ሺ௦ሻכ ǡ ݈௙௢௥ሺ௦ሻכ ܽ݊݀݈௢௧௛ሺ௦ሻכ  are the resulting socially optimal rural land allocations, which 
illustrates the optimum for social welfare based on the preferences on land use and welfare weights of 
each stakeholder group in the society.  
2.4 Research region and data collection 
An empirical application of the above theoretical model was conducted in Tai Pusi County, located in 
the eco-fragile region in the mixed farming zone in northern China. Tai Pusi faces both economic 
backwardness and ecological degradation (Chen, 2007) and is on the southern edge of Otindag Sandy 
Land, the nearest crucial sand source of sandstorms in Beijing. Its ecosystem plays a significant role in 
preventing sandstorms from reaching Beijing and various eco-environmental policies with restrictive 
land use are implemented here. Tai Pusi is one of the poverty-stricken counties of China and two thirds 
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of local rural households’ income is derived from agricultural production. Its total population is 211,146, 
and there are 171,500 and 39,646 residents living in rural and urban areas, respectively. Rural residents 
include 168,514 farmers and 2,986 herders. Tai Pusi County’s total area measures 341,473 hectares, 
including 322,100 hectares of rural land, 14,613 hectares of urban and industrial land and 4,760 hectares 
of unused land. Figure 2.2 presents the 7 townships of Tai Pusi County. The townships are divided into 
pasture area and agricultural area because of different natural and social factors. In the pasture area, 
where the herders are living, the local livelihoods depend primarily on grazing and very few herders 
engage in crop farming. The farmers living in the agricultural area are involved in both crop farming 
and livestock breeding, but only with pen grazing due to the limitation of a strict policy that bans grazing 
since 2008. In recent years, with increasing population and eco-environmental policies, conflicts on 
rural land use among local farmers, herders and the government have intensified.  
 
Figure 2.2 The eco-fragile regions in northern China (left) and Tai Pusi County (right) 
Source: Ouyang (2013) and Farming and Grazing Bureau, Tai Pusi County. 
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B for the detailed derivation). This gives: 
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and there are 171,500 and 39,646 residents living in rural and urban areas, respectively. Rural residents 
include 168,514 farmers and 2,986 herders. Tai Pusi County’s total area measures 341,473 hectares, 
including 322,100 hectares of rural land, 14,613 hectares of urban and industrial land and 4,760 hectares 
of unused land. Figure 2.2 presents the 7 townships of Tai Pusi County. The townships are divided into 
pasture area and agricultural area because of different natural and social factors. In the pasture area, 
where the herders are living, the local livelihoods depend primarily on grazing and very few herders 
engage in crop farming. The farmers living in the agricultural area are involved in both crop farming 
and livestock breeding, but only with pen grazing due to the limitation of a strict policy that bans grazing 
since 2008. In recent years, with increasing population and eco-environmental policies, conflicts on 
rural land use among local farmers, herders and the government have intensified.  
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Figure 2.3 shows the change of the cultivated land, forestland, rangeland and other rural land in Tai Pusi 
County from 1995 to 2009.  
 
Figure 2.3 The dynamic change of rural land use in Tai Pusi County9 
Source: Land Resources Bureau, Tai Pusi County.  
The largest proportion of rural land has always been represented by rangeland, with cultivated land in 
second position and other rural land in the last position. In general, rural land use change has occurred, 
but has had little effect on the order of the dominant land use type. The total area of rural land is 
decreasing slightly and transitions of land use between cultivated land, rangeland, forest land and other 
rural land are clearly observable. The area of rangeland decreased rapidly during 2007 and 2008 after a 
smooth decrease between 2002 and 2006. The area of cultivated land decreased from 1999 until 2008, 
while conversely, the area of forest land area started increasing from 1999 with a sharp growth in 2002 
and 2003.                                                            
2.5 Estimation of the model parameters 
2.5.1 The parameters ࢇ࢏ǡ ࢈࢏ǡ ࢉ࢏ǡ ܉ܖ܌ࢊ࢏ 
Parameters ܽ௜ǡ ܾ௜ǡ ܿ௜ܽ݊݀݀௜  are the utility elasticities of stakeholder group i on cultivated land, 
rangeland, forest land and other rural land. Interviews with key informants and stakeholder 
representatives were done to assess their preferences. Interviewees included 15 herders, 15 farmers, 6 
representatives for the economic public authority and 6 for the ecological public authority10. From 30 
public authorities in charge of local affairs in Tai Pusi County, the Local Finance Bureau and the 
Farming and Grazing bureau were selected as the public authorities for economic affairs, since they pay 
more attention to local economic development than other departments. Similarly, the Environmental 
                                                 
9 Note that garden plots are included in the category of cultivated land as their area is relatively small in the research 
region. 
10 We believe that a limited number of interviewees per stakeholder group is sufficient to determine the parameter estimates 
because the variance in interviewee responses was very small (see Appendix 2-C for details).    
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Protection Agency and the Forestry Bureau represent the ecological public authorities. Based on the 
interviews, the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) is employed to evaluate the weight values of  
ܽ௜ǡ ܾ௜ǡ ܿ௜݀௜ (see Appendix 2-C for the different steps in the AHP process). AHP, introduced by 
Thomas Saaty (1980), is one of the most effective tools for dealing with complex decision-making. A 
large number of studies in different fields have been published based on AHP, such as planning, resource 
allocation, conflict resolution and optimisation (Vaidya and Kumar, 2006). The values of parameters 
ܽ௜ǡ ܾ௜ǡ ܿ௜݀௜ that we derived using AHP are shown in Table 2.1. 
Table 2.1 Values of parameters ܽ௜ǡ ܾ௜ǡ ܿ௜ܽ݊݀݀௜ 
 Cultivated land Rangeland Forest land Other rural land Total  
Herders 0.2084 0.5286 0.1606 0.1024 1 
Farmers  0.4317 0.2695 0.2202 0.0786 1 
Ecological 
public authority 
0.2121 0.3173 0.3746 0.0960 1 
Economic public 
authority 
0.4304 0.3134 0.1154 0.1409 1 
2.5.2 The welfare weight ሺࢼ࢏ሻ 
The social welfare weight ߚ௜ will be calculated for three scenarios. 
Scenario 1: ߚ௜ is considered equal for all four stakeholder groups. The prevailing practice in choosing 
social welfare weights is to pick the utilitarian weights (Yang and Nordhaus, 2006). Following this 
approach we assume that each stakeholder group has the same weight in the social welfare function, i.e. 
ߚଵ ൌ ߚଶ ൌ ߚଷ ൌ ߚସ ൌ ͳȀͶ. This scenario is considered the scenario of social fairness in land allocation. 
Scenario 2: ߚ௜ is considered as the Negishi weight, introduced by Negishi (1972). In this scenario, the 
social welfare function is maximized using a weighted sum of individual utilities with constant weights 
that add up to one across the population. In other words, everyone in the equilibrium of Negishi format 
will be at the maximum level of utility subject to their initial endowments (Stanton, 2011). Furthermore, 
Manne and Rutherford (1994) interpreted the equilibrium values of the Negishi weights as the shares in 
the global endowment of economic resources. Zhu and van Ierland (2006) showed that the Negishi 
weight is the income share of each region in the total economy if the Cobb-Douglas utility function is 
used. Here, we use the income share of each stakeholder group in the total income as its Negishi weight 
ߚ௜. Specifically, the total income of the farmers/herders is the population of farmers/herders multiplied 
by the average net income of farmers/herders in 2012. Similarly,ߚଷܽ݊݀ߚସ depend on the income of 
the economic public authority and ecological public authority, respectively. In terms of the income of 
the public authorities, a proxy income is employed. That is, assuming that the local government balances 
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Figure 2.3 shows the change of the cultivated land, forestland, rangeland and other rural land in Tai Pusi 
County from 1995 to 2009.  
 
Figure 2.3 The dynamic change of rural land use in Tai Pusi County9 
Source: Land Resources Bureau, Tai Pusi County.  
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because the variance in interviewee responses was very small (see Appendix 2-C for details).    
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Protection Agency and the Forestry Bureau represent the ecological public authorities. Based on the 
interviews, the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) is employed to evaluate the weight values of  
ܽ௜ǡ ܾ௜ǡ ܿ௜݀௜ (see Appendix 2-C for the different steps in the AHP process). AHP, introduced by 
Thomas Saaty (1980), is one of the most effective tools for dealing with complex decision-making. A 
large number of studies in different fields have been published based on AHP, such as planning, resource 
allocation, conflict resolution and optimisation (Vaidya and Kumar, 2006). The values of parameters 
ܽ௜ǡ ܾ௜ǡ ܿ௜݀௜ that we derived using AHP are shown in Table 2.1. 
Table 2.1 Values of parameters ܽ௜ǡ ܾ௜ǡ ܿ௜ܽ݊݀݀௜ 
 Cultivated land Rangeland Forest land Other rural land Total  
Herders 0.2084 0.5286 0.1606 0.1024 1 
Farmers  0.4317 0.2695 0.2202 0.0786 1 
Ecological 
public authority 
0.2121 0.3173 0.3746 0.0960 1 
Economic public 
authority 
0.4304 0.3134 0.1154 0.1409 1 
2.5.2 The welfare weight ሺࢼ࢏ሻ 
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ߚଵ ൌ ߚଶ ൌ ߚଷ ൌ ߚସ ൌ ͳȀͶ. This scenario is considered the scenario of social fairness in land allocation. 
Scenario 2: ߚ௜ is considered as the Negishi weight, introduced by Negishi (1972). In this scenario, the 
social welfare function is maximized using a weighted sum of individual utilities with constant weights 
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will be at the maximum level of utility subject to their initial endowments (Stanton, 2011). Furthermore, 
Manne and Rutherford (1994) interpreted the equilibrium values of the Negishi weights as the shares in 
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weight is the income share of each region in the total economy if the Cobb-Douglas utility function is 
used. Here, we use the income share of each stakeholder group in the total income as its Negishi weight 
ߚ௜. Specifically, the total income of the farmers/herders is the population of farmers/herders multiplied 
by the average net income of farmers/herders in 2012. Similarly,ߚଷܽ݊݀ߚସ depend on the income of 
the economic public authority and ecological public authority, respectively. In terms of the income of 
the public authorities, a proxy income is employed. That is, assuming that the local government balances 
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its real income and expenditure, the eco-environmental expenditures on rural land are equivalent to the 
income of the ecological public authority from the rural land, and the economic expenditures on local 
rural residents are equivalent to the income of the economic public authority from the rural land. 
Scenario 3: ߚ௜  is considered as the working population share of stakeholder group i, which is to 
investigate the optimal land allocation from the perspective of the employment structure in the society.  
Values of ߚ௜ in the three scenarios are shown in Table 2.2 (see Appendix 2-D for more details). 
Table 2.2 Values of  ߚ௜ in three scenarios 
 Scenario 1 
(Ⱦ୧) 
Scenario 2 
(Ⱦ୧) 
Scenario 3 
(Ⱦ୧) 
Herders 0.25 0.01 0.03 
Farmers 0.25 0.53 0.86 
Ecological public authority 0.25 0.04 0.00 
Economic public authority 0.25 0.42 0.10 
Total  1 1 1 
2.6 Results       
2.6.1 Land use conflicts among stakeholder groups  
We find the local optima of each stakeholder group on land allocation according to the individual 
preferences and stakeholder utility functions. The actual total area of rural land in 2009 was used as the 
maximum rural land availability in the study region (322,261 hectares).  
Table 2.3 Optimal rural land allocation according to each stakeholder group and actual allocation in 
2009 (103 hectares) 
 Cultivated land Rangeland Forest land Other rural land Total  
Herders 67.2 170.3 51.8 33 322.3 
Farmers  139.1 86.8 71.1 25.3 322.3 
Ecological public authority 68.4 102.3 120.7 30.9 322.3 
Economic public authority 138.7 101 37.2 45.4 322.3 
Actual allocation in 2009 94.7 158.1 62.4 7.1 322.3 
The results in Table 2.3 present the conflicts among stakeholder groups on rural land use. The herders 
have a strong preference for rangeland, while farmers have more of an interest in cultivated land and a 
lesser interest in rangeland. The ecological public authority pays more attention to the rangeland and 
forest land as they have more of an ecological function. Cultivated land and rangeland are also favoured 
by the economic public authority. Compared to the actual allocation in 2009 we observe large 
differences to the local optima. This indicates the differences between the actual allocation and the 
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aspirations of stakeholders. In the following section, we explore the equilibrium in land allocation based 
on social welfare optimisation under three scenarios. 
2.6.2 The optimal social allocation 
According to the three scenarios on welfare weight ߚ௜, we identified the optimal rural land allocation in 
eco-fragile regions from the social welfare perspective. The results are shown in Table 2.4. 
Table 2.4 Socially optimal land allocation under three scenarios and actual allocation in 2009 (103 
hectares) 
Land allocation Cultivated 
land 
Rangeland Forest land Other rural land Total  
Scenario 1 
(Ⱦ୧) 
103.3 115.1 70.2 33.7 322.3 
Scenario 2 
(Ⱦ୧) 
135.4 94.3 58.5 34.1 322.3 
Scenario 3 
(Ⱦ୧) 
136.7 90.9 67.1 27.6 322.3 
Optimal range 103.3--136.7 90.9--115.1 58.5--70.2 27.6--34.1  
Actual allocation in 2009 94.7 158.1 62.4 7.1 322.3 
Considering the welfare weight as the income share of each stakeholder group (scenario 2), cultivated 
land has much more weight than the other three types of land, a result which is similar to the one in 
scenario 3. However, the demand for rangeland is higher than for cultivated land if we give equal weight 
to every stakeholder group (scenario 1), and also the demand for forest land is larger than in the other 
scenarios. The optimal range is based on the minimum and maximum in the scenarios as the lower and 
upper bound, in which the highest demand by the society is on the cultivated land and rangeland, 
followed by forest land, and finally other rural land. Comparing the actual allocation in 2009 with the 
optimal range, all types of rural land are out of the optimal range except the forest land. In addition, the 
mean of the optimal range is highest for cultivated land while the actual allocation tends most towards 
rangeland. 
2.6.3 Comparison of individual optimum, social optimum and actual land allocation 
Table 2.5 presents an overview of the above results. It shows the individual optimum for the four 
stakeholder groups, the social optimum and the actual situation in rural land allocation, all as the share 
of each rural land type in total rural land. Comparing the results within each type of land, we see that 
the individual optimal shares of cultivated land are outside of the socially optimal range. Herders and 
the ecological public authority wish to allocate less land for cultivation, while farmers and the economic 
public authority want to allocate more land for cultivation. Preferences for rangeland are largely within 
the socially optimal range except for farmers who would like to see less rangeland and herders who 
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prefer a much larger share of rangeland than what is socially optimal. Unsurprisingly, the ecological 
public authority would want to allocate much more land for forestry. The actual land allocation in the 
research region is outside of the socially optimal range for each of the land types except for forest land. 
Land allocation based on social optimisation would increase the area of cultivated land and decrease 
the area of rangeland. 
Table 2.5 Shares of rural land allocated to cultivated land, rangeland, forest land and other rural land 
in different situations 
 Cultivated land Rangeland Forest land Other rural 
land 
Total  
Herders optimal 
allocation 
20.9% 52.8% 16.1% 10.2% 100% 
Farmers optimal 
allocation 
43.2% 26.9% 22.0% 7.8% 100% 
Ecological public 
authority optimal 
allocation 
21.2% 31.7% 37.4% 9.6% 100% 
Economic public 
authority optimal 
allocation 
43.0% 31.3% 11.5% 14.1% 100% 
The socially optimal 
range 
32.1%--42.4% 28.2%--35.7% 18.2%--21.8% 8.6%--10.6%  
Actual share in 2009 29.4% 49.1% 19.4% 2.2% 100% 
2.7 Conclusion 
This paper takes a welfare economics perspective to investigate current land use conflicts and socially 
optimal land allocation. Optimisation based on individual utility functions and AHP reveals land use 
conflicts among stakeholders due to heterogeneous preferences for different types of land. By 
optimising the social welfare function, using different welfare weights, we derive the socially optimal 
range of land allocation. Comparing our empirical results with current land allocation over different 
land types, we find that a socially optimal land allocation would require a shift towards more cultivated 
land and less rangeland. 
These results should be put in the Chinese policy context. Since the 1990s, the Chinese government has 
shown increased interest in extending the area of forest land and rangeland for ecosystem protection 
purposes. Programs such as the SLCP that aim to convert sloping cropland into forestland or grassland 
are witness to this policy direction (Liu et al., 2010). However, our results show that the social optimum 
land allocation requires conversion in the other direction: from grasslands towards cultivated land, while 
the area of forest land is already within the socially optimal range. The preference for cultivated land 
over rangeland may be driven by the policy restrictions on rangeland. Farmers can use cultivated land 
more freely than rangeland. While this insight might seem controversial in view of the current policy 
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context, our results could also be driven by the overall pressure on rural land, and cultivated land in 
particular, in China. This pressure is likely to be especially strong in the eco-fragile regions where most 
of the local residents depend on farming, but where agricultural productivity falls far behind the national 
average level. This promotes the demand for more cultivated land and land for agricultural infrastructure. 
Furthermore, our results may also reflect the misalignment between preferences of the national 
government – as included in the national policy programs that focus on environmental protection – and 
preferences of local governments – whose performance evaluation is based primarily on economic 
growth indicators (Liu and Diamond, 2005). Moreover, it is worth mentioning that a decrease in the 
area of grasslands in favour of cultivated land does not necessarily conflict with environmental 
objectives. First, research on the effectiveness of current grassland protection policies has not yet 
provided conclusive evidence (Zheng et al., 2006; Cao et al., 2013). Second, a conversion to more 
cultivated land is likely to lead to a more intensified use of the rural land. As a result, this may reduce 
the pressure on the grasslands as rural residents can sustain their livelihoods through cultivation rather 
than by increasing the number of animals on the grasslands. 
Finally, we would like to point out a number of limitations of our research. While the research method 
is generic and likely to be valid for other regions facing land use conflicts, the specific outcomes 
presented in this paper are based on stakeholder interviews in one Chinese county and are therefore not 
generalizable. Furthermore, the application of the model includes only 4 different categories of land and 
4 stakeholder groups which is a simplification of reality. Finally, the analysis only assesses the 
distribution of land resources and hence abstracts from the allocation of other relevant resources of rural 
households. 
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3. LAND TENURE REFORM AND GRASSLAND DEGRADATION IN INNER MONGOLIA, CHINA11 
 
ABSTRACT: Since the start of the land tenure reform in the pastoral areas of China in the 1980s, 
grassland use rights have increasingly been assigned to individual households and subsequently more 
grasslands have been in private use. However, in the same period, most of the grasslands in China have 
experienced degradation. The question that this paper tries to address is whether the land tenure reform 
plays a significant role in grassland degradation. It is answered by an empirical analysis of the impact 
of land tenure reform on the changes in grassland condition, using data from 60 counties in Inner 
Mongolia between 1985 and 2008. Grassland condition is presented by grassland quantity and quality 
using spatial information based on remote sensing. The timing of the assignment of grassland use rights 
and the timing of the actual adoption of private use by households differ among counties. These timing 
differences and differences in grassland condition among counties allow disentangling the impact of the 
land tenure reform. A fixed effects model is used to control for climate, agricultural activity and the 
time-invariant heterogeneity among counties. The model results show that the private use of grasslands 
following the land tenure reform has had significantly negative effects on grassland quality and quantity 
in Inner Mongolia. Moreover, the negative effects did not disappear even after several years of 
experience with private use. In conclusion, our analysis reveals that the land tenure reform, namely 
privatisation of grassland use rights, is a significant driver of grassland degradation in Inner Mongolia 
in a long term, which presents “a tragedy of privatisation”, as opposed to the well-known “tragedy of 
the commons”. 
KEYWORDS: privatisation, formal use rights, private use, grassland degradation, fixed effects model 
                                                 
11 Paper by Min Liu, Liesbeth Dries, Wim Heijman, Jikun Huang, Xueqin Zhu, and Xiangzheng Deng, submitted to a 
peer-reviewed journal.  
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3.1 Introduction 
The tragedy of the commons, a concept introduced by Hardin (1968), has long been part of the 
conventional wisdom in ecology, economics and political science (McEvoy, 1987). Theoretical research 
contended that resource degradation was inevitable unless the commons were either privatised or 
maintained as common land with clear rights of entry and use (Hardin, 1968). Similarly, in the theorem 
of property rights (Coase, 1960), a clear assignment of property rights is proposed as a precondition for 
economically efficient resource allocation and environmental sustainability. As a consequence, the 
privatisation of property rights or use rights over resources has been implemented widely by 
governments around the world (Little, 1992; Lesorogol, 2003; Squires et al., 2009; Ybarra, 2009). The 
same privatisation trend has been observed in Inner Asia and Africa regarding the reform of grassland 
tenure (Sneath, 1998; Lesorogol, 2008).  
However, Hardin’s theory of the tragedy of the commons and Coase’s theorem of property rights have 
been rejected by pastoral specialists, who found that these theoretical findings provided a poor guide to 
understanding pastoralism (Feeny et al., 1990; Behnke, 1994; Sneath, 1998). They concluded that 
exclusionary land tenure is counterproductive to protect the grassland condition in arid and semi-arid 
areas (Turner, 1999; Galvin, 2009). And some scholars (e.g. Ostrom, 1990; Li and Zhang, 2009) found 
that traditional common use systems of grasslands often met the criteria for sustainable Social-
Ecological Systems (Ostrom, 2009), namely the exclusion of outsiders and the self-organization of 
resource users (Ostrom, 1990). Therefore, doubts exist about the likelihood that traditional common use 
systems would induce a tragedy of the commons. Moreover, a growing number of academic studies 
question the effects of the prevailing privatisation of grassland property rights or use rights on the 
grassland condition. For instance, some studies assert that grassland privatisation puts an end to mobile 
pastoralism by introducing inflexible boundaries and identify this as a main driver for grassland 
degradation (e.g. Fernandez-Gimenez and Le Febre, 2006; Li and Zhang, 2009). Mobile pastoralism is 
embraced because mobility maintains ecosystem stability and biological diversity and conforms with 
the sustainable use of natural resources that are subject to strong spatial and temporal heterogeneity, as 
is the case in arid and semi-arid areas (Fernandez-Gimenez, 2002; Fernandez-Gimenez and Le Febre, 
2006; Tessema et al., 2014; Fan et al., 2015). Empirical evidence was provided by Sneath (1998) who 
used satellite images to show that grassland degradation was much less severe in Mongolia – which 
kept the common use system for grasslands – than in the Russian and Chinese parts of Inner Asia where 
the privatisation of grassland property rights or use rights was implemented. Furthermore, Guelke (2003) 
showed that grassland degradation in South Africa was primarily due to the introduction of privatisation.  
In China, land tenure reform started with the Household Production Responsibility System in the 
cropland areas in the late 1970s and spread to the pastoral areas by the early 1980s. The land tenure 
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of land tenure reform on the changes in grassland condition, using data from 60 counties in Inner 
Mongolia between 1985 and 2008. Grassland condition is presented by grassland quantity and quality 
using spatial information based on remote sensing. The timing of the assignment of grassland use rights 
and the timing of the actual adoption of private use by households differ among counties. These timing 
differences and differences in grassland condition among counties allow disentangling the impact of the 
land tenure reform. A fixed effects model is used to control for climate, agricultural activity and the 
time-invariant heterogeneity among counties. The model results show that the private use of grasslands 
following the land tenure reform has had significantly negative effects on grassland quality and quantity 
in Inner Mongolia. Moreover, the negative effects did not disappear even after several years of 
experience with private use. In conclusion, our analysis reveals that the land tenure reform, namely 
privatisation of grassland use rights, is a significant driver of grassland degradation in Inner Mongolia 
in a long term, which presents “a tragedy of privatisation”, as opposed to the well-known “tragedy of 
the commons”. 
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3.1 Introduction 
The tragedy of the commons, a concept introduced by Hardin (1968), has long been part of the 
conventional wisdom in ecology, economics and political science (McEvoy, 1987). Theoretical research 
contended that resource degradation was inevitable unless the commons were either privatised or 
maintained as common land with clear rights of entry and use (Hardin, 1968). Similarly, in the theorem 
of property rights (Coase, 1960), a clear assignment of property rights is proposed as a precondition for 
economically efficient resource allocation and environmental sustainability. As a consequence, the 
privatisation of property rights or use rights over resources has been implemented widely by 
governments around the world (Little, 1992; Lesorogol, 2003; Squires et al., 2009; Ybarra, 2009). The 
same privatisation trend has been observed in Inner Asia and Africa regarding the reform of grassland 
tenure (Sneath, 1998; Lesorogol, 2008).  
However, Hardin’s theory of the tragedy of the commons and Coase’s theorem of property rights have 
been rejected by pastoral specialists, who found that these theoretical findings provided a poor guide to 
understanding pastoralism (Feeny et al., 1990; Behnke, 1994; Sneath, 1998). They concluded that 
exclusionary land tenure is counterproductive to protect the grassland condition in arid and semi-arid 
areas (Turner, 1999; Galvin, 2009). And some scholars (e.g. Ostrom, 1990; Li and Zhang, 2009) found 
that traditional common use systems of grasslands often met the criteria for sustainable Social-
Ecological Systems (Ostrom, 2009), namely the exclusion of outsiders and the self-organization of 
resource users (Ostrom, 1990). Therefore, doubts exist about the likelihood that traditional common use 
systems would induce a tragedy of the commons. Moreover, a growing number of academic studies 
question the effects of the prevailing privatisation of grassland property rights or use rights on the 
grassland condition. For instance, some studies assert that grassland privatisation puts an end to mobile 
pastoralism by introducing inflexible boundaries and identify this as a main driver for grassland 
degradation (e.g. Fernandez-Gimenez and Le Febre, 2006; Li and Zhang, 2009). Mobile pastoralism is 
embraced because mobility maintains ecosystem stability and biological diversity and conforms with 
the sustainable use of natural resources that are subject to strong spatial and temporal heterogeneity, as 
is the case in arid and semi-arid areas (Fernandez-Gimenez, 2002; Fernandez-Gimenez and Le Febre, 
2006; Tessema et al., 2014; Fan et al., 2015). Empirical evidence was provided by Sneath (1998) who 
used satellite images to show that grassland degradation was much less severe in Mongolia – which 
kept the common use system for grasslands – than in the Russian and Chinese parts of Inner Asia where 
the privatisation of grassland property rights or use rights was implemented. Furthermore, Guelke (2003) 
showed that grassland degradation in South Africa was primarily due to the introduction of privatisation.  
In China, land tenure reform started with the Household Production Responsibility System in the 
cropland areas in the late 1970s and spread to the pastoral areas by the early 1980s. The land tenure 
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reform in the pastoral areas aims at privatising use rights of grasslands to individual households and 
displacing traditional common use (Banks et al., 2003). Some differences have been observed in the 
tenure reform of grasslands among the provinces. For instance, the grasslands tenure reform started in 
1984 in Inner Mongolia and Heilongjiang while it had started already in 1983 in Ningxia (Ho, 2000). 
Furthermore, the privatisation of grassland use rights in some provinces was ahead of the national 
decision about the tenure reform of grasslands, as the first Grassland Law of China was introduced only 
in 1985. Moreover, it is reported that most of the grasslands in China have experienced various degrees 
of degradation since the 1980s (Li et al., 2014). The manifestation of the grassland degradation involves 
a reduction in the extent of grass cover, a reduction in the density of grass cover, a reduction in the 
output of forage material, an increase in unpalatable grass species, an increase in soil compaction, 
changes in plant functional group or a combination of all of them (Feng et al., 2009; Li et al., 2013; Lin 
et al., 2015). According to Chinese governmental reports, 10% of the total area of grasslands was 
degraded in the 1970s, increasing to 30% in the 1980s and 50% in the middle of the 1990s (Meng and 
Gao, 2002). By the 2000s, about 90% of the grasslands were degraded to various extents, with 
significant regional variation (Unkovich and Nan, 2008; Waldron et al., 2010). It is widely agreed that 
grassland degradation is one of the most important environmental issues confronting China presently 
(Han et al., 2008; Feng et al., 2009). As efficient policy interventions derive from correct understandings 
about the causes of grassland degradation (Brown et al., 2008), and good management practices are 
capable of improving the grassland condition significantly (Parras-Alcántara et al. 2015), a relevant 
question is what role the land tenure reform has played in the process of grassland degradation.  
Although some studies exist that discuss the impact of the land tenure reform on the grassland condition 
in China (e.g. Ho, 2001; Li and Zhang, 2009), there is a lack of empirical analysis based on long-term 
data on a large-scale (Lu et al., 2015). Therefore, this paper uses information on the changes in grassland 
condition and progress of the land tenure reform in a typical pastoral area in China over a relatively 
long period (1985-2008) to estimate the effect of land tenure reform on grassland condition. In the 
following sections, we first provide some background information about the grassland tenure reform in 
China, including the progress in the assignment of grassland use rights and the actual use of grasslands. 
Next, the materials of our empirical research are described and the fixed effects model in our case is 
presented. We conclude with some remarks about the effects of the land tenure reform on the grassland 
condition in the research region and implications of our findings for future research.  
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3.2 Materials 
3.2.1 Study area 
To explore the effect of land tenure reform on the grassland condition in the pastoral areas of China, we 
selected Inner Mongolia, a province located in northern China, to conduct our empirical study. Inner 
Mongolia belongs to the arid and semi-arid areas of China that is vulnerable to degradation, 
desertification and salinization (Feng et al., 2009). It contains 21.7% of the area of China’s natural 
grasslands. Approximately 67% of the total land in Inner Mongolia is classified as grassland, the 
majority of which is temperate grassland (Angerer et al., 2008). As a traditionally pastoral region 
populated by Mongolians, the vast majority of local people maintain their livelihoods upon the 
permanent grasslands and the region has a relatively low population density in spite of rapid economic 
growth and a soaring population growth elsewhere in China (Angerer et al., 2008). The grassland 
condition in Inner Mongolia has been a major concern because the region is not only one of the main 
production regions for animal products of China (Li et al., 2016), it also functions as an ecological 
barrier for northern China. For instance, the colossal dust storms which rumbled through hundreds of 
cities and villages of northern China and blanketed the sky of Beijing between 1998 and 2001, are said 
to have originated from dryland areas and degraded grasslands mainly in Inner Mongolia (Wu et al., 
2015). In terms of its status as main region for livestock production in China, the mutton output of Inner 
Mongolia accounted for 22% of the total output of China in 2013, while 8% of all Chinese beef was 
produced here (China Animal Industry Yearbook, 2014). Therefore, continued grassland degradation in 
Inner Mongolia is supposed to harm economic development as well as cause ecosystem instability in 
China (Meyer, 2006). By the end of the twentieth century, 90% of the grassland condition of Inner 
Mongolia had been degraded to various extents (Mei et al., 2013), which has stimulated growing 
attention to the protection of grasslands in recent decades. 
Inner Mongolia was the first region for implementation of the land tenure reform in the grassland area 
(Li and Huntsinger, 2011). According to provincial government reports for Inner Mongolia, the 
privatisation of grassland use rights began officially through the Double Contracts System in 1982. 
Because of its limited uptake, the implementation of grassland privatisation was strengthened by the 
Two Rights and One System policy (Shuang Quan Yi Zhi) in 1996 (Bureau of Animal husbandry of 
Inner Mongolia, 2000; Li and Zhang, 2009). This is regarded as the second round of privatisation of 
grassland use rights. To this date, local governments continue to work on clarifying the boundaries of 
grassland use rights for each household and on issuing certificates (Bureau of Animal husbandry of 
Inner Mongolia, 2015). In practice, the specific timing and extent of conducting the land tenure reform 
differed among counties in Inner Mongolia. This paper is therefore based on county-level data with the 
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aim of disentangling the effects of privatisation on the grassland condition. Figure 3.1 presents the 
region of Inner Mongolia and marks the counties that are included in our empirical analysis. 
 
Figure 3.1 Inner Mongolia and the selected counties in this study 
3.2.2 Data sources 
County-level data were collected for the period 1985-2008, the main period during which the land tenure 
reform was implemented across Inner Mongolia. Information about the land tenure reform was collected 
through questionnaires. The questionnaires were sent to the Animal Husbandry Bureau of each county 
and answered by local experts on the grassland tenure reform. In a second phase, interviews were 
conducted by telephone to confirm the answers that were received. A total of 74 valid questionnaires 
were obtained out of 102 counties of Inner Mongolia. Besides the questionnaires, we had interviews 
with the officers who are working in the provincial institutes of Animal Husbandry of Inner Mongolia 
and with local herders to verify the progress of land tenure reform on local grasslands. 
In the existing literature, grassland condition is indicated by grass cover, height, density, biomass 
production or density of perennial vegetation (Gu and Li, 2013; Yu and Farrell, 2013). Commonly used 
methods to measure these indicators include small-scale sampling tests in field studies and data analysis 
with remote sensing and GIS (Geographic Information System) over large areas. The former focuses on 
measuring the specific indices of grass production and vegetation diversity directly, while the latter 
estimates the general grassland condition based on satellite images (Gu and Li, 2013). In this study, the 
method with remote sensing and GIS is more appropriate because we aim to quantify the spatial and 
42 
 
temporal differences in grassland condition across extensive grasslands during a long period. In this 
regard, our information on grasslands and climate conditions relies on a land use database developed 
by the Chinese Academy of Sciences with original data from Landsat Thematic Mapper / Enhanced 
Thematic Mapper (Plus) (TM/ETM+) images which have a spatial resolution of 30*30m (Deng et al. 
2011). Visual interpretation and digitization of Landsat TM/ETM+ images were conducted to generate 
land use maps for the years 1985, 1995, 2000, 2005 and 2008. Land cover classification system was 
applied to distinguish grasslands from cultivated land, forestry area, water area, built-up area, and 
unused land. According to the grass cover, grasslands were further classified into three subclasses which 
were adopted from the research by Feng et al. (2009) and Deng et al. (2011), including dense grassland, 
moderate grassland and sparse grassland. In addition, socio-economic information was derived from 
statistical data collected by local governments. After dropping the urbanised counties - where changes 
in the grassland area can be attributed mainly to changes in land use types - and those counties that 
experienced changes in administrative regions, 60 counties out of 74 counties with valid questionnaires 
are retained as the research sample for this study, as marked in Figure 3.1.  
3.2.3 Land tenure reform for the grasslands  
3.2.3.1 A review of the legislation on grassland tenure of China 
In the collectivist period of China, grasslands were assigned to production teams or People’s communes 
and the grasslands were managed and used communally by all households in the same production team 
(Hua and Squires, 2015; Taylor, 2006). After that period, given the successful experience of privatising 
land use rights to individual households in the cropland regions in the late 1970s, the Chinese central 
government introduced the household-based privatisation of land use rights into the pastoral areas in 
the early 1980s. Since then, the management of grasslands has increasingly become the responsibility 
of individual households (Banks et al., 2003).   
The first Grassland Law of China was initiated in 1985 and stipulated that the property rights over 
grasslands are owned either by the state or the collective but that use rights to the grasslands can be 
contracted out to either households or collectives (Ho, 2000). According to the current Law on the 
Contracting of Rural Land, the grassland use rights can be contracted to individual households for a 
duration of 30 to 50 years. In practice, local governments started to assign grassland use rights to 
households through a Double Contracting System (“cao xu shuang cheng bao”) in the 1980s. In 2002, 
the revised Grassland Law reaffirmed the devolution of land use rights from the state and collectives to 
individual households (National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China, 2002). The State 
Council emphasised the specific allocation of the contracted items (e.g. grassland plots, areas, issuing 
user-right certificates etc.) to households to ensure the long-term stability of contract relations in a  
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government report in 2011 (Li, 2012). With these legislative efforts, the privatisation of the grasslands 
has been conducted gradually in the extensive pastoral areas of China, and increasingly private use by 
households has replaced traditional open access to land (Hua and Squires, 2015; Yang et al., 2004). By 
2014, the total area of grasslands that have been assigned to individual households reached 223 million 
hectares, out of 400 million hectares of grasslands in China (Ministry of Agriculture of China, 2015). 
3.2.3.2 The implementation of the land tenure reform on grasslands 
Table 3.1 provides a typology of the assignment of use rights and the actual ways of grassland use in 
the pastoral areas of China since the start of the land tenure reform. This typology is in line with the 
investigation of land tenure reform on the Tibetan plateau by Banks (2003). Three types of assignment 
of grassland use rights existed during the last three decades, namely, formal use rights assigned to 
individual households, to a group of households or to a collective. Correspondingly, there were three 
ways of grassland use, including private use, joint use and common use. Private use indicates that a 
certain area of grasslands is managed and used by an individual household, while other users are 
excluded. Joint use means that a group of households manage and use an area of grasslands together, in 
which group members are often neighbours or relatives that have small parcels of grasslands and wish 
to make their land larger and contiguous. Finally, common use means that the grasslands within a 
collective or administrative village are used by all of the members of the collective or the villagers.  
Table 3.1 The assignment of formal use rights of grasslands and the actual ways of grassland use 
Formal use rights  assigned to Actual use of grasslands  Private use Joint use Common use 
Individual households + + +  
Group of households  na + + 
Collective/administrative village na  na +  
Source: adapted from “formal and de facto grassland management units” (Banks et al., 2003)  
na indicates not available. 
When the use rights are assigned to a collective or an administrative village, the actual way of grassland 
use is always common use. If use rights are assigned to a group of households, actual use can be common 
use or joint use. Private use, joint use and common use can all occur when the use rights are assigned 
to individual households. The intention of the land tenure reform in the pastoral areas is, however, to 
achieve full private use when use rights are assigned to households. This has spurred criticisms and 
claims of failure of the privatisation process in China's extensive grasslands, compared to the case of 
the cropland areas where household-based use rights were assigned overnight and private use was 
established simultaneously (Ho, 2000; Banks et al., 2003). Scholars (e.g. Richard et al, 2006; Li and 
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Zhang, 2009; Li, 2012) have  identified a number of possible barriers to the completion of the land 
tenure reform in the pastoral areas of China: (1) the inflexible boundaries stemming from the 
privatisation of grassland use rights is incompatible with the need for livestock mobility due to the 
heterogeneity of resources in arid and semi-arid areas (Li and Zhang, 2009); (2) there is a lack of 
financial resources for protecting private property rights, e.g. to build fences (Ho, 1996; Li et al., 2007); 
(3) individual household ownership is inconsistent with local or traditional knowledge about property 
or use rights (Richard et al, 2006); and (4) private use by individual households destroys the traditional 
institutions of grassland use and management (Li, 2012). In what follows, we will investigate another 
possible explanation for why the adoption of private use is lagging, namely that privatisation negatively 
affects the grassland condition. 
3.2.3.3 Land tenure reform in sample counties 
Table 3.2 gives indications of the land tenure reform progress of grasslands in the selected counties 
between 1985 and 2008. In 1985, only 6.67% of the 60 counties had assigned grassland use rights to 
individual households. By 2008, this proportion had increased to 81.67%, and the average number of 
years since formal use rights had been contracted to individual households was 11.55. Meanwhile, actual 
changes in the use of the grasslands followed this institutional evolution. In 1985, only 5% of the 
selected counties had adopted the practice of private use. In 2008, this percentage had reached to 63.33% 
and the average number of years since private use had been adopted was 8.72. These observations about 
the land tenure reform in the sample counties demonstrate that the adoption of private use lagged behind 
the privatisation of formal use rights. 
Table 3.2 Land tenure reform progress in the selected counties, 1985-2008 
 Unit 1985 1995 2000 2005 2008 
The proportion of counties in which 
grassland use rights have been assigned to 
individual households 
Percent 6.67 23.33 76.67 80.00 81.67 
The average number of years since the use 
rights have been assigned to households 
Years 0.18 1.92 5.17 9.13 11.55 
The proportion of counties with actual 
private use of grasslands 
Percent 5.00 15.00 58.33 63.33 63.33 
The average number of years since actual 
private use has been adopted 
Years 0.13 1.22 3.68 6.82 8.72 
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When the use rights are assigned to a collective or an administrative village, the actual way of grassland 
use is always common use. If use rights are assigned to a group of households, actual use can be common 
use or joint use. Private use, joint use and common use can all occur when the use rights are assigned 
to individual households. The intention of the land tenure reform in the pastoral areas is, however, to 
achieve full private use when use rights are assigned to households. This has spurred criticisms and 
claims of failure of the privatisation process in China's extensive grasslands, compared to the case of 
the cropland areas where household-based use rights were assigned overnight and private use was 
established simultaneously (Ho, 2000; Banks et al., 2003). Scholars (e.g. Richard et al, 2006; Li and 
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Zhang, 2009; Li, 2012) have  identified a number of possible barriers to the completion of the land 
tenure reform in the pastoral areas of China: (1) the inflexible boundaries stemming from the 
privatisation of grassland use rights is incompatible with the need for livestock mobility due to the 
heterogeneity of resources in arid and semi-arid areas (Li and Zhang, 2009); (2) there is a lack of 
financial resources for protecting private property rights, e.g. to build fences (Ho, 1996; Li et al., 2007); 
(3) individual household ownership is inconsistent with local or traditional knowledge about property 
or use rights (Richard et al, 2006); and (4) private use by individual households destroys the traditional 
institutions of grassland use and management (Li, 2012). In what follows, we will investigate another 
possible explanation for why the adoption of private use is lagging, namely that privatisation negatively 
affects the grassland condition. 
3.2.3.3 Land tenure reform in sample counties 
Table 3.2 gives indications of the land tenure reform progress of grasslands in the selected counties 
between 1985 and 2008. In 1985, only 6.67% of the 60 counties had assigned grassland use rights to 
individual households. By 2008, this proportion had increased to 81.67%, and the average number of 
years since formal use rights had been contracted to individual households was 11.55. Meanwhile, actual 
changes in the use of the grasslands followed this institutional evolution. In 1985, only 5% of the 
selected counties had adopted the practice of private use. In 2008, this percentage had reached to 63.33% 
and the average number of years since private use had been adopted was 8.72. These observations about 
the land tenure reform in the sample counties demonstrate that the adoption of private use lagged behind 
the privatisation of formal use rights. 
Table 3.2 Land tenure reform progress in the selected counties, 1985-2008 
 Unit 1985 1995 2000 2005 2008 
The proportion of counties in which 
grassland use rights have been assigned to 
individual households 
Percent 6.67 23.33 76.67 80.00 81.67 
The average number of years since the use 
rights have been assigned to households 
Years 0.18 1.92 5.17 9.13 11.55 
The proportion of counties with actual 
private use of grasslands 
Percent 5.00 15.00 58.33 63.33 63.33 
The average number of years since actual 
private use has been adopted 
Years 0.13 1.22 3.68 6.82 8.72 
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3.3 Empirical model 
3.3.1 Fixed effects model 
The fixed effects model has been widely used in economic research (e.g., Fergusson et al., 2002; Huang 
et al., 2006). It is used primarily to study the causes of changes within entities over time. The general 
model is presented as follows: 
௜ܻ௧ ൌ ߚ ௜ܺ୲ ൅ ௜ܷ ൅ ߮௜௧ሺͳሻ 
where i and t present entity i and year t, respectively. ௜ܻ௧ is the dependent variable. ܺ௜௧ denotes the vector 
of independent variables. ௜ܷ is the specific intercept for each entity and represents all time-invariant 
(fixed) characteristics of entity i that influence the dependent variable, including both observable and 
unobservable factors. ߮௜௧ is the random error term. The difficulty in estimating the parameters of β is 
that ௜ܷ involves unobserved factors. In this regard, a within transformation is used to remove all time-
invariant (fixed) explanatory variables, i.e. a model is performed using deviations from individual 
means (Verbeek, 2012). Therefore, the fixed effects model is a method of estimating the parameter of 
β that takes the observable as well as unobservable time-invariant explanatory variables ( ௜ܷ ) into 
account, but the estimation does not dependent on the value of ௜ܷ (Fergusson et al., 2002). 
The fixed effects model is appropriate to solve our research question considering that the results of the 
land tenure reform within each county can be studied effectively by controlling for the unmeasured 
heterogeneity among counties. As shown in table 3.2, the progress in land tenure reform changes 
substantially across our research period and for a considerable proportion of the counties in our dataset, 
which satisfies the basic requirement of the fixed effects model (Daun-Barnett, 2011).  Moreover, our 
research sample attempts to include all of the relevant counties in Inner Mongolia, rather than random 
draws, which preliminarily indicates the fixed effects model more appropriate than the random effects 
model (Verbeek, 2012). Nevertheless, the appropriateness of the fixed effects model will be further 
examined through statistical testing in section 5. 
3.3.2 Variable definitions and expected results  
The dependent variable in the empirical analysis is the grassland condition. The grassland condition 
includes the situations of both quantity and quality of grasslands, which are quantified considering the 
extent and density of grass cover that are suggested as the crucial manifestation of grassland degradation 
(Feng et al., 2009; Li et al., 2013). Specifically, the quantity of grasslands is measured by the total area 
of grasslands in hectares, while the areas with less than 5 percent of grass cover are not counted as 
grasslands. And the quality of grasslands is presented through the areas of grasslands of different 
subclasses that are classified according to the different density of grass cover, including dense grassland, 
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moderate grassland and sparse grassland. According to the research by Feng et al. (2009) and Deng et 
al. (2011), dense grassland has the highest quality and its grass cover is more than 50 percent. Moderate 
grassland has grass covering 20-50 percent of the land, and sparse grassland with 5-20 percent. In our 
case, it is supposed that the grassland degradation is manifested by the decrease of total, dense and 
moderate grassland areas, as well as the increase of sparse grassland area when total grassland area with 
decrease or no changes. The latter considers that the dense and moderate grasslands may degrade into 
sparse grassland, which was observed by the research about the moving direction of grassland centre of 
gravity in China during 1976-1996 by Feng et al. (2009). Hence, four dependent variables are included 
in the empirical analysis to indicate the grassland condition: total grassland area, dense grassland area, 
moderate grassland area, and sparse grassland area. The following equations for estimation are derived 
from the general fixed effects model (see equation (1)): 
ܩ௜௧ ൌ ݃௜ ൅ ܽଵܮ௜௧ ൅ ܽଶܮ௜௧ଶ ൅ ܽଷ ௜ܶ௧ ൅ ܽସ ௜ܶ௧ଶ ൅ ܽହܨ௜௧ ൅ ܽ଺ܨ௜௧ଶ ൅ ܽ଻ܶܨ௜௧ ൅ ଼ܽܥ௜௧ ൅ ܽଽܥ௜௧ଶ ൅ ᖡ௜௧ሺʹሻ 
 
ܦ௜௧ ൌ ݀௜ ൅ ܾଵܮ௜௧ ൅ ܾଶܮ௜௧ଶ ൅ ܾଷ ௜ܶ௧ ൅ ܾସ ௜ܶ௧ଶ ൅ ܾହܨ௜௧ ൅ ܾ଺ܨ௜௧ଶ ൅ ܾ଻ܶܨ௜௧ ൅ ଼ܾܥ௜௧ ൅ ܾଽܥ௜௧ଶ ൅ Ɋ௜௧ሺ͵ሻ 
 
ܯ௜௧ ൌ ݉௜ ൅ ܿଵܮ௜௧ ൅ ܿଶܮ௜௧ଶ ൅ ܿଷ ௜ܶ௧ ൅ ܿସ ௜ܶ௧ଶ ൅ ܿହܨ௜௧ ൅ ܿ଺ܨ௜௧ଶ ൅ ܿ଻ܶܨ௜௧ ൅ ଼ܿܥ௜௧ ൅ ܿଽܥ௜௧ଶ ൅ ߛ௜௧ሺͶሻ 
 
௜ܵ௧ ൌ ݏ௜ ൅ ݀ଵܮ௜௧ ൅ ݀ଶܮ௜௧ଶ ൅ ݀ଷ ௜ܶ௧ ൅ ݀ସ ௜ܶ௧ଶ ൅ ݀ହܨ௜௧ ൅ ݀଺ܨ௜୲ଶ ൅ ݀଻ܶܨ௜௧ ൅ ଼݀ܥ௜௧ ൅ ݀ଽܥ௜௧ଶ ൅ ߪ௜௧ሺͷሻ 
 
where i and t present the ith county and year t. Total grassland area (ܩ௜௧), dense grassland area (ܦ௜௧), 
moderate grassland area (ܯ௜௧) and sparse grassland area ( ௜ܵ௧) are the dependent variables. Equations (2), 
(3), (4) and (5) will be referred to as the total, the dense, the moderate and the sparse grassland model, 
respectively.  
ܮ௜௧ indicates our main variable of interest, the progress of the land tenure reform in county i until year 
t. It is measured as the number of years until year t that private use has been adopted in county i. We 
focus on the years of actual private use of the grasslands rather than the years of the assignment of 
formal use rights to households because it is considered that the actual use will affect the grassland 
condition. As was shown in table 3.2, the adoption of actual private use lags behind the assignment of 
formal use rights, and the correlation value between the years of assigning formal use rights and actually 
adopting private use is 0.825. In this regard, including both the years of formal use rights assignment 
and the years of actual private use as variables in the model would cause multicollinearity. The quadratic 
term of ܮ௜௧, ܮ௜௧ଶ , is included in the model because a non-linear relationship is expected between the land 
tenure reform and the grassland condition.  
To correctly estimate the effect of the land tenure reform, we control for other factors that may affect 
the condition of the grasslands, namely, the factors related to climate (Gao et al., 2010; Li et al., 2012; 
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model is presented as follows: 
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that ௜ܷ involves unobserved factors. In this regard, a within transformation is used to remove all time-
invariant (fixed) explanatory variables, i.e. a model is performed using deviations from individual 
means (Verbeek, 2012). Therefore, the fixed effects model is a method of estimating the parameter of 
β that takes the observable as well as unobservable time-invariant explanatory variables ( ௜ܷ ) into 
account, but the estimation does not dependent on the value of ௜ܷ (Fergusson et al., 2002). 
The fixed effects model is appropriate to solve our research question considering that the results of the 
land tenure reform within each county can be studied effectively by controlling for the unmeasured 
heterogeneity among counties. As shown in table 3.2, the progress in land tenure reform changes 
substantially across our research period and for a considerable proportion of the counties in our dataset, 
which satisfies the basic requirement of the fixed effects model (Daun-Barnett, 2011).  Moreover, our 
research sample attempts to include all of the relevant counties in Inner Mongolia, rather than random 
draws, which preliminarily indicates the fixed effects model more appropriate than the random effects 
model (Verbeek, 2012). Nevertheless, the appropriateness of the fixed effects model will be further 
examined through statistical testing in section 5. 
3.3.2 Variable definitions and expected results  
The dependent variable in the empirical analysis is the grassland condition. The grassland condition 
includes the situations of both quantity and quality of grasslands, which are quantified considering the 
extent and density of grass cover that are suggested as the crucial manifestation of grassland degradation 
(Feng et al., 2009; Li et al., 2013). Specifically, the quantity of grasslands is measured by the total area 
of grasslands in hectares, while the areas with less than 5 percent of grass cover are not counted as 
grasslands. And the quality of grasslands is presented through the areas of grasslands of different 
subclasses that are classified according to the different density of grass cover, including dense grassland, 
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moderate grassland and sparse grassland. According to the research by Feng et al. (2009) and Deng et 
al. (2011), dense grassland has the highest quality and its grass cover is more than 50 percent. Moderate 
grassland has grass covering 20-50 percent of the land, and sparse grassland with 5-20 percent. In our 
case, it is supposed that the grassland degradation is manifested by the decrease of total, dense and 
moderate grassland areas, as well as the increase of sparse grassland area when total grassland area with 
decrease or no changes. The latter considers that the dense and moderate grasslands may degrade into 
sparse grassland, which was observed by the research about the moving direction of grassland centre of 
gravity in China during 1976-1996 by Feng et al. (2009). Hence, four dependent variables are included 
in the empirical analysis to indicate the grassland condition: total grassland area, dense grassland area, 
moderate grassland area, and sparse grassland area. The following equations for estimation are derived 
from the general fixed effects model (see equation (1)): 
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where i and t present the ith county and year t. Total grassland area (ܩ௜௧), dense grassland area (ܦ௜௧), 
moderate grassland area (ܯ௜௧) and sparse grassland area ( ௜ܵ௧) are the dependent variables. Equations (2), 
(3), (4) and (5) will be referred to as the total, the dense, the moderate and the sparse grassland model, 
respectively.  
ܮ௜௧ indicates our main variable of interest, the progress of the land tenure reform in county i until year 
t. It is measured as the number of years until year t that private use has been adopted in county i. We 
focus on the years of actual private use of the grasslands rather than the years of the assignment of 
formal use rights to households because it is considered that the actual use will affect the grassland 
condition. As was shown in table 3.2, the adoption of actual private use lags behind the assignment of 
formal use rights, and the correlation value between the years of assigning formal use rights and actually 
adopting private use is 0.825. In this regard, including both the years of formal use rights assignment 
and the years of actual private use as variables in the model would cause multicollinearity. The quadratic 
term of ܮ௜௧, ܮ௜௧ଶ , is included in the model because a non-linear relationship is expected between the land 
tenure reform and the grassland condition.  
To correctly estimate the effect of the land tenure reform, we control for other factors that may affect 
the condition of the grasslands, namely, the factors related to climate (Gao et al., 2010; Li et al., 2012; 
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Lu et al., 2015), agricultural activities (He et al., 2014; Hua and Squires, 2015) and heterogeneity among 
counties (Deng et al. 2011; He et al., 2014). Climate factors are presented by temperature ( ௜ܶ௧) and 
precipitation (ܨ௜௧) (Gong et al., 2015). Their quadratic terms ( ௜ܶ௧ଶ and ܨ௜௧ଶ) and cross term (ܶܨ௜௧) are 
considered (Li et al., 2013). ܥ௜௧ is the percentage change in cultivated land in county i in the five years 
preceding year t and ܥ௜௧ଶ  is its quadratic term. ܥ௜௧ and ܥ௜௧ଶ  are considered as controls for the switch of 
land between grassland and arable land which was shown to have a significant and direct effect on 
grassland quantity in China (Feng et al., 2009; Li et al., 2013). Finally, the factors about the 
heterogeneity among counties such as elevation, slope, soil type and distance to the provincial capital 
do not change significantly over time and are therefore treated as time-invariant (fixed) factors in the 
model, denoted by ݃௜, ݀௜, ݉௜ and ݏ௜ in equations (2) to (5). Variable definitions and the expected impact 
of independent variables on the grassland condition are listed in table 3.3. 
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Lu et al., 2015), agricultural activities (He et al., 2014; Hua and Squires, 2015) and heterogeneity among 
counties (Deng et al. 2011; He et al., 2014). Climate factors are presented by temperature ( ௜ܶ௧) and 
precipitation (ܨ௜௧) (Gong et al., 2015). Their quadratic terms ( ௜ܶ௧ଶ and ܨ௜௧ଶ) and cross term (ܶܨ௜௧) are 
considered (Li et al., 2013). ܥ௜௧ is the percentage change in cultivated land in county i in the five years 
preceding year t and ܥ௜௧ଶ  is its quadratic term. ܥ௜௧ and ܥ௜௧ଶ  are considered as controls for the switch of 
land between grassland and arable land which was shown to have a significant and direct effect on 
grassland quantity in China (Feng et al., 2009; Li et al., 2013). Finally, the factors about the 
heterogeneity among counties such as elevation, slope, soil type and distance to the provincial capital 
do not change significantly over time and are therefore treated as time-invariant (fixed) factors in the 
model, denoted by ݃௜, ݀௜, ݉௜ and ݏ௜ in equations (2) to (5). Variable definitions and the expected impact 
of independent variables on the grassland condition are listed in table 3.3. 
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Given the contradicting views in the literature about the effect of privatisation on grassland quality, the 
expected effect of ܮ௜௧ in our estimations is ambiguous (e.g. Hardin, 1968; Guelke, 2003; Galvin, 2009). 
However, we expect that the effects of the land tenure reform will be strong at the beginning and reduce 
in intensity over the years. Hence an opposite sign to that of ܮ௜௧ is expected for the coefficients of ܮ௜௧ଶ  in 
the four models. It is noted that the expected effects of all explanatory variables in the sparse grassland 
model are the opposite of the expectations in the other three models because grassland degradation 
involves a decrease in total, dense and moderate grassland areas, but an increase in sparse grassland 
area. Additionally, the expected sign of temperature ( ௜ܶ௧) is ambiguous because higher temperatures 
facilitate plant growth, but also cause fast evaporation from ground surfaces and stimulate the 
development of pests (Deng et al., 2013; Li et al., 2013). Precipitation (ܨ௜௧) improves the grassland 
condition in the arid and semi-arid areas (Li and Zhang, 2009). Both temperature and precipitation are 
expected to have nonlinear relationships with the grassland condition (Li et al., 2012; Zhou et al., 2002), 
and therefore the opposite signs to those of ௜ܶ௧ and ܨ௜௧ are expected for the coefficients of ௜ܶ௧ଶ and ܨ௜௧ଶ in 
the four models. The interaction term of ௜ܶ௧ and ܨ௜௧ is also included because the effect of temperature 
depends on the amount of precipitation. Finally, the intensive agricultural activities were suggested to 
cause grassland degradation (Zhang et al., 2007; Feng et al., 2009). We therefore expect negative 
coefficients for ܥ௜௧ in the total, dense and moderate grassland models, and a positive coefficient in the 
sparse grassland model. Again a nonlinear relationship is expected for this variable.  
3.3.3 Descriptive statistics on the variables 
Table 3.4 shows the mean value and standard deviation of our main variables for the research sample. 
In general, the areas of total grassland (ܩ௜௧ ), dense grassland (ܦ௜௧ ) and moderate grassland (ܯ௜௧ ) 
decreased, and the area of sparse grassland ( ௜ܵ௧) presented fluctuant increases between 1985 and 2008. 
The areas of total, dense and moderate grasslands experienced their highest points in 1985, and in 2000 
for sparse grassland area. Specifically comparing 1985 and 2008, the total grassland area decreased 
which indicates the degradation of grassland quantity. Furthermore, given the decrease in total grassland 
area, the decrease in dense and moderate grassland areas and increase in sparse grassland area 
demonstrate the degradation of grasslands with higher grass cover into lower quality grasslands. 
Moreover, the average number of years with actual private use in the 60 sample counties was increasing 
from 0.13 in 1985 to 8.72 in 2008. And the standard deviations of ܮ௜௧ indicate that the differences in 
adopting private use among the 60 sample counties were increasing from 1985 to 2008. The average 
temperature reached its highest point in 2008, while annual precipitation was the highest in 1985 and 
the lowest in 2000. The average percentage change in cultivated land increased from 1985 to 2000 then 
decreased to become even negative in 2005.   
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Given the contradicting views in the literature about the effect of privatisation on grassland quality, the 
expected effect of ܮ௜௧ in our estimations is ambiguous (e.g. Hardin, 1968; Guelke, 2003; Galvin, 2009). 
However, we expect that the effects of the land tenure reform will be strong at the beginning and reduce 
in intensity over the years. Hence an opposite sign to that of ܮ௜௧ is expected for the coefficients of ܮ௜௧ଶ  in 
the four models. It is noted that the expected effects of all explanatory variables in the sparse grassland 
model are the opposite of the expectations in the other three models because grassland degradation 
involves a decrease in total, dense and moderate grassland areas, but an increase in sparse grassland 
area. Additionally, the expected sign of temperature ( ௜ܶ௧) is ambiguous because higher temperatures 
facilitate plant growth, but also cause fast evaporation from ground surfaces and stimulate the 
development of pests (Deng et al., 2013; Li et al., 2013). Precipitation (ܨ௜௧) improves the grassland 
condition in the arid and semi-arid areas (Li and Zhang, 2009). Both temperature and precipitation are 
expected to have nonlinear relationships with the grassland condition (Li et al., 2012; Zhou et al., 2002), 
and therefore the opposite signs to those of ௜ܶ௧ and ܨ௜௧ are expected for the coefficients of ௜ܶ௧ଶ and ܨ௜௧ଶ in 
the four models. The interaction term of ௜ܶ௧ and ܨ௜௧ is also included because the effect of temperature 
depends on the amount of precipitation. Finally, the intensive agricultural activities were suggested to 
cause grassland degradation (Zhang et al., 2007; Feng et al., 2009). We therefore expect negative 
coefficients for ܥ௜௧ in the total, dense and moderate grassland models, and a positive coefficient in the 
sparse grassland model. Again a nonlinear relationship is expected for this variable.  
3.3.3 Descriptive statistics on the variables 
Table 3.4 shows the mean value and standard deviation of our main variables for the research sample. 
In general, the areas of total grassland (ܩ௜௧ ), dense grassland (ܦ௜௧ ) and moderate grassland (ܯ௜௧ ) 
decreased, and the area of sparse grassland ( ௜ܵ௧) presented fluctuant increases between 1985 and 2008. 
The areas of total, dense and moderate grasslands experienced their highest points in 1985, and in 2000 
for sparse grassland area. Specifically comparing 1985 and 2008, the total grassland area decreased 
which indicates the degradation of grassland quantity. Furthermore, given the decrease in total grassland 
area, the decrease in dense and moderate grassland areas and increase in sparse grassland area 
demonstrate the degradation of grasslands with higher grass cover into lower quality grasslands. 
Moreover, the average number of years with actual private use in the 60 sample counties was increasing 
from 0.13 in 1985 to 8.72 in 2008. And the standard deviations of ܮ௜௧ indicate that the differences in 
adopting private use among the 60 sample counties were increasing from 1985 to 2008. The average 
temperature reached its highest point in 2008, while annual precipitation was the highest in 1985 and 
the lowest in 2000. The average percentage change in cultivated land increased from 1985 to 2000 then 
decreased to become even negative in 2005.   
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3.4 Results 
In this section, we first examine whether our data are appropriate for using the fixed effects model 
through statistical tests, involving the choice of the fixed effects or random effects model and a test for 
cross-sectional dependence. Moreover, we examine whether the variable of private use (ܮ௜௧) and its 
quadratic term (ܮ௜௧ଶ ) are endogenous variables. This may be the case because the moment at which actual 
private use was adopted in a county could be decided by local households rather than by the (exogenous) 
formal government policy.  
Specifically, the Hausman test is employed to determine whether a fixed or a random effects model is 
more appropriate. The test results for all four models reject the null hypothesis at p<0.05, indicating that 
the fixed effects model is more appropriate. Cross–sectional dependence in panel–data models (also 
called contemporaneous correlation) is then tested using the Pasaran CD test considering that our panel 
data includes many more cross-sectional units (60) than time periods (5). Test results show that residuals 
are not correlated across entities and hence no cross–sectional dependence occurs in any of the four 
models. Ultimately, the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test is employed to examine endogeneity of the variables 
of ܮ௜௧  and ܮ௜௧ଶ . The test results reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity of ܮ௜௧  in the total and dense 
grassland models. The null hypothesis of exogeneity of ܮ௜௧ଶ  is rejected in the total, dense and moderate 
grassland models. It indicates that endogeneity is found in the total, dense and moderate grassland 
models, which therefore require the instrumental variables approach. In this regard, the number of years 
for which formal use rights have been assigned to households is strongly correlated with the number of 
years for which actual private use has been adopted (the correlation coefficient is 0.825). Moreover, the 
implementation of this formal policy was not decided by the local government or households, but it 
followed the policy guidelines from higher level governments, which means the variable about formal 
use rights can be supposed to be exogenous. We therefore consider the number of years with formal use 
rights and its quadratic term as the instrumental variables of ܮ௜௧ and ܮ௜௧ଶ . The instrumental variables tests 
further prove that they are valid and strong instrumental variables for ܮ௜௧ and ܮ௜௧ଶ . After these tests, our 
four models are run using fixed effects and based on instrumental variables in the models with 
endogeneity. The results are shown in table 3.5.  
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3.4 Results 
In this section, we first examine whether our data are appropriate for using the fixed effects model 
through statistical tests, involving the choice of the fixed effects or random effects model and a test for 
cross-sectional dependence. Moreover, we examine whether the variable of private use (ܮ௜௧) and its 
quadratic term (ܮ௜௧ଶ ) are endogenous variables. This may be the case because the moment at which actual 
private use was adopted in a county could be decided by local households rather than by the (exogenous) 
formal government policy.  
Specifically, the Hausman test is employed to determine whether a fixed or a random effects model is 
more appropriate. The test results for all four models reject the null hypothesis at p<0.05, indicating that 
the fixed effects model is more appropriate. Cross–sectional dependence in panel–data models (also 
called contemporaneous correlation) is then tested using the Pasaran CD test considering that our panel 
data includes many more cross-sectional units (60) than time periods (5). Test results show that residuals 
are not correlated across entities and hence no cross–sectional dependence occurs in any of the four 
models. Ultimately, the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test is employed to examine endogeneity of the variables 
of ܮ௜௧  and ܮ௜௧ଶ . The test results reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity of ܮ௜௧  in the total and dense 
grassland models. The null hypothesis of exogeneity of ܮ௜௧ଶ  is rejected in the total, dense and moderate 
grassland models. It indicates that endogeneity is found in the total, dense and moderate grassland 
models, which therefore require the instrumental variables approach. In this regard, the number of years 
for which formal use rights have been assigned to households is strongly correlated with the number of 
years for which actual private use has been adopted (the correlation coefficient is 0.825). Moreover, the 
implementation of this formal policy was not decided by the local government or households, but it 
followed the policy guidelines from higher level governments, which means the variable about formal 
use rights can be supposed to be exogenous. We therefore consider the number of years with formal use 
rights and its quadratic term as the instrumental variables of ܮ௜௧ and ܮ௜௧ଶ . The instrumental variables tests 
further prove that they are valid and strong instrumental variables for ܮ௜௧ and ܮ௜௧ଶ . After these tests, our 
four models are run using fixed effects and based on instrumental variables in the models with 
endogeneity. The results are shown in table 3.5.  
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As listed in table 3.5, the coefficient of ܮ௜௧ is significant and negative and the coefficient of ܮ௜௧ଶ  
is significant and positive in the total grassland model. It indicates that a possible turning point 
exists at which the decrease in total grassland area may be reversed as the increase in the number 
of years with private use. Similarly in the sparse grassland model, the coefficient of ܮ௜௧  is 
significant and negative, and the coefficient of ܮ௜௧ଶ  is significant and positive as well. Again the 
possibility of a turning point exists at which the decrease in sparse grassland area will reverse. 
It is noted that the coefficients of ܮ௜௧ are significant and negative in the dense and the moderate 
grassland models, but the coefficients of ܮ௜௧ଶ  are not significant. It indicates that when other 
variables remain constant, the dense (moderate) grassland area decreases by 1274 (2138) 
hectares if the period with private use increases by one year. In addition, the significant and 
negative coefficient of ௜ܶ௧ଶ indicates that temperature has a nonlinear relationship with the total 
grassland area. The significant coefficients of ܨ௜௧ show that precipitation is able to increase the 
dense grassland area significantly, but conversely reduce the sparse grassland area. And sparse 
grassland area has a nonlinear relationship with precipitation as presented by its significant 
coefficient of ܨ௜௧ଶ. Ultimately, the growth of cultivated land (ܥ௜௧) has significant and negative 
effects on the total, dense and moderate grassland areas, and a significant and positive effect on 
the sparse grassland area. Nonlinear relationships are present in the total, moderate and sparse 
grassland models as shown by their significant coefficients of ܥ௜௧ଶ .  
Comparing the above estimated model results with our expected results in table 3.3, the 
coefficients of significant variables in the models are almost consistent with our expectations, 
but the coefficients of  ܮ௜௧ and ܮ௜௧ଶ  in the sparse grassland model did not present opposite signs 
with that in the other three models. This difference indicates that the private use results in the 
decrease of sparse grassland area firstly and then increase, rather than increase from the 
beginning as we expected. A possible explanation could be that some sparse grassland degrades 
to such a degree that the grass cover drops from 5-20% to less than 5%. Such severe levels of 
degradation would however not be picked up by the variable of sparse grassland because land 
areas with less than 5% grass cover are no longer counted as grassland areas. And then the 
decrease of spares grassland area per se is offset by its increase caused by the degradation of 
grassland quality that the dense and moderate grasslands degrade into sparse grassland after 
several years of private use.  
54 
 
 
Figure 3.2 Estimated changes in the areas of different grasslands as the increase in the number 
of years with private use 
In figure 3.2, we employ the significant regression coefficients of ܮ௜௧ and ܮ௜୲ଶ  to particularly 
depict the changes in the areas of different grasslands as the number of years with private use 
increases. It is interpreted as the estimated effects of the land tenure reform on grassland 
condition while all of the other factors are controlled for. Specifically, the x-axis indicates the 
number of years with private use and the y-axis presents the areas of different grasslands. 
Considering the longest duration with private use till 2008 was 26 years in our original dataset, 
we drawn the maximum year of the x-axis at 26. The figure shows that the dense and moderate 
grassland areas present continuous decreases without reversion as their coefficients for ܮ௜௧ଶ  are 
not significant in the model. And the moderate grassland area decreases more quickly than 
dense grassland. However, both sparse and total grassland areas demonstrate the predicted 
upward trends after the initial decreases as their coefficients for ܮ௜௧ and ܮ௜௧ଶ  are significant. That 
is, sparse and total grassland areas decrease at first but then start to increase after a certain 
number of years with private use. The turning point is 4.6 years for the sparse grassland area 
and 14 years for the total grassland area in our case.  
As such, the figure indicates that the total grassland area decreases and is not able to recover to 
the initial level until several decades after the start of the land tenure reform. Moreover, the 
continuing decrease in dense and moderate grassland areas indicates that the grasslands with 
higher grass cover will sustain degradation over time under privatisation. This trend is 
confirmed by the increase in the sparse grassland area while the reduction in the total grassland 
area. Subsequently, the increase in the total grassland area may stem from the increase in the 
sparse grassland area, rather than the improvement of grassland quantity. In short, the empirical 
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analysis confirms the negative effects of privatisation on grassland quantity and quality in the 
long term. 
3.5 Discussion  
In line with the results of Sneath (1998), Li et al. (2007) and Li and Huntsinger (2011), we find 
a negative impact of privatisation on the grassland condition. This may have discouraged 
herders to adopt private use, which could be an inherent explanation for the slow progress in 
the implementation of the land tenure reform on the grasslands of China in recent decades. But 
conversely, some scholars (see e.g. Li et al., 2007) have argued that the observed negative 
impacts of the privatisation of grassland use rights result from constraints in the supporting 
conditions for a successful privatisation process, rather than from the privatisation per se. 
Specifically, they point to a lack of resources for pastoral herders for instance to build fences 
and to effectively protect privatised grasslands from overuse by outsiders. An interesting 
avenue for further research would be to explore in more detail whether the so-called tragedy of 
privatisation has its roots in privatised use rights per se or in its failed implementation in practice.  
Another challenge for future empirical research is to take into account the specific effects of 
overgrazing and the impacts of ecological reconstruction projects that have been initiated to 
protect the grassland condition in China since the 2000s (Li et al., 2014). The existing evidence 
on the relationship between livestock production and grassland degradation is vague and 
controversial (Harris, 2010; Cao et al., 2013b). Moreover, Liu et al. (2016) has shown that the 
impact of ecological projects on grassland condition was offset to some extent by socio-
economic and climate factors. While these elements were not directly investigated in this paper 
because of limitations in the data, they were approximated by including the variables of 
agricultural activities in the model. 
Concerning the governance of China’s grasslands, instead of the private use by households, the 
community-based governance is fiercely advocated by pastoral specialists (e.g. Fernandez-
Gimenez et al., 2012). They claim that community-based governance can facilitate the 
reciprocity of resource use among households, including capital investment and labour force 
use (e.g. Vetter, 2005; Li and Zhang, 2009; Cao et al., 2013b). Some empirical evidence exists 
to support community-based governance as well. For instance, Cao et al. (2013a) observed that 
the biomass, vegetation cover and species richness of grasslands are significantly higher under 
multi-household management than under single-household management in Maqu county, 
Gansu province. Ho (2001) showed that grasslands can be successfully managed by a village 
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community on the basis of a community-based arrangement at low transaction costs. However, 
more empirical evidence is needed on a large-scale to allow assessing the benefits of 
community-based governance over private use, taking into account the conditions of current 
social, economic and policy incentives in the pastoral areas. 
3.6 Conclusions 
This paper used quantitative analysis to investigate the relationship between grassland 
privatisation and grassland degradation. First, a review was made of the controversial views on 
the impact of privatisation on the grassland condition. Next, we summarized the progress in the 
land tenure reform in the pastoral areas of China. The evolution of grassland degradation was 
demonstrated in a typical pastoral area, using data for 60 counties in Inner Mongolia between 
1985 and 2008. A fixed effects model was employed to disentangle the effect of the land tenure 
reform on the grassland condition while controlling for factors related to climate, agricultural 
activity and heterogeneity among counties. The model results show that private use causes the 
reduction of the total grassland area and the degradation of dense and moderate grasslands into 
sparse grassland in the long run. In conclusion, our analysis suggests that the land tenure reform, 
namely the privatisation of grassland use rights, plays a significant role in the degradation of 
grassland quantity and quality in Inner Mongolia. In other words, we observe “a tragedy of 
privatisation” (Guelke, 2003; Li and Huntsinger, 2011), as opposed to the well-known “tragedy 
of the commons”.  
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4. HOW DOES LAND TENURE REFORM IMPACT UPON PASTORAL LIVESTOCK 
PRODUCTION? AN EMPIRICAL STUDY FOR INNER MONGOLIA, CHINA12 
ABSTRACT: How has land tenure reform affected livestock production in pastoral areas of 
China? This question is explored by estimating what impact assigning grassland use rights has 
on livestock production based on county-level data for Inner Mongolia between 1985 and 2008. 
The timing of the introduction of the household-based assignment of grassland use rights 
differed between counties, enabling a comparison of the effects of the land tenure reform. The 
changes in livestock production over time are examined by analysing data on changes in 
livestock population and meat output. The descriptive analysis shows that livestock production 
increased at a higher speed in the crop farming areas, but that the development of livestock 
productivity was faster in the pastoral areas. In the empirical analysis, we employed a fixed 
effects model to disentangle the effects of land tenure reform on livestock production from 
factors related to market forces, grassland condition, technological development and 
environmental heterogeneity. The model results reveal that the implementation of land tenure 
reform had significant and negative effects on the increase in livestock production, although 
total livestock production actually increased. It therefore appears that land reform is in itself 
unable to offset the impact of other factors that accelerate the increase in livestock production. 
Moreover, the constraining effect of land tenure reform on the increase in livestock production 
decreases with the number of years for which land tenure reform has been implemented, and 
ultimately disappears. Remarkably, the constraining effect of land tenure reform is stronger on 
the increase of livestock population than on that of meat output. This indicates that land tenure 
reform is beneficial in that it improves livestock productivity. In conclusion, land tenure reform, 
namely the privatisation of grassland use rights, puts a ceiling on livestock production, which 
could be a possible reason as to why it has been difficult to implement the reform on grasslands. 
However, the reform does prove to be beneficial in improving the livestock productivity of 
pastoral areas. 
KEYWORDS: assignment of property rights, use rights, pastoral area, livestock population, 
meat output, fixed effects model 
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4.1 Introduction 
Land tenure reform in China is characterised by assigning long-term land use rights to 
individual households, involving cropland, grassland, and forest land (see e.g. Hu, 1997; Banks, 
2003; Zhang et al., 2012a). According to the current Law of the People's Republic of China on 
the Contracting of Rural Land, use rights of grassland are contracted to individual households 
for a duration of 30-50 years. At the end of the 1970s, land tenure reform was first implemented 
through the Household Production Responsibility System in the crop farming areas of China 
and was completed rapidly and successfully. Research showed that the assignment of individual 
cropland use rights gave farmer the incentive of improved agricultural production and spurred 
the marketing of agricultural goods (see e.g. Ho, 1996; Hu, 1997; Krusekopf, 2002; Banks, 
2003). Based on this outcome, the central government of China continued land tenure reform 
in pastoral areas in the early 1980s and assigned grassland use rights as well as livestock 
property rights that had been owned by the communes to individual households. However, the 
assignment of grassland use rights has not been completed as successfully as that of cropland 
in China (Liu et al., 2015). For instance, compared with the cropland in China, where 
household-based use rights were assigned overnight, the assignment of grassland use rights is 
still incomplete despite efforts for 30 years. By 2014, around 84% of grasslands had been 
allocated to individual households in China, and the central government continues to emphasise 
the need for clarifying grassland use rights for individual households (Ministry of Agriculture 
of China, 2015). In practice, in some areas of Inner Mongolia, only the grasslands for mowing 
forages have been allocated to individual households while the grazing grasslands are still 
owned and used by all of the local households (Li et al., 2007). Scholars (e.g. Richard et al, 
2006; Li and Zhang, 2009; Li, 2012) have identified a number of possible barriers to the 
completion of the land tenure reform in the pastoral areas of China. This paper will explore 
possible reasons by focussing on the aspect of pastoral livestock production. 
Land tenure has been the concern of academia for a long time. The privatisation of grassland 
property rights or use rights has been regarded as a panacea to avoid overgrazing and protect 
the grassland ecosystem, in order to avoid the situation termed 'the tragedy of the commons' 
(Hardin, 1968; McEvoy, 1987; Ybarra, 2009). Coase’s (1960) theorem of property rights also 
argued that a clear assignment of property rights is a precondition for economically efficient 
resource allocation and environmental sustainability. The followers of the 'tragedy of the 
commons' and property rights theories advocate that the grassland resource should be either 
privatised or maintained as common land whilst clearly assigning rights of entry and use to 
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promote the sustainable use of grassland through exclusiveness. Following this conventional 
wisdom, most governments in the world have assigned grassland property rights or use rights 
in an attempt to ensure the sustainable development of grasslands (Li et al., 2014). In line with 
observations about the effects of privatisation of cropland, the central government of China 
believes that the assignment of grassland use rights provides land users with incentives to graze 
animals within the carrying capacity of the land, as well as to increase land investment in order 
to conserve their own grasslands (Banks, 2003). 
However, the findings on the effects of privatising grassland resources are complex (e.g. see Li 
and Zhang, 2009). During recent years, some scholars have expressed concern that the 
traditional common-use system and nomadism have been replaced by private use and settlement 
due to grassland privatisation (Banks et al., 2003). This transformation of traditional 
pastoralism has impeded mobility and flexible grazing (Fernandez-Gimenez, 2000; Wang et al., 
2013) and limited herders’ access to emergency pastures and other key productive resources 
(Niamir-Fuller and Turner, 1999; Fernandez-Gimenez, 2002). This, in turn, has increased 
feeding costs and reduced herders’ ability to withstand natural risks (e.g. Li et al., 2007), 
causing constraints on the development of animal husbandry in pastoral areas. Some voices 
have also stated that grassland privatisation reduces the amount of land available for livestock 
grazing, further leading to a reduction in the number of livestock that an individual can 
potentially own, ultimately resulting in poverty (Mwangi, 2007). In addition, research has 
shown that the carrying capacity of grassland is reduced due to decreased access to 
heterogeneous landscapes (Boone and Hobbs, 2004; Hobbs et al., 2008; Boone et al., 2005). As 
such, the total population of livestock that could be supported by a grassland ecosystem is 
predicted to decline as a result of the spatial and social boundaries stemming from privatisation. 
In fact, much of the growth in animal supply has been coming from rapidly expanding intensive 
breeding systems rather than through traditional grazing systems in pastoral areas (FAO, 2015). 
Similarly, the main production areas for livestock products in China have experienced a 
geographic shift from being pastoral areas to being crop farming areas (Li et al., 2008). The 
market share of livestock products from grazing systems is decreasing compared to that of crop-
livestock mixed or industrialised systems (Squires et al., 2009). This trend is suggested to be 
attributed to the reduction in grass yields due to grassland degradation, and raises environmental 
concern about the ecosystem of permanent grassland (Li et al., 2008; Squires et al., 2009). 
Besides these possible factors, we wish to ascertain whether the privatisation of grasslands has 
played a role in the changes in livestock production of pastoral areas. Despite an abundance of 
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academic arguments and government reports on the results of the privatisation of grassland, 
there is a lack of quantitative studies, especially based on large-scale areas and long-term 
observations (e.g. Li and Huntsinger, 2011; Yu and Farrell, 2013; Conte, 2015). Moreover, the 
existing literature is short of empirical analysis targeting the impact of grassland privatisation 
on livestock production, although some studies are concerned with ecological effectiveness. 
Nevertheless, animal husbandry provides livelihoods to millions of people in pastoral areas and 
has the potential capacity to meet the rapidly increasing global demand for livestock products 
which is stimulated by growing populations, urbanisation and rising disposable incomes (FAO, 
2015). In this regard, livestock production in pastoral areas is a very significant area and one 
which deserves being paid close attention to. 
In the following section, we first describe the land tenure reform and the current livestock 
production in the research region. Next, in section 3, the data collection method is illustrated 
and a descriptive analysis based on the collected data is used to elaborate on the changes in 
livestock production in the pastoral areas compared to crop farming areas. In sections 4 and 5, 
we present the empirical model used in the study and the model results on how land tenure 
reform and other potential factors affect livestock production in the pastoral areas. In section 6, 
we discuss the model results and their underlying reasons. We conclude this paper with remarks 
on the effects of grassland privatisation on livestock production in pastoral areas. 
4.2 Research region 
China has around 400 million hectares of grassland, accounting for nearly 40% of its total 
territory, this being the second largest area of grassland in the world after Australia (Hua and 
Squires, 2015). Inner Mongolia, a province located in the arid and semi-arid areas of northern 
China, has 118.3 million hectares of land; in 2014, its permanent population was 25 million. It 
accounts for 21.7% of China’s permanent area of grasslands. Approximately 67% of the total 
land area in Inner Mongolia is classified as grassland, the majority of which can be sub-
classified as temperate grassland (Angerer et al., 2008). Inner Mongolia plays an important role 
in the supply of animal products as well as in the ecosystem of China due to its extensive 
grasslands. In the pastoral areas populated by Mongolians, the vast majority of local people 
maintain their livelihoods through grazing their livestock on the grasslands (Angerer et al., 
2008). Inner Mongolia was one of the first regions in which land tenure reform was 
implemented on grasslands in China because of its crucial position in China’s grassland 
resource and livestock production (Li and Huntsinger, 2011). 
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According to the current administrative divisions of Inner Mongolia, there are 102 counties, 
including 33 pastoral counties and 21 semi-pastoral counties. The remaining 48 counties are 
dominated by crop farming or urban districts. Pastoral counties are characterised by traditional 
grazing systems and permanent grassland is the dominant land type. In semi-pastoral counties, 
both permanent grassland and cropland are the dominant land types. Mixed crop-livestock 
systems also exist, where intensive animal husbandry and cropping both occur (Waldron et al., 
2010). The majority of the pastoral areas of Inner Mongolia are found in the pastoral counties 
as well as semi-pastoral counties. Figure 4.1 presents the location of Inner Mongolia in China 
and its three types of counties. 
 
Figure 4.1 Inner Mongolia and its 102 counties 
4.2.1 Land tenure reform in the pastoral areas of Inner Mongolia 
Land tenure reform started in Inner Mongolia with the Double Contracts System (Cao Xu 
Shuang Cheng Bao) in 1982. This system aimed at assigning to individual households the 
livestock and grasslands that were managed by the communes during the collectivist period of 
China. Meanwhile, the users (individual households) of the grasslands are regulated in order to 
control their livestock numbers according to a determinant stocking rate with the aim of 
avoiding overuse of grasslands (Ho, 2000). The assignment of property rights over livestock 
was completed promptly but grasslands were not strictly assigned to individual households in 
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the majority of the pastoral areas in the 1980s. Particularly, the use of grasslands merely 
indicated a rough direction and position to herders, but local herders and their animals still 
roamed wherever they preferred. Hinton (1990) called this phenomenon privately controlled 
stock of animals on publicly owned lands in Inner Mongolia. The result was an uncontrolled 
scramble for wherever forage existed, which amounted to a general attack on a range of 
vegetation (Hu, 1997). Subsequently, the assignment of grassland use rights to individual 
households was strengthened by the Two Rights and One System policy (Shuang Quan Yi Zhi) 
in 1996 (Bureau of Animal husbandry of Inner Mongolia, 2000; Li and Zhang, 2009). This 
stimulated the progress of grassland privatisation greatly and is regarded as the second round 
of land tenure reform in the pastoral areas of Inner Mongolia (Yang, 2007). In recent years, 
growing attention has been paid to ensure the long-term stability of grassland use rights to 
individual households, such as confirming grassland plots, areas and contracts (Li, 2012). In 
2015, local governments in Inner Mongolia are still working on clarifying the boundaries of 
grassland use rights for each household and issuing certificates (Bureau of Animal husbandry 
of Inner Mongolia, 2015). 
Compared with crop farming areas, the implementation of the land tenure reform on grasslands 
is relatively complex and has taken a long time. More specifically, the grasslands have been 
subject to several different types of ownership (Yu and Farrell, 2013) and correspondingly, 
various types of land use have arisen since the start of the land tenure reform in Inner Mongolia. 
Table 4.1 provides a typology of the land tenure reform on the changes in formal use rights and 
actual types of grassland use, which is in line with the investigation of the Tibetan plateau by 
Banks et al. (2003). 
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Table 4.1 Typology of land tenure reform on grasslands of Inner Mongolia 
Formal use rights owned by Actual grassland use Private use Joint use Common use 
Individual households  + + +  
A group of households  na + + 
Collective/administrative village na na +  
Source: adapted from “formal and de facto grassland management units” (Banks et al., 2003) 
na indicates not available 
As presented in Table 4.1, with the implementation of land tenure reform, three types of 
ownership of formal grassland use rights have arisen, namely individual household ownership, 
ownership by a group of households and collective ownership. There are also three types of 
actual grassland use, these being private use by individual households, joint use by a group of 
households and common use by all of the villagers. When formal use rights are owned by an 
administrative or natural village, the only type of grassland use is common use. This arose 
primarily before or at the beginning of the implementation of the land tenure reform when the 
grassland rights had not yet been assigned. If the formal use rights are owned by a group of 
households, the land use is either common or joint. This situation mostly occurs in areas where 
the grassland resource is too scarce to be assigned to individual households, or where grassland 
use rights have not been assigned. Private use, joint use and common use exist simultaneously 
when the formal use rights are owned by individual households. The intention of the land tenure 
reform in the pastoral areas, however, is to achieve full private use when use rights are assigned 
to households. This reflects the gap between the household-based assignment of formal use 
rights and the actual adoption of private use. In practice, the specific timing and extent of 
conducting the land tenure reform13, including the changes in formal use rights and use patterns, 
differed among counties in Inner Mongolia. 
4.2.2 Livestock production in Inner Mongolia 
Inner Mongolia is one of the main production regions for animal products in China. In 2013, it 
accounted for 18% of the population of sheep14 of China, ranking first out of all Chinese 
provinces. The mutton output accounted for 22% of the total meat output in China. Six per cent 
                                                 
13In the reminder of the paper, the land tenure reform means the grassland use rights are assigned to individual 
households. 
14 The term 'sheep' in this paper includes both sheep and goats, in accordance with the China Statistical 
Yearbook. 
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of cattle were raised in Inner Mongolia, and 8% of China's total beef output was produced there, 
in both cases ranking second in China. Figures 4.2 and 4.3 present the livestock production of 
Inner Mongolia from 1979 to 2013, based on data from the China Statistical Yearbook (Zhong 
Guo Tong Ji Nian Jian). Livestock production is interpreted by the livestock population and 
meat output. Sheep and cattle are the dominant animals being raised in Inner Mongolia (Zhang 
et al., 2012b). We therefore employ the population of sheep and cattle to represent the livestock 
population, and the outputs of mutton and beef for meat output.  
Figure 4.2 shows that the population of sheep decreased in 1982 and then generally presented 
an increasing trend until 1999, apart from a decrease during 1991-1993. It experienced a sharp 
increase from 2001 to 2004 after a decrease from 1999 to 2001, and remained relatively steady 
between 2005 and 2013. The population of cattle saw slight fluctuations but remained almost 
unchanged between 1979 and 2000. It reached the lowest point in 2001 after a slight decrease 
from 1999 and then experienced an increase between 2002 and 2010, followed by a slight 
decrease until 2013. It is evident that the number of sheep exceeded cattle numbers by a wide 
margin during the whole period.  
 
Figure 4.2 Livestock population of Inner Mongolian from 1979 to 2013  
Figure 4.3 depicts Inner Mongolia's mutton and beef outputs from 1979 to 2013. Until 2002, 
the outputs of mutton and beef experienced fluctuating and slow increases. The output of 
mutton and beef increased sharply between 2002 and 2005, after which the output of mutton 
remained relatively steady, while beef continued to increase slightly between 2006 and 2013. 
In general, mutton output exceeded beef output during the whole period. Mutton output in 2013 
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was around 14 times higher than in 1979, while beef output was 19 times higher in 2013 than 
in 1979.  
 
Figure 4.3 Mutton and beef outputs of Inner Mongolia from 1979 to 2013 
Figure 4.4 illustrates the development of livestock productivity in Inner Mongolia from 1979 
to 2013. The livestock productivity for both sheep and cattle has increased. The increase of 
productivity for cattle experienced obvious fluctuations, while the productivity for sheep saw a 
slight and steady increase. It is evident that the output per cattle increased faster than the output 
per sheep. 
 
Figure 4.4 Livestock productivity of Inner Mongolia from 1979 to 2013 
Although livestock population, meat output and livestock productivity have generally increased 
in Inner Mongolia over time, the importance and competitiveness of its livestock production 
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within China have been threatened by Henan and Shandong provinces, which are the dominant 
crop farming areas of China where intensive animal husbandry systems have developed in 
recent years (Su, 2010). Furthermore, a number of ecological projects for grassland 
conservation and the promotion of non-farming industries have been introduced in Inner 
Mongolia and have impacted upon the development of animal husbandry in the region (Squires 
et al., 2009). As a result, the share represented by animal husbandry in the gross domestic 
product of Inner Mongolia has decreased. Moreover, since 2001, the provincial government of 
Inner Mongolia has laid emphasis on the development of livestock production in its crop 
farming areas instead of in the pastoral areas. In 2007, 70% of livestock production in Inner 
Mongolia was located in crop farming areas (Su, 2010). This geographic shift from pastoral 
areas to the crop farming areas is discussed in the following section. 
4.3 Data description 
4.3.1 Data collection 
We aim to estimate the impact of land tenure reform on pastoral livestock production. The 
pastoral areas are therefore distinguished from the crop farming areas for the purposes of data 
collection. Given that the timing and extent of the implementation of land tenure reform differed 
between counties, our empirical study of the effects of the reform on livestock production is 
conducted based on county-level data. The other factors that are controlled for their potential 
impacts on the pastoral livestock production are grassland condition, market forces, 
technological development and environmental heterogeneity (Li et al., 2008; Tessema et al., 
2014). We therefore collected three types of data at the county-level in Inner Mongolia: survey 
data on land tenure reform of each county, observational data on grassland conditions and 
statistical data on socio-economic indicators.  
First, the data on land tenure reform was collected via questionnaires in each county in Inner 
Mongolia. Based on the typology shown in Table 4.1, the questionnaire focused on when formal 
use rights were owned by collectives, groups and individual households respectively, and when 
grassland was actually in common use, joint use or private use. Questionnaires were sent to the 
Animal Husbandry Bureau of each county and were answered by key informants on local land 
tenure reform. Interviews were conducted by telephone to confirm the answers after receiving 
feedback from each county. We ultimately obtained valid feedback from 74 out of 102 counties. 
In addition, we conducted interviews with the officers who are working in the provincial 
institutes of Animal Husbandry of Inner Mongolia as well as with local herders to verify the 
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between counties, our empirical study of the effects of the reform on livestock production is 
conducted based on county-level data. The other factors that are controlled for their potential 
impacts on the pastoral livestock production are grassland condition, market forces, 
technological development and environmental heterogeneity (Li et al., 2008; Tessema et al., 
2014). We therefore collected three types of data at the county-level in Inner Mongolia: survey 
data on land tenure reform of each county, observational data on grassland conditions and 
statistical data on socio-economic indicators.  
First, the data on land tenure reform was collected via questionnaires in each county in Inner 
Mongolia. Based on the typology shown in Table 4.1, the questionnaire focused on when formal 
use rights were owned by collectives, groups and individual households respectively, and when 
grassland was actually in common use, joint use or private use. Questionnaires were sent to the 
Animal Husbandry Bureau of each county and were answered by key informants on local land 
tenure reform. Interviews were conducted by telephone to confirm the answers after receiving 
feedback from each county. We ultimately obtained valid feedback from 74 out of 102 counties. 
In addition, we conducted interviews with the officers who are working in the provincial 
institutes of Animal Husbandry of Inner Mongolia as well as with local herders to verify the 
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progress of land tenure reform on local grasslands. Second, information about grassland 
conditions was obtained based on remote sensing and an analysis of Geographic Information 
Systems. This relies on a database developed by the Chinese Academy of Sciences with original 
data from Landsat Thematic Mapper / Enhanced Thematic Mapper (Plus) (TM/ETM+) images 
(Deng et al., 2011). GIS satellite images were only collected in 1985, 1995, 2000, 2005 and 
2008. We therefore use the average growth rate of grassland areas between the years of 
observation to estimate the grassland condition for each year. Third, the data on socio-economic 
indicators is based on existing statistical data collected by local governments. Specifically, the 
data about livestock production was gathered from the Statistical Yearbooks of Inner Mongolia. 
Market forces are represented by the real producer price of mutton and beef. This information 
was collected based on the Annual Compilation of Cost-benefit Data of Chinese Agricultural 
products (Zhong Guo Nong Chan Pin Cheng Ben Shou Yi Hui Bian) and deflated by a producer 
price index. Specific data on technological development is lacking, and is thus proxied by a 
time variable. The factor of environmental heterogeneity among counties is removed by the 
fixed effects model as a time-invariant variable. 
The research period covers 1985-2008, which includes the main period when land tenure reform 
was implemented on the grasslands of Inner Mongolia. After excluding the urbanised counties 
and counties that underwent changes in administrative regions during the research period, 60 
counties are retained in the research sample. They include 27 pastoral counties, 18 semi-pastoral 
counties and 15 crop farming counties. In fact, the crop farming counties only have a few 
permanent grasslands and their livestock production relies mainly on cropping rather than 
grazing. Furthermore, household-based assignment of grassland use rights was barely 
implemented because the areas of grasslands in most crop farming counties are too small to be 
subdivided. Therefore, the information from crop farming counties is only used in the 
descriptive analysis to compare the relative changes in livestock production between crop 
farming areas (crop farming counties) and pastoral areas (pastoral and semi-pastoral counties).  
4.3.2 Descriptive analysis 
Based on the collected data, we first illustrate the progress of the land tenure reform15 in the 
pastoral areas of Inner Mongolia from 1985 to 2008. In Figure 4.5, the proportion of counties 
                                                 
15 Considering that some counties did not complete the land tenure reform fully, we denote a county as having 
implemented the land tenure reform if at least 50% of the grassland area of this county has been assigned to 
individual households.  
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in which formal use rights were assigned to households increased from 9% in 1985 to 91% in 
2008; the proportion of counties that adopted actual private use rose from 7% in 1985 to 71% 
in 2008. A sharp increase in formal and actual use rights adoption is observed between 1995 
and 1998. This is consistent with the second round of land tenure reform implemented in this 
period. It can be seen that the adoption of actual private use lagged behind the assignment of 
formal use rights; neither were fully completed until 2008. 
 
Figure 4.5 Progress of the land tenure reform in the pastoral areas of Inner Mongolia from 
1985 to 2008 
Figures 4.6, 4.7 and 4.8 demonstrate the changes in livestock production and productivity of 
the pastoral areas relative to the crop farming areas from 1985 to 2008. The changes are 
represented as an index where the level in 1985 is set equal to 100. Figure 4.6 indicates that 
both sheep population and mutton output increased in pastoral areas as well as in crop farming 
areas from 1985 to 2008, and that the increase of sheep population was slower than that of 
mutton output, especially after 1995. In addition, after 2001, the growth rate of the sheep 
population in crop farming areas significantly exceeded that in pastoral areas. And the growth 
rate of mutton output of crop farming areas exceeded that of pastoral areas from 1999 onwards. 
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progress of land tenure reform on local grasslands. Second, information about grassland 
conditions was obtained based on remote sensing and an analysis of Geographic Information 
Systems. This relies on a database developed by the Chinese Academy of Sciences with original 
data from Landsat Thematic Mapper / Enhanced Thematic Mapper (Plus) (TM/ETM+) images 
(Deng et al., 2011). GIS satellite images were only collected in 1985, 1995, 2000, 2005 and 
2008. We therefore use the average growth rate of grassland areas between the years of 
observation to estimate the grassland condition for each year. Third, the data on socio-economic 
indicators is based on existing statistical data collected by local governments. Specifically, the 
data about livestock production was gathered from the Statistical Yearbooks of Inner Mongolia. 
Market forces are represented by the real producer price of mutton and beef. This information 
was collected based on the Annual Compilation of Cost-benefit Data of Chinese Agricultural 
products (Zhong Guo Nong Chan Pin Cheng Ben Shou Yi Hui Bian) and deflated by a producer 
price index. Specific data on technological development is lacking, and is thus proxied by a 
time variable. The factor of environmental heterogeneity among counties is removed by the 
fixed effects model as a time-invariant variable. 
The research period covers 1985-2008, which includes the main period when land tenure reform 
was implemented on the grasslands of Inner Mongolia. After excluding the urbanised counties 
and counties that underwent changes in administrative regions during the research period, 60 
counties are retained in the research sample. They include 27 pastoral counties, 18 semi-pastoral 
counties and 15 crop farming counties. In fact, the crop farming counties only have a few 
permanent grasslands and their livestock production relies mainly on cropping rather than 
grazing. Furthermore, household-based assignment of grassland use rights was barely 
implemented because the areas of grasslands in most crop farming counties are too small to be 
subdivided. Therefore, the information from crop farming counties is only used in the 
descriptive analysis to compare the relative changes in livestock production between crop 
farming areas (crop farming counties) and pastoral areas (pastoral and semi-pastoral counties).  
4.3.2 Descriptive analysis 
Based on the collected data, we first illustrate the progress of the land tenure reform15 in the 
pastoral areas of Inner Mongolia from 1985 to 2008. In Figure 4.5, the proportion of counties 
                                                 
15 Considering that some counties did not complete the land tenure reform fully, we denote a county as having 
implemented the land tenure reform if at least 50% of the grassland area of this county has been assigned to 
individual households.  
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Figure 4.6 Comparison of sheep population and mutton output between pastoral and crop 
farming areas of Inner Mongolia from 1985 to 2008 
Figure 4.7 shows that the cattle population increased slightly compared with 1985, and that the 
output of beef has increased significantly in both pastoral and crop farming areas over the past 
24 years. The increase of beef output was more obvious than that of cattle population. Moreover, 
the growth rate of the cattle population in pastoral areas was exceeded by that in crop farming 
areas from 2001 onwards. Also, the growth rate of the beef output in pastoral areas was 
exceeded by the beef output in crop farming areas after 2000. 
 
Figure 4.7 Comparison of cattle population and beef output between pastoral and crop 
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0
400
800
1200
1600
2000
2400
2800
19
85
19
86
19
87
19
88
19
89
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
sheep population in
pastoral areas
sheep population in
crop farming areas
mutton output in
pastoral areas
mutton output in
crop farming areas
8000
Index (Year 1985=100)
0
400
800
1200
1600
2000
2400
2800
19
85
19
86
19
87
19
88
19
89
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
cattle population in
pastoral areas
cattle population in
crop farming areas
beef output in
pastoral areas
beef output in crop
farming areas
Index (Year 1985=100)
72 
 
Figure 4.8 compares the development of livestock productivity between pastoral and crop 
farming areas from 1985 to 2008. It is evident that the increment of output per sheep in pastoral 
areas proved to be larger than that of crop farming areas after 2002. The increment of output 
per cattle in pastoral areas was larger than that of crop farming areas since 1999. The 
development of output per cattle was faster than per sheep in both areas. 
 
Figure 4.8 Comparison of livestock productivity between pastoral and crop farming areas of 
Inner Mongolia from 1985 to 2008 
In short, land tenure reform was implemented progressively in the pastoral areas in the period 
1985-2008. Meanwhile, it appears that the increase of livestock production was faster in crop 
farming areas than in pastoral areas, but conversely the development of livestock productivity 
was slower in crop farming areas. It can be seen that the competitiveness of animal husbandry 
in pastoral areas has been threatened by crop farming areas in recent decades as the livestock 
population and meat output has grown faster in crop farming areas since around 2000. This is 
consistent with the fact that in China, the main producing areas of livestock products have 
experienced an adjustment, moving from a grazing system to a crop-livestock mixed system 
and from pastoral areas to crop farming areas (Li et al., 2008). Interestingly, the development 
of livestock productivity was faster in pastoral areas than in crop farming areas, which may be 
attributed to the transformation of traditional pastoralism in the pastoral areas of Inner Mongolia. 
As such, we assume that land tenure reform constrained the increase of livestock production, 
but spurred the development of livestock productivity of pastoral areas. We will assess this 
assumption with an empirical model based on the data from 45 sample counties of pastoral 
areas in Inner Mongolia.  
0
400
800
1200
1600
2000
2400
2800
19
85
19
86
19
87
19
88
19
89
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
output per sheep in
pastoral areas
output per sheep in
crop farming areas
output per cattle in
pastoral areas
output per cattle in
crop farming areas
Index (Year 1985=100)
471 
 
 
Figure 4.6 Comparison of sheep population and mutton output between pastoral and crop 
farming areas of Inner Mongolia from 1985 to 2008 
Figure 4.7 shows that the cattle population increased slightly compared with 1985, and that the 
output of beef has increased significantly in both pastoral and crop farming areas over the past 
24 years. The increase of beef output was more obvious than that of cattle population. Moreover, 
the growth rate of the cattle population in pastoral areas was exceeded by that in crop farming 
areas from 2001 onwards. Also, the growth rate of the beef output in pastoral areas was 
exceeded by the beef output in crop farming areas after 2000. 
 
Figure 4.7 Comparison of cattle population and beef output between pastoral and crop 
farming areas of Inner Mongolia from 1985 to 2008 
0
400
800
1200
1600
2000
2400
2800
19
85
19
86
19
87
19
88
19
89
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
sheep population in
pastoral areas
sheep population in
crop farming areas
mutton output in
pastoral areas
mutton output in
crop farming areas
8000
Index (Year 1985=100)
0
400
800
1200
1600
2000
2400
2800
19
85
19
86
19
87
19
88
19
89
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
cattle population in
pastoral areas
cattle population in
crop farming areas
beef output in
pastoral areas
beef output in crop
farming areas
Index (Year 1985=100)
72 
 
Figure 4.8 compares the development of livestock productivity between pastoral and crop 
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4.4 Empirical model 
A fixed effects model is widely used in economic research, primarily to study the causes of 
changes within entities over time (e.g., Fergusson et al., 2002; Huang et al., 2006). The model 
employs within transformation to remove all time-invariant (fixed) explanatory variables, i.e. 
the model is performed in deviations from individual means (Verbeek, 2012). As such, the fixed 
effects model provides a method that takes observable as well as unobservable time-invariant 
explanatory variables into account, but the estimation is not dependent on the value of time-
invariant (fixed) variables (Verbeek, 2012). Such an approach is appropriate in this study 
considering that the results of land tenure reform within each county over time can be studied 
effectively by controlling for the unmeasured heterogeneity among counties. On the other hand, 
the explanatory variables of land tenure reform we are interested in show changes in value 
across our research period for a substantial proportion of counties in our data (see Figure 4.5), 
which satisfies the basic requirement of the fixed effects model (Daun-Barnett, 2011). In 
addition, our research sample attempts to include all counties in the pastoral areas of Inner 
Mongolia, rather than random draws, which preliminarily indicates that a fixed effects model 
is more appropriate than a random effects model (Verbeek, 2012).  
Based on the theoretical framework of the fixed effects model, we formulate the effects of the 
land tenure reform and other potential factors on livestock production into the following 
equations: 
݈݋݃ሺ ௜ܵ௧ሻ ൌ ݏ௜ ൅ ܽଵ݈݋݃ሺܴ௜௧ିଵሻ ൅ ܽଶሺͳ ሺܴ௜௧ିଵΤ ሻሻ ൅ ܽଷ݈݋݃ሺܯ௜௧ିଵሻ ൅ ܽସ݈݋݃ሺ ௜ܶ௧ିଵሻ ൅ ܽହ݈݋݃ሺܩ௜௧ିଵሻ
൅ ܽ଺ ௧ܻ ൅ ܽ଻ ௜ܲ כ ௧ܻ ൅ ᖡ௜௧ሺͳሻ 
݈݋݃ሺܥ௜௧ሻ ൌ ݃௜ ൅ ܾଵ݈݋݃ሺܴ௜௧ିଵሻ ൅ ܾଶሺͳ ሺܴ௜௧ିଵΤ ሻሻ ൅ ܾଷ݈݋݃ሺܤ௜௧ିଵሻ ൅ ܾସ݈݋݃ሺ ௜ܶ௧ିଵሻ ൅ ܾହ݈݋݃ሺܩ௜௧ିଵሻ
൅ ܾ଺ ௧ܻ ൅ ܾ଻ ௜ܲ כ ௧ܻ ൅ Ɋ௜௧ሺʹሻ 
݈݋݃ሺ ௜ܷ௧ሻ ൌ ݑ௜ ൅ ܿଵ݈݋݃ሺܴ௜௧ିଵሻ ൅ ܿଶሺͳ ሺܴ௜௧ିଵΤ ሻሻ ൅ ܿଷ݈݋݃ሺܯ௜௧ିଵሻ ൅ ܿସ݈݋݃ሺ ௜ܶ௧ିଵሻ ൅ ܿହ݈݋݃ሺܩ௜௧ିଵሻ
൅ ܿ଺ ௧ܻ ൅ ܿ଻ ௜ܲ כ ௧ܻ ൅ ߣ௜௧ሺ͵ሻ 
݈݋݃ሺܨ௜௧ሻ ൌ ௜݂ ൅ ݀ଵ݈݋݃ሺܴ௜௧ିଵሻ ൅ ݀ଶሺͳ ሺܴ௜௧ିଵΤ ሻሻ ൅ ݀ଷ݈݋݃ሺܤ௜௧ିଵሻ ൅ ݀ସ݈݋݃ሺ ௜ܶ௧ିଵሻ ൅ ݀ହ݈݋݃ሺܩ௜௧ିଵሻ
൅ ݀଺ ௧ܻ ൅ ݀଻ ௜ܲ כ ௧ܻ ൅ ߜ௜௧ሺͶሻ 
where i and t present the ith county and year t. Variables are defined in Table 4.2 and summary 
statistics are provided.  
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4.4 Empirical model 
A fixed effects model is widely used in economic research, primarily to study the causes of 
changes within entities over time (e.g., Fergusson et al., 2002; Huang et al., 2006). The model 
employs within transformation to remove all time-invariant (fixed) explanatory variables, i.e. 
the model is performed in deviations from individual means (Verbeek, 2012). As such, the fixed 
effects model provides a method that takes observable as well as unobservable time-invariant 
explanatory variables into account, but the estimation is not dependent on the value of time-
invariant (fixed) variables (Verbeek, 2012). Such an approach is appropriate in this study 
considering that the results of land tenure reform within each county over time can be studied 
effectively by controlling for the unmeasured heterogeneity among counties. On the other hand, 
the explanatory variables of land tenure reform we are interested in show changes in value 
across our research period for a substantial proportion of counties in our data (see Figure 4.5), 
which satisfies the basic requirement of the fixed effects model (Daun-Barnett, 2011). In 
addition, our research sample attempts to include all counties in the pastoral areas of Inner 
Mongolia, rather than random draws, which preliminarily indicates that a fixed effects model 
is more appropriate than a random effects model (Verbeek, 2012).  
Based on the theoretical framework of the fixed effects model, we formulate the effects of the 
land tenure reform and other potential factors on livestock production into the following 
equations: 
݈݋݃ሺ ௜ܵ௧ሻ ൌ ݏ௜ ൅ ܽଵ݈݋݃ሺܴ௜௧ିଵሻ ൅ ܽଶሺͳ ሺܴ௜௧ିଵΤ ሻሻ ൅ ܽଷ݈݋݃ሺܯ௜௧ିଵሻ ൅ ܽସ݈݋݃ሺ ௜ܶ௧ିଵሻ ൅ ܽହ݈݋݃ሺܩ௜௧ିଵሻ
൅ ܽ଺ ௧ܻ ൅ ܽ଻ ௜ܲ כ ௧ܻ ൅ ᖡ௜௧ሺͳሻ 
݈݋݃ሺܥ௜௧ሻ ൌ ݃௜ ൅ ܾଵ݈݋݃ሺܴ௜௧ିଵሻ ൅ ܾଶሺͳ ሺܴ௜௧ିଵΤ ሻሻ ൅ ܾଷ݈݋݃ሺܤ௜௧ିଵሻ ൅ ܾସ݈݋݃ሺ ௜ܶ௧ିଵሻ ൅ ܾହ݈݋݃ሺܩ௜௧ିଵሻ
൅ ܾ଺ ௧ܻ ൅ ܾ଻ ௜ܲ כ ௧ܻ ൅ Ɋ௜௧ሺʹሻ 
݈݋݃ሺ ௜ܷ௧ሻ ൌ ݑ௜ ൅ ܿଵ݈݋݃ሺܴ௜௧ିଵሻ ൅ ܿଶሺͳ ሺܴ௜௧ିଵΤ ሻሻ ൅ ܿଷ݈݋݃ሺܯ௜௧ିଵሻ ൅ ܿସ݈݋݃ሺ ௜ܶ௧ିଵሻ ൅ ܿହ݈݋݃ሺܩ௜௧ିଵሻ
൅ ܿ଺ ௧ܻ ൅ ܿ଻ ௜ܲ כ ௧ܻ ൅ ߣ௜௧ሺ͵ሻ 
݈݋݃ሺܨ௜௧ሻ ൌ ௜݂ ൅ ݀ଵ݈݋݃ሺܴ௜௧ିଵሻ ൅ ݀ଶሺͳ ሺܴ௜௧ିଵΤ ሻሻ ൅ ݀ଷ݈݋݃ሺܤ௜௧ିଵሻ ൅ ݀ସ݈݋݃ሺ ௜ܶ௧ିଵሻ ൅ ݀ହ݈݋݃ሺܩ௜௧ିଵሻ
൅ ݀଺ ௧ܻ ൅ ݀଻ ௜ܲ כ ௧ܻ ൅ ߜ௜௧ሺͶሻ 
where i and t present the ith county and year t. Variables are defined in Table 4.2 and summary 
statistics are provided.  
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Sheep and cattle population and mutton and beef output are used to represent the livestock 
production. The ratios of these four indicators in year t compared with the base year 1985 
( ௜ܵ௧ǡ ܥ௜௧ǡ ௜ܷ௧ܨ௜௧), expressed in logarithms, are employed as the four dependent variables in 
equations (1)-(4). The four equations are denoted as the sheep population, cattle population, 
mutton output and beef output models, respectively. Variable ܴ௜௧  indicates the land tenure 
reform of county i in year t, which is presented by the number of years in which the formal use 
rights of grassland have been owned by individual households in county i by year t. We assume 
that land tenure reform has a non-linear relationship with livestock production. Plenty of 
scholars have proved the existence of a nonlinear relationship between access to land and 
agricultural production (e.g. Finan et al., 2005). Ostrom (2007) claimed that the problems linked 
with social-ecological systems require serious study which take account of complex, 
multivariable, nonlinear, cross-scale, and changing systems. Our functions attempt to explore 
the trend of livestock production under the land tenure reform over time based on the 
assumption of their non-linear relationship, which can be concave, convex, quasi-concave or 
quasi-convex. The logarithm and reciprocal of the variable of land tenure reform are employed 
to present the non-linear relationships20. Considering that the value of the land tenure reform 
variable is zero for some counties as they had not implemented the reform by 2008, we add a 
small original value (e.g., 0.01) 21 to ܴ௜௧  when ܴ௜௧  is specified in ݈݋݃ሺܴ௜௧ሻ orͳ ሺܴ௜௧Τ ሻ. 
Based on the existing academic research, the factors of market forces, grassland condition, 
technology development and environmental heterogeneity are widely suggested to impact the 
pastoral livestock production (Li et al., 2008; Squires et al., 2009; Tessema et al., 2014). As 
such, they are considered as control variables in our functions for disentangling the impact of 
land tenure reform. Market forces are proxied by the local mutton price (ܯ௜௧) and the beef price 
(ܤ௜௧) which are expected to affect supply decisions of livestock producers (Komarek et al., 
2012). The grassland condition refers to the quantity and quality of grasslands. It indicates the 
carrying capacity for livestock, reflecting grassland degradation and climate change factors 
such as temperature and water availability (Henry et al., 2012). Specifically in our model, the 
ratio of total grassland area in year t over that in 1985 is used to present the changes in quantity 
                                                 
20We have also tested a model with a quadratic term instead of the reciprocal to specify the non-linear 
relationship. The results of both model specifications were comparable, which indicates the model specification 
is reliable and the model results are robust (see appendix 4-B for details of the specification with the quadratic 
form). 
21 0.01 is small enough to be regarded as the original value because we tried smaller values (such as 0.001, and 
0.0001) and obtained consistent model results. 
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of grassland ( ௜ܶ௧). The grassland quality is presented by the share of the area of good quality 
grassland22 in the total grassland area in year t (ܩ௜௧).  
Technological development is presented by the time variable ௧ܻ. It should be noted that the 
development of technology in pastoral areas is mostly government-driven, mainly as a result of 
the growing interest of the central government in the ecological benefits of grasslands in recent 
years. For instance, a series of Ecological Construction Programs for grassland conservation 
have been implemented since 2000 to develop intensive animal husbandry through improving 
the technology of animal husbandry (Li et al., 2014). These have stimulated the improvement 
of forage production, feeding and fattening techniques and the use of improved breeds (Liao, 
2009). The time variable ୲  is therefore used to interpret the impact of these ecological 
programs as well. ௜ܲ is a dummy variable that is one for pastoral counties and zero otherwise. 
The interaction term of ௧ܻ  and ௜ܲ  is included in the equations to recognise the differences 
between pastoral counties and semi-pastoral counties in terms of technological development 
and ecological policies. Apart from the time and dummy variables, we treat all independent 
variables with a one year lag because market forces, grassland condition and land tenure reform 
are all considered to affect livestock production with a time delay. Moreover, market forces and 
grassland condition are used in logarithmic form.  
Finally, other factors such as elevation, terrain slope and distance to the provincial capital, 
which are not expected to change significantly over time, are treated as time-invariant (fixed) 
factors. They are represented by the terms ݏ௜, ݃௜, ݑ௜ and ௜݂ in the models. The coefficients of 
the independent variables are ܽ௡, ܾ௡, ܿ௡ and ݀௡ (n=1, 2, ... 7) and the random error terms are 
ᖡ௜௧, Ɋ௜௧, ߣ௜௧ and ߜ௜௧. There are 1035 observations used in the fixed effects model, covering 45 
counties and 23 years. 
4.5 Model results 
Before the estimation, we first conduct a Hausman test to choose between the fixed effects or 
random effects regression as the estimation technique. The test results for the models of sheep 
population, mutton output and beef output reject the null hypothesis at p<0.01, indicating that 
the fixed effects regression is more appropriate. Only the test result for the model of cattle 
                                                 
22 ‘Good quality grassland’ denotes grassland where the canopy cover of grass is more than 20%. Grasslands are 
divided into three categories according to the canopy cover, namely dense grassland, moderate grassland and 
sparse grassland (Deng et al., 2011). In this paper, good quality grassland includes dense grassland and moderate 
grassland. 
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Sheep and cattle population and mutton and beef output are used to represent the livestock 
production. The ratios of these four indicators in year t compared with the base year 1985 
( ௜ܵ௧ǡ ܥ௜௧ǡ ௜ܷ௧ܨ௜௧), expressed in logarithms, are employed as the four dependent variables in 
equations (1)-(4). The four equations are denoted as the sheep population, cattle population, 
mutton output and beef output models, respectively. Variable ܴ௜௧  indicates the land tenure 
reform of county i in year t, which is presented by the number of years in which the formal use 
rights of grassland have been owned by individual households in county i by year t. We assume 
that land tenure reform has a non-linear relationship with livestock production. Plenty of 
scholars have proved the existence of a nonlinear relationship between access to land and 
agricultural production (e.g. Finan et al., 2005). Ostrom (2007) claimed that the problems linked 
with social-ecological systems require serious study which take account of complex, 
multivariable, nonlinear, cross-scale, and changing systems. Our functions attempt to explore 
the trend of livestock production under the land tenure reform over time based on the 
assumption of their non-linear relationship, which can be concave, convex, quasi-concave or 
quasi-convex. The logarithm and reciprocal of the variable of land tenure reform are employed 
to present the non-linear relationships20. Considering that the value of the land tenure reform 
variable is zero for some counties as they had not implemented the reform by 2008, we add a 
small original value (e.g., 0.01) 21 to ܴ௜௧  when ܴ௜௧  is specified in ݈݋݃ሺܴ௜௧ሻ orͳ ሺܴ௜௧Τ ሻ. 
Based on the existing academic research, the factors of market forces, grassland condition, 
technology development and environmental heterogeneity are widely suggested to impact the 
pastoral livestock production (Li et al., 2008; Squires et al., 2009; Tessema et al., 2014). As 
such, they are considered as control variables in our functions for disentangling the impact of 
land tenure reform. Market forces are proxied by the local mutton price (ܯ௜௧) and the beef price 
(ܤ௜௧) which are expected to affect supply decisions of livestock producers (Komarek et al., 
2012). The grassland condition refers to the quantity and quality of grasslands. It indicates the 
carrying capacity for livestock, reflecting grassland degradation and climate change factors 
such as temperature and water availability (Henry et al., 2012). Specifically in our model, the 
ratio of total grassland area in year t over that in 1985 is used to present the changes in quantity 
                                                 
20We have also tested a model with a quadratic term instead of the reciprocal to specify the non-linear 
relationship. The results of both model specifications were comparable, which indicates the model specification 
is reliable and the model results are robust (see appendix 4-B for details of the specification with the quadratic 
form). 
21 0.01 is small enough to be regarded as the original value because we tried smaller values (such as 0.001, and 
0.0001) and obtained consistent model results. 
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of grassland ( ௜ܶ௧). The grassland quality is presented by the share of the area of good quality 
grassland22 in the total grassland area in year t (ܩ௜௧).  
Technological development is presented by the time variable ௧ܻ. It should be noted that the 
development of technology in pastoral areas is mostly government-driven, mainly as a result of 
the growing interest of the central government in the ecological benefits of grasslands in recent 
years. For instance, a series of Ecological Construction Programs for grassland conservation 
have been implemented since 2000 to develop intensive animal husbandry through improving 
the technology of animal husbandry (Li et al., 2014). These have stimulated the improvement 
of forage production, feeding and fattening techniques and the use of improved breeds (Liao, 
2009). The time variable ୲  is therefore used to interpret the impact of these ecological 
programs as well. ௜ܲ is a dummy variable that is one for pastoral counties and zero otherwise. 
The interaction term of ௧ܻ  and ௜ܲ  is included in the equations to recognise the differences 
between pastoral counties and semi-pastoral counties in terms of technological development 
and ecological policies. Apart from the time and dummy variables, we treat all independent 
variables with a one year lag because market forces, grassland condition and land tenure reform 
are all considered to affect livestock production with a time delay. Moreover, market forces and 
grassland condition are used in logarithmic form.  
Finally, other factors such as elevation, terrain slope and distance to the provincial capital, 
which are not expected to change significantly over time, are treated as time-invariant (fixed) 
factors. They are represented by the terms ݏ௜, ݃௜, ݑ௜ and ௜݂ in the models. The coefficients of 
the independent variables are ܽ௡, ܾ௡, ܿ௡ and ݀௡ (n=1, 2, ... 7) and the random error terms are 
ᖡ௜௧, Ɋ௜௧, ߣ௜௧ and ߜ௜௧. There are 1035 observations used in the fixed effects model, covering 45 
counties and 23 years. 
4.5 Model results 
Before the estimation, we first conduct a Hausman test to choose between the fixed effects or 
random effects regression as the estimation technique. The test results for the models of sheep 
population, mutton output and beef output reject the null hypothesis at p<0.01, indicating that 
the fixed effects regression is more appropriate. Only the test result for the model of cattle 
                                                 
22 ‘Good quality grassland’ denotes grassland where the canopy cover of grass is more than 20%. Grasslands are 
divided into three categories according to the canopy cover, namely dense grassland, moderate grassland and 
sparse grassland (Deng et al., 2011). In this paper, good quality grassland includes dense grassland and moderate 
grassland. 
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population does not reject the null hypothesis at p<0.01. We conducted the random effects and 
fixed effects regression for the model of cattle population. The results are comparable, with the 
exception of the coefficient of the constant term. To compare the results of the four models 
consistently, we use the fixed effects regression for all of them.  
Furthermore, we discuss the exogeneity of the variable of land tenure reform (ܴ௜௧). ܴ௜௧ indicates 
the number of years for which formal grassland use rights have been assigned. In practice, the 
assignment of formal grassland use rights was implemented by the county-level government 
based on top-down executive orders. According to our survey, the differences in the assignment 
of formal grassland use rights among counties resulted mainly from the implementation 
efficiency of each county government and the county’s geographical location. For instance, a 
county that is located in a remote area was less motivated to assign formal use rights. In this 
regard, the speed of implementation of the land tenure reform by local governments was not 
related to local livestock production, grassland condition, or other factors that we include in the 
model. Hence, we treat ܴ௜௧  as an exogenous variable. In contrast, the decision by local 
households to actually adopt private use is likely to have taken into account the grassland 
condition, living customs, production pattern etc., and would therefore have created a potential 
problem of endogeneity. The exogeneity of policy implementation in China was also supported 
by Liu et al. (2010) based on their research about the implementation of the Sloping Land 
Conversion Program (SLCP). 
The fixed effects model is used to estimate our four models based on the panel data set. The 
model results about how the factors impacted upon livestock production in the pastoral areas 
are listed in Table 4.3. 
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population does not reject the null hypothesis at p<0.01. We conducted the random effects and 
fixed effects regression for the model of cattle population. The results are comparable, with the 
exception of the coefficient of the constant term. To compare the results of the four models 
consistently, we use the fixed effects regression for all of them.  
Furthermore, we discuss the exogeneity of the variable of land tenure reform (ܴ௜௧). ܴ௜௧ indicates 
the number of years for which formal grassland use rights have been assigned. In practice, the 
assignment of formal grassland use rights was implemented by the county-level government 
based on top-down executive orders. According to our survey, the differences in the assignment 
of formal grassland use rights among counties resulted mainly from the implementation 
efficiency of each county government and the county’s geographical location. For instance, a 
county that is located in a remote area was less motivated to assign formal use rights. In this 
regard, the speed of implementation of the land tenure reform by local governments was not 
related to local livestock production, grassland condition, or other factors that we include in the 
model. Hence, we treat ܴ௜௧  as an exogenous variable. In contrast, the decision by local 
households to actually adopt private use is likely to have taken into account the grassland 
condition, living customs, production pattern etc., and would therefore have created a potential 
problem of endogeneity. The exogeneity of policy implementation in China was also supported 
by Liu et al. (2010) based on their research about the implementation of the Sloping Land 
Conversion Program (SLCP). 
The fixed effects model is used to estimate our four models based on the panel data set. The 
model results about how the factors impacted upon livestock production in the pastoral areas 
are listed in Table 4.3. 
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the mutton price in year t-1 increases by 1%. Similarly, cattle population (beef output) in year t will 
increase by 0.18% (0.19%) when the beef price in year t-1 increases by 1%. The better grassland 
condition also has a significant and positive effect on livestock production. Cattle population in year t 
will increase by 1.54% if the total grassland area in year t-1 increases by 1%. Sheep population (mutton 
output) in year t will increase by 1.17% (1.67%) if the good quality grassland area in year t-1 increases 
by 1%. In an attempt to improve grassland condition, China has implemented various ecological projects. 
However, in reality, 90% of the grasslands are still degraded to various degrees (Mei et al., 2013). For 
example, between 1991 and 2002, 3.1% of the available natural grassland was lost, either through its 
being degraded into unused land, or being transformed into other purposes. During the same period, 
1.68 million hectares of land was rehabilitated into natural grassland through eco-environmental 
projects. This resulted in a net decline of 6.38million hectares (around 2.4% of the available natural 
grassland) (Qu et al., 2011). In this regard, the deteriorating grasslands could have impeded the livestock 
production. 
The coefficients of the time variable are significant and positive in four models. It indicates that the 
technology development affects livestock production positively, and it can be seen that the positive 
effects are stronger with respect to meat output than for the livestock population. The interaction term 
of the time variable and the dummy variable of pastoral counties is also significant, but negative, in the 
cattle population, mutton output and beef output models. It indicates that cattle population, mutton 
output and beef output increase less in the pastoral counties than in the semi-pastoral counties with 
technology development. Sheep population increases significantly without a distinction between 
pastoral or semi-pastoral counties. In general, it appears that the development of livestock production 
is slower in the pastoral counties than in the semi-pastoral counties over time, with the exception of the 
development of the sheep population which does not differ between county types. Notably, Figures 4.6 
and 4.7 showed that livestock production experienced a geographic shift from pastoral areas to the crop 
farming areas. Our results extended this finding to the specific comparison between pastoral counties 
and semi-pastoral counties. That is, livestock production, with exception of the sheep population, has 
experienced a geographic shift from semi-pastoral counties to pastoral counties in the pastoral areas. 
4.6 Discussion 
The model results demonstrate that the implementation of land tenure reform has significantly 
constrained the increase of livestock population and meat output in the pastoral areas of Inner Mongolia. 
This finding can be explained in various ways. On the one hand, the implementation of land tenure 
reform may have effectively controlled the increase in livestock population, as was the aim of land 
tenure reform, which expected to internalise the social costs of overgrazing by privatisation and thereby 
avoid the tragedy of the commons. The increase in meat output is correspondingly restricted due to the 
79
First, we focus on the coefficients of ݈݋݃ (ܴ௜௧ିଵ) and 1 (ܴ௜௧ିଵΤ ), indicating the effects of the land tenure 
reform on livestock production over time. All of these coefficients are significant and negative in the 
four models. Based on the coefficients of ݈݋݃ (ܴ௜௧ିଵ) and 1 (ܴ௜௧ିଵΤ ), quasi-concave curves are obtained 
as depicted in Fig. 9. The horizontal axis presents the number of years that the land tenure reform has 
been implemented and the vertical axis shows the livestock production index (livestock production in 
the first year of land tenure reform equals 100). Considering the longest duration for formal use rights 
privatised until 2008 was 26 years in our research sample, we determined the maximum year of the 
horizontal-axis as 26.
Figure 4.9 Relationship between land tenure reform and livestock production
In Figure 4.9, the indexes of sheep population, cattle population, mutton output and beef output are all 
decreasing with the number of years that the land tenure reform is implemented, and the reduction is 
fastest in the first years of the reform while it slows down in later years. Moreover, the decrease in sheep 
population is faster than that of mutton output, indicating that land tenure reform had a more negative 
impact on the sheep population than on mutton output.  Similarly, land tenure reform has affected the 
cattle population more than beef output as the decrease in cattle population is faster than that of beef 
output. These results indicate that the implementation of land tenure reform promotes the development 
of livestock productivity in pastoral areas although it constrains the increase in livestock population. 
Moreover, the mutton output (sheep population) decreases faster than beef output (cattle population).
It is interesting to compare Figure 4.9 with Figures 4.6 and 4.7 – which present the increasing trends in 
the sheep population, mutton output and beef output after 1985. The seemingly contradicting trends of 
livestock production in these figures can be explained by the effects of the other factors considered in 
our models. For instance, the producer price has a significant and positive effect on livestock production.
The mutton price elasticity indicates that the sheep population in year t will increase by 0.23% when
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the mutton price in year t-1 increases by 1%. Similarly, cattle population (beef output) in year t will 
increase by 0.18% (0.19%) when the beef price in year t-1 increases by 1%. The better grassland 
condition also has a significant and positive effect on livestock production. Cattle population in year t 
will increase by 1.54% if the total grassland area in year t-1 increases by 1%. Sheep population (mutton 
output) in year t will increase by 1.17% (1.67%) if the good quality grassland area in year t-1 increases 
by 1%. In an attempt to improve grassland condition, China has implemented various ecological projects. 
However, in reality, 90% of the grasslands are still degraded to various degrees (Mei et al., 2013). For 
example, between 1991 and 2002, 3.1% of the available natural grassland was lost, either through its 
being degraded into unused land, or being transformed into other purposes. During the same period, 
1.68 million hectares of land was rehabilitated into natural grassland through eco-environmental 
projects. This resulted in a net decline of 6.38million hectares (around 2.4% of the available natural 
grassland) (Qu et al., 2011). In this regard, the deteriorating grasslands could have impeded the livestock 
production. 
The coefficients of the time variable are significant and positive in four models. It indicates that the 
technology development affects livestock production positively, and it can be seen that the positive 
effects are stronger with respect to meat output than for the livestock population. The interaction term 
of the time variable and the dummy variable of pastoral counties is also significant, but negative, in the 
cattle population, mutton output and beef output models. It indicates that cattle population, mutton 
output and beef output increase less in the pastoral counties than in the semi-pastoral counties with 
technology development. Sheep population increases significantly without a distinction between 
pastoral or semi-pastoral counties. In general, it appears that the development of livestock production 
is slower in the pastoral counties than in the semi-pastoral counties over time, with the exception of the 
development of the sheep population which does not differ between county types. Notably, Figures 4.6 
and 4.7 showed that livestock production experienced a geographic shift from pastoral areas to the crop 
farming areas. Our results extended this finding to the specific comparison between pastoral counties 
and semi-pastoral counties. That is, livestock production, with exception of the sheep population, has 
experienced a geographic shift from semi-pastoral counties to pastoral counties in the pastoral areas. 
4.6 Discussion 
The model results demonstrate that the implementation of land tenure reform has significantly 
constrained the increase of livestock population and meat output in the pastoral areas of Inner Mongolia. 
This finding can be explained in various ways. On the one hand, the implementation of land tenure 
reform may have effectively controlled the increase in livestock population, as was the aim of land 
tenure reform, which expected to internalise the social costs of overgrazing by privatisation and thereby 
avoid the tragedy of the commons. The increase in meat output is correspondingly restricted due to the 
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four models. Based on the coefficients of ݈݋݃ (ܴ௜௧ିଵ) and 1 (ܴ௜௧ିଵΤ ), quasi-concave curves are obtained 
as depicted in Fig. 9. The horizontal axis presents the number of years that the land tenure reform has 
been implemented and the vertical axis shows the livestock production index (livestock production in 
the first year of land tenure reform equals 100). Considering the longest duration for formal use rights 
privatised until 2008 was 26 years in our research sample, we determined the maximum year of the 
horizontal-axis as 26.
Figure 4.9 Relationship between land tenure reform and livestock production
In Figure 4.9, the indexes of sheep population, cattle population, mutton output and beef output are all 
decreasing with the number of years that the land tenure reform is implemented, and the reduction is 
fastest in the first years of the reform while it slows down in later years. Moreover, the decrease in sheep 
population is faster than that of mutton output, indicating that land tenure reform had a more negative 
impact on the sheep population than on mutton output.  Similarly, land tenure reform has affected the 
cattle population more than beef output as the decrease in cattle population is faster than that of beef 
output. These results indicate that the implementation of land tenure reform promotes the development 
of livestock productivity in pastoral areas although it constrains the increase in livestock population. 
Moreover, the mutton output (sheep population) decreases faster than beef output (cattle population).
It is interesting to compare Figure 4.9 with Figures 4.6 and 4.7 – which present the increasing trends in 
the sheep population, mutton output and beef output after 1985. The seemingly contradicting trends of 
livestock production in these figures can be explained by the effects of the other factors considered in 
our models. For instance, the producer price has a significant and positive effect on livestock production.
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constraints on livestock population. On the other hand, the spatial and social boundaries stemming from 
land tenure reform have impeded livestock production because fragmentation and loss in mobility 
increase the costs of feeding and reduce herders’ ability to withstand natural risks (e.g. Li et al., 2007).  
These results are in line with findings from Mongolia where livestock production declined and poverty 
rose sharply after grassland privatisation in the 1990s (Griffin, 1995). The model results also illustrate 
that the decrease in livestock numbers and meat output occurred especially in the early years of the land 
reform and that this effect weakened over time, which may be attributed to the gradual adaptation of 
production patterns to the privatised grasslands. Moreover, the constraining effects on the increase of 
livestock production could be a potential reason to explain why land tenure reform was so slow to be 
implemented and is still in progress after 30 years. This raises doubts about the adaptability of extending 
policy measures designed for crop farming areas to the pastoral areas. Although the land tenure reform 
promoted agricultural production successfully in the crop farming areas of China, the pastoral areas 
may have produced different results. 
Compared with the constraining effects of the land tenure reform, market forces have a strong positive 
effect on livestock production. The passing of time implies technological development, and also 
promotes the increase in livestock production, although more slowly in pastoral counties than in semi-
pastoral counties. This points towards potential approaches for stimulating livestock production in 
pastoral areas. In addition, improved grassland conditions also have positive effects on livestock 
production, which suggests that grassland conservation is necessary not only to improve the ecosystem, 
but also to develop sustainable livestock production.  
Given the controlling effects of land tenure reform on the increase in livestock population and the 
facilitating effects on improving livestock productivity, it is recommended that the government 
supervises the implementation of assigning grassland use rights to individual households and clarifies 
fuzzy grassland boundaries between households. However, pastoralism that embraces common use may 
also have benefits for the sustainable development of animal husbandry in pastoral areas due to the 
advantages of the mobility, flexibility and reciprocity (e.g. Fernandez-Gimenez, 2002). In this regard, 
the privatisation of grassland property rights or use rights may be a precondition to ensuring cooperative 
use based on stable property rights or use rights in practice. In fact, recent institutional innovations in 
pastoral areas of China has followed two distinct pathways: the strict implementation of clarifying 
grassland use rights to individual households on the one hand, and the encouragement of co-
management and cooperative use of grasslands based on substantive community participation on the 
other hand (Banks, 2003).   
As a final note, we would like to mention a number of limitations of our analysis that present challenges 
for future research. Our use of the time variable is a simplified way to capture the effect of technological 
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development and ecological policy. One challenge for future work is therefore to ascertain the specific 
effects of technological improvements and ecological policies on livestock production in pastoral areas. 
Moreover, the data on the grassland quality only represents the canopy cover, but does not indicate its 
edibility by animals, which is a serious limitation related to the measurement of the grassland conditions. 
Furthermore, the accuracy of Chinese livestock statistics is questionable (Waldron et al., 2007). The 
statistical collection of data on the livestock population is extremely difficult in China because small 
rural households raise livestock on a small scale and supply chains are dominated by countless small 
traders and processors, unlike the centralised slaughter and auction systems that facilitate statistical 
collection in developed countries (Waldron et al., 2007). In this regard, our research findings should be 
useful for detecting general trends if not specific numbers. 
4.7 Conclusions 
This paper explores the period during which the household-based assignment of grassland use rights 
has been implemented in order to describe the progress of land tenure reform and its impact on the 
grasslands of China. We focus on comparing the development of livestock production between pastoral 
areas and crop farming areas under the land tenure reform and evaluating the effect of land tenure reform 
on livestock production. Livestock production was presented by sheep population, cattle population, 
mutton output and beef output. The descriptive analysis shows that land tenure reform was implemented 
progressively in the pastoral areas, rather than the case of the cropland areas where household-based 
use rights were completed overnight (Banks et al., 2003; Ho, 2000). It appears that the increase of 
livestock production was faster in crop farming areas than in pastoral areas, while conversely the 
development of livestock productivity was slower in crop farming areas. A fixed effects model is 
employed to estimate the impacts of the land tenure reform on livestock production based on a dataset 
of 45 counties in the pastoral areas of Inner Mongolia from 1985 to 2008. The model controls for factors 
that obscure the relationship between livestock production and land tenure reform, such as market forces, 
grassland condition, technological development and environmental heterogeneity among counties. The 
model results provide quantitative evidence that land tenure reform has put a ceiling on livestock 
production, but this constraining effect is unable to offset the impact of other factors that accelerate the 
increase in livestock production, which explains the actual increase in livestock production. Moreover, 
the constraining effect of land tenure reform on the increase in livestock production decreases with the 
number of years since the implementation of land tenure reform and ultimately disappears. Remarkably, 
the constraining effect is stronger on the increase in livestock population than on that of meat output, 
which indicates that land tenure reform stimulates the development of livestock productivity. With 
respect to the other factors, it appears that the cattle population tends to be affected by the quantity of 
grassland, while the sheep population and mutton output are more affected by the quality of grassland. 
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The factor of technological development impacts on the increase in meat output more than that on the 
increase in livestock population, and the influence is more evident in the semi-pastoral counties than in 
the pastoral counties. It can be seen that technological development also prompts the development of 
livestock productivity. 
The development of livestock productivity that is caused by the implementation of land tenure reform 
is different from that due to technological development. More specifically, land tenure reform in 
pastoral areas has transformed the production patterns of pastoralists through the privatisation of 
grasslands (Ho, 2000). For instance, the indigenous people in Inner Mongolia employed nomadic 
management and seasonal transhumance to graze animals in areas where pastures and water were 
available (Wang et al., 2013). Since the spread of the land tenure reform on the grasslands, a growing 
number of households have built physical boundaries (such as fences) in order to prevent others from 
using their grasslands, which implies that mobile grazing is no longer possible and most areas of 
grassland are in small-scale private use (Hua and Squires, 2015). The traditional nomadic production 
pattern has therefore gradually been displaced by a sedentary pattern. Our research results essentially 
indicate that this transformation, resulting from land tenure reform, has prompted livestock productivity 
in the pastoral areas of Inner Mongolia. In other words, land tenure reform entailing grassland 
privatisation probably stimulates herders to put more effort into improving the output per animal, instead 
of increasing the amount of animals, which is beneficial to the development of livestock production 
systems in pastoral areas. However, the constraining effects of grassland privatisation on the increase 
in livestock production could also be a possible reason to explain why land tenure reform was 
implemented with difficulty on grasslands, especially in terms of the lag between the reform and the 
actual adoption of private use. 
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5. THE IMPACT OF ECOLOGICAL CONSTRUCTION PROGRAMS ON GRASSLAND 
CONSVERVATION IN THE PASTORAL AREAS OF CHINA24 
ABSTRACT: A series of Ecological Construction Programs have been initiated to protect the condition 
of grasslands in China during recent decades. However, grassland degradation is still severe and 
conditions have not been restored as intended. This paper aims to empirically examine the effectiveness 
of Ecological Construction Programs for protecting the grassland condition in the extensive pastoral 
areas of China. We focus on one Ecological Construction Program that has been implemented widely 
on the grasslands, the Subsidy and Incentive System for Grassland Conservation (SISGC). The 
Normalized Difference Vegetation Index (NDVI), measured with remote sensing technology, is used to 
quantify the grassland condition between 2001 and 2014. With data from 54 counties in the pastoral 
areas of Inner Mongolia, we estimate the impact of SISGC on the grassland condition. A fixed effects 
model is employed to control for livestock production, climate, time trends and time-invariant 
heterogeneity between counties. The model results provide quantitative evidence that the condition of 
the grasslands has improved significantly due to SISGC, but that the effectiveness of SISGC was offset 
to some extent by other socio-economic and climate factors, such as increased producer prices and high 
temperature. This may explain why the actual grassland degradation has not been prevented as 
effectively as was expected. In addition, the impact of SISGC was stronger in counties with a worse 
initial grassland condition. Furthermore, the effects of producer prices and climate changes were also 
more pronounced in these counties.
KEYWORDS: Ecological Construction Programs, grassland degradation, NDVI, fixed effects model, 
Inner Mongolia
                                                
24 Paper by Min Liu, Liesbeth Dries, Wim Heijman, Jikun Huang, Xueqin Zhu, Yuanning Hu, and Haibin Chen, has been 
accepted by Land Degradation and Development.
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5.1 Introduction 
Grasslands are important as a feed source for livestock, as a habitat for wildlife, for environmental 
protection and for the in situ conservation of plant genetic resources (FAO, 2008). However, rapid 
increases in livestock populations have increased pressures on the world’s grasslands, leading to 
widespread deterioration, particularly in arid and semi-arid environments (Suttie et al., 2005). China 
has around 392 million hectares of grasslands, accounting for 12% of the world’s grasslands and 41.7% 
of the national land area (Fan et al., 2008). Nearly 80% of these grasslands are in arid and semi-arid 
regions (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2009). Approximately 17 million herders and agro-
herders maintain their livelihoods on the grasslands in China (Li et al., 2014). According to Chinese 
governmental reports, 10% of the total area of grasslands was degraded in the 1970s, increasing to 30% 
in the 1980s and 50% in the middle of the 1990s. By the 2000s, about 90% of the grasslands were 
degraded to various extent, with significant regional variation (Unkovich and Nan, 2008; Waldron et 
al., 2010). The manifestation of grassland degradation includes initial lowering of grassland 
productivity, fragmentation of grass cover, reduction in soil fertility, soil compaction, an increase in 
unpalatable grass species or a combination of all of them (Feng et al., 2009; Li et al., 2013). Grassland 
degradation, especially in northern China, is considered to be the cause of serious environmental and 
ecological problems, such as Yangtze River floods, Yellow River droughts and sand storms of Beijing 
(Harris, 2010). Grassland degradation therefore threatens not only animal husbandry on the grasslands 
but also the livelihoods of millions of people and the ecological security of China (Huang et al., 2013). 
To address these problems, national and local governments have initiated an ambitious series of 
Ecological Construction Programs for grassland protection in recent decades. 
In 1985, China passed the first national Grassland Law which explicitly stipulated the protection and 
improvement of grasslands (Ho, 2000). The Law devolved grassland use rights from the state and 
collectives to individual households through long-term contracts, and introduced maximum stocking 
rates for livestock on the grassland areas. Since the serious drought in China in 1997 and the massive 
floods of 1998, additional Ecological Construction Programs have been introduced, for example, the 
Conversion of Cropland to Forest and Grassland Program (also known as the Grain for Green Program), 
the Returning Grazing to Grassland Program, and the Program to Combat Desertification around Beijing 
and Tianjin, which aimed at preventing grasslands from degradation and were actively implemented in 
the 2000s (Liu et al., 2010; Hua and Squires, 2015). Since 2011, another major Ecological Construction 
Program, the Subsidy and Incentive System for Grassland Conservation (SISGC), has been initiated in 
eight pastoral provinces of China, including Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang, Tibet, Qinghai, Sichuan, Gansu, 
Ningxia and Yunnan (State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2010).  Compared to the 
Ecological Construction Programs for grassland conservation before 2011, the SISGC includes much 
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wider areas that involve most of the available natural grasslands of China and provides herders with 
more ecological compensations. Moreover, its monitoring system for policy implementation has been 
improved with the use of more targeted monitoring staffs (Guan Hu Yuan) that are employed by local 
governments.  
In general, China’s Ecological Construction Programs include two categories of measures for grassland 
conservation, namely sowing grass or planting trees in the eco-fragile areas to restore the degraded 
grasslands and reducing livestock grazing to prevent grassland degradation (Ho and Azadi, 2010; Kou 
et al., 2016). This coincides with the measures for preventing desertification in China: controlling 
desertification by plantation and combating desertification by natural recovery through isolating the 
degraded area from external human influences (Miao et al., 2015). In practice, these two measures cover 
a vast array of regulations (Waldron et al., 2010). Particularly, the reduction in grazing is targeted by 
regulations determining stocking rate and grazing bans (either permanently, temporarily or seasonally) 
(Qu et al., 2011). The stocking rate is based on the theoretical maximum of the available biomass 
production from grasslands that can be consumed by grazing herds without impairing the capacity of 
the pasture to regrow the following year (Fernández-Giménez et al., 2011).  
Despite the fact that Ecological Construction Programs have been widely introduced in the pastoral 
areas of China for more than ten years, grassland degradation is still severe (Waldron et al., 2010; Li 
and Huntsinger, 2011; Ministry of Agriculture of China, 2012; Li et al., 2014). Although the average 
vegetation coverage of China’s grasslands increased by 0.4% between 2014 and 2015, and there has 
been an increase of 3% since 2011, more than one third of the grasslands are still suffering moderate 
and serious degradation (Ministry of Agriculture of China, 2014; 2016). Some academic studies have 
therefore criticized the effectiveness of the Ecological Construction Programs on grassland conservation, 
and attributed the causes of this ineffectiveness to inappropriate policy measures and failed 
implementation (Li and Zhang, 2009). For example, some authors argue that the determination of a 
maximum stocking rate and various grazing bans are inappropriate management measures for the 
conservation of grasslands in arid and semi-arid areas (Higgins et al., 2007). In particular, deterministic 
stocking rates are questioned because they largely ignore the grasslands' spatial heterogeneity and 
climate variability (Li and Huntsinger, 2011). Moreover, it is claimed that appropriate grazing is 
beneficial to plant succession processes (Zhang et al., 2015). Deterministic stocking rates have also led 
to resistance from local herders that are unwilling to limit their own livestock numbers based on a top-
down government measure (Li and Zhang, 2009).  High supervision costs of the implementation of the 
policy make that deterministic stocking rates and grazing bans are difficult to sustain effectively for a 
long period, especially in extensive grassland areas with a scattered population distribution (Li and 
Zhang, 2009; Waldron et al., 2010). Considering these criticisms and the fact that the grassland 
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condition is still deteriorating, despite the current policy measures, this paper will examine the 
effectiveness of Ecological Construction Programs on grassland protection and discuss the potential 
factors that impact the policy effectiveness.  
Some academic studies and governmental reports discuss the impacts of Ecological Construction 
Programs. A number of them focus on limited regions based on household-level or experimental field 
data (e.g. Gu and Li, 2013; Zhang et al., 2015). Others conduct spatial and temporal comparisons but 
without controlling for the possible impacts of other socio-economic and climate factors on the 
grassland condition. Some studies also have systematically discussed the impacts of particular aspects 
of eco-environmental policy interventions, including grassland laws (Nelson, 2006), grazing bans (Yeh, 
2005), and herder resettlement policies (Dickinson and Webber, 2007), but they have mainly used 
qualitative analysis. In short, the existing literature lacks estimations on the effectiveness of Ecological 
Construction Programs for grassland conservation that are based on large-scale and long-term samples 
and control for the impacts of other potential factors through a quantitative analysis. This paper employs 
an econometric model based on data from 54 counties in the extensive pastoral areas of Inner Mongolia 
from 2001 to 2014 to disentangle the impact of one specific Ecological Construction Programs, namely 
the SISGC, on the grassland condition. In the following, the research region, data collection and 
methods are described. Next, the empirical results about the relationship between SISGC and grassland 
condition are presented and interpreted. Ultimately, we conclude with an assessment of the effectiveness 
of SISGC for grassland conservation based on the comparison between the estimated results from our 
model and the actual condition of the grassland. 
5.2 Material and methods 
5.2.1 Research region 
We conduct our empirical study based on Inner Mongolia, which is located in northern China and in 
which animal husbandry is the traditional and dominant agricultural industry. Most of the population 
are indigenous Mongolians and are reliant on grazing animals on the natural grasslands in order to 
maintain a livelihood. Inner Mongolia belongs to the arid and semi-arid areas of China and contains 
21.7% of the area of China’s natural grasslands. Approximately 67% of the total land in Inner Mongolia 
is classified as grassland, the majority of which can be sub-classified as temperate grassland (Angerer 
et al., 2008). The current administrative divisions of Inner Mongolia include 102 counties, consisting 
of 33 pastoral counties and 21 semi-pastoral counties. The remaining 48 counties are dominated by crop 
farming or urban districts. The agricultural industry of pastoral counties is characterized by its extensive 
grazing; natural grassland is the dominant land type. In semi-pastoral counties, both natural grassland 
and cropland are the dominant land types, in which there is more intensive animal husbandry along with 
cropping (Waldron et al., 2010). The pastoral and semi-pastoral counties include almost all of the natural 
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grasslands of Inner Mongolia. Figure 5.1 illustrates the location of Inner Mongolia in China and the 
distribution of its pastoral and semi-pastoral counties. 
 
Figure 5.1 Inner Mongolia and its pastoral and semi-pastoral counties 
According to government reports, by the year 2000, 90% of the natural grasslands of Inner Mongolia 
had been degraded to some extent, reflected by the degraded composition of plant species, declining 
biodiversity, accelerated soil erosion etc. (Waldron et al., 2010; Briske et al., 2015). Moreover, the 
results of large-scale field ecological surveys highlighted that the average grassland biomass 
productivity in Inner Mongolia has reduced from 1871 kg/ha in 1961 to 900 kg/ha in 2010 (Wang et al., 
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northern China. For instance, the colossal dust storms which rumbled through hundreds of cities and 
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Since 2011, the SISGC has been initiated in Inner Mongolia. Considering that the SISGC is currently 
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condition is still deteriorating, despite the current policy measures, this paper will examine the 
effectiveness of Ecological Construction Programs on grassland protection and discuss the potential 
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grasslands of Inner Mongolia. Figure 5.1 illustrates the location of Inner Mongolia in China and the 
distribution of its pastoral and semi-pastoral counties. 
 
Figure 5.1 Inner Mongolia and its pastoral and semi-pastoral counties 
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Construction Programs in the extensive pastoral areas of China. It is reported by the local government 
that 67.3 million hectares of available natural grasslands are covered by SISGC, which includes almost 
all of the available natural grassland areas of Inner Mongolia. 30 million hectares of them belong to the 
area with the permanent grazing ban and the remaining 37.3 million hectares belong to the forage-
livestock balance area. In practice, every county in the pastoral areas contains different areas of 
grasslands which are subject to the permanent grazing ban, deterministic stocking rate or both of them. 
Almost all rural households in the pastoral areas have been covered by SISGC, and they have been 
given subsidies (or incentives) as well as the obligation to comply with the permanent grazing ban (or 
the deterministic stocking rate).  
5.2.2 Data collection 
The empirical model is conducted using county-level data to estimate the impact of the SISGC on the 
condition of grasslands in the pastoral areas of Inner Mongolia. The dataset includes 54 counties 
consisting of the 33 pastoral counties and 21 semi-pastoral counties, and spans 14 years from 2001 to 
2014 including the period before and after the introduction of the SISGC. The data collected include 
indicators of the grassland condition, the status of SISGC, and climate and socio-economic factors. In 
the existing literature, the grassland condition has been indicated by vegetation coverage, height, density, 
biomass production and density of perennial vegetation (Gu and Li, 2013; Yu and Farrell, 2013). These 
indicators are commonly measured using two methods: direct sampling tests undertaken during small-
scale fieldwork; and estimation over large areas with remote sensing technology (Gu and Li, 2013). The 
former focuses on measuring the micro-indices of grass, while the latter estimates the macro grassland 
condition on the basis of satellite images. For this study, the remote sensing technology appeared more 
feasible and appropriate considering that we aim to quantify the grassland condition of the 54 counties 
in Inner Mongolia over 14 years. The Normalised Difference Vegetation Index (NDVI) is a widely-
used indicator to quantify the grassland condition on the basis of the remote sensing technology (e.g. 
Yang et al., 1998; Liu et al., 2013; Gong et al., 2015). Theoretically, the measurement of NDVI is based 
on the differential absorption, transmittance and reflectance of energy by the vegetation in the red and 
near-infrared portions of the electromagnetic spectrum (Senay and Elliott, 2000). NDVI is calculated 
on a per-pixel basis as the ratio of the difference of the near infrared and red bands over their sum from 
a remotely-sensed image. It provides a clear description of land surface features and is regarded as a 
proxy for terrestrial vegetation condition because it is strongly associated with percentage of vegetation 
coverage, leaf area index, potential photosynthesis, aboveground net primary productivity and biomass 
availability (Tan and Li, 2015). Based on the data set of MOD13A1 from NASA’s Earth Science Data 
Systems Program, which is the Moderate Resolution Imaging Spectroradiometer (MODIS) imagery 
with 500m spatial resolution and 16 days temporal resolution, we employed the Maximum Value 
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Composite (MVC) method to get the NDVI of each year during 2001-2014 (Holben, 1986). Ultimately, 
the image layer of administrative divisions of Inner Mongolia is used to determine the NDVI for each 
county.  
Information about SISGC was provided by the Agriculture and Animal Husbandry Bureau of Inner 
Mongolia. Moreover, interviews were conducted with local herders and public officers who are key 
informants on the implementation of Ecological Construction Programs in Inner Mongolia to improve 
our understanding of these programs and their possible impacts. The data on socio-economic indicators 
was collected based on existing statistical data gathered by national and local Statistical bureaus. For 
instance, the producer price of live sheep was collected based on the Annual Compilation of Cost-
benefit Data of Chinese Agricultural Products and deflated with the Producer Price Index of Agricultural 
Products of Inner Mongolia. The data on climate indicators were gathered from the Statistical 
Yearbooks of Inner Mongolia. It should be noted that we used the city-level climate data to represent 
the temperature and precipitation of each county that affiliates to its corresponding city.  
5.2.3 Statistical analysis on grassland condition 
Based on the data of NDVI over the 54 counties of Inner Mongolia from 2001 to 2014, table 5.1 outlines 
the changes in grassland condition at different time intervals.  
Table 5.1 Grassland condition (NDVI) at different time intervals of SISGC 
Periods Status of SISGC Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Welch's t-
test 
Period 1 
(2001-2010) Before SISGC 540 0.467 0.199 0.074 0.853 na 
Period 2 
(2011-2014) After SISGC 216 0.502 0.201 0.083 0.851 -0.035** 
Period 2 
2011 The first year of SISGC 54 0.482 0.208 0.084 0.851 -0.015 
2012 The second year of SISGC 54 0.528 0.186 0.085 0.850 -0.061** 
2013 The third year of SISGC 54 0.520 0.203 0.084 0.840 -0.053* 
2014 The fourth year of SISGC 54 0.480 0.208 0.083 0.850 -0.013 
Sources: Statistics are derived from the data set of NASA’s Earth Science Data Systems Program 
Note: *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. 
According to the Welch's t-test on NDVI between periods 1 and 2 (Lee, 1992), the overall mean of 
NDVI is significantly larger in the period after SISGC than before, which implies an improvement in 
overall grassland condition. Moreover, all of the mean NDVI values are larger in the years with SISGC 
than the overall mean of NDVI in the period before SISGC. However, the Welch's t-test on NDVI 
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Composite (MVC) method to get the NDVI of each year during 2001-2014 (Holben, 1986). Ultimately, 
the image layer of administrative divisions of Inner Mongolia is used to determine the NDVI for each 
county.  
Information about SISGC was provided by the Agriculture and Animal Husbandry Bureau of Inner 
Mongolia. Moreover, interviews were conducted with local herders and public officers who are key 
informants on the implementation of Ecological Construction Programs in Inner Mongolia to improve 
our understanding of these programs and their possible impacts. The data on socio-economic indicators 
was collected based on existing statistical data gathered by national and local Statistical bureaus. For 
instance, the producer price of live sheep was collected based on the Annual Compilation of Cost-
benefit Data of Chinese Agricultural Products and deflated with the Producer Price Index of Agricultural 
Products of Inner Mongolia. The data on climate indicators were gathered from the Statistical 
Yearbooks of Inner Mongolia. It should be noted that we used the city-level climate data to represent 
the temperature and precipitation of each county that affiliates to its corresponding city.  
5.2.3 Statistical analysis on grassland condition 
Based on the data of NDVI over the 54 counties of Inner Mongolia from 2001 to 2014, table 5.1 outlines 
the changes in grassland condition at different time intervals.  
Table 5.1 Grassland condition (NDVI) at different time intervals of SISGC 
Periods Status of SISGC Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Welch's t-
test 
Period 1 
(2001-2010) Before SISGC 540 0.467 0.199 0.074 0.853 na 
Period 2 
(2011-2014) After SISGC 216 0.502 0.201 0.083 0.851 -0.035** 
Period 2 
2011 The first year of SISGC 54 0.482 0.208 0.084 0.851 -0.015 
2012 The second year of SISGC 54 0.528 0.186 0.085 0.850 -0.061** 
2013 The third year of SISGC 54 0.520 0.203 0.084 0.840 -0.053* 
2014 The fourth year of SISGC 54 0.480 0.208 0.083 0.850 -0.013 
Sources: Statistics are derived from the data set of NASA’s Earth Science Data Systems Program 
Note: *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. 
According to the Welch's t-test on NDVI between periods 1 and 2 (Lee, 1992), the overall mean of 
NDVI is significantly larger in the period after SISGC than before, which implies an improvement in 
overall grassland condition. Moreover, all of the mean NDVI values are larger in the years with SISGC 
than the overall mean of NDVI in the period before SISGC. However, the Welch's t-test on NDVI 
93 
 
between period 1 and each year after SISGC indicates that the difference is only significant in the years 
2012 and 2013. 
5.2.4 Fixed effects model 
A fixed effects model has been widely used in economic research, primarily to study the causes of 
changes within entities over time (e.g. Fergusson et al., 2002; Huang et al., 2006). The model employs 
within transformation to remove all time-invariant (fixed) explanatory variables, i.e. the model is 
performed in deviations from individual means (Verbeek, 2012). As such, the fixed effects model 
provides a method that takes observable explanatory variables as well as unobservable time-invariant 
variables into account, but the estimation does not depend on the value of time-invariant (fixed) 
variables (Verbeek, 2012). Such an approach is appropriate for this study because the causes of 
grassland condition changes within each county over time can be studied by controlling for the measured 
as well as unmeasured time-invariant heterogeneity between counties. In addition, our research samples 
include all of the counties in the pastoral areas of Inner Mongolia, rather than random draws, which 
preliminarily indicates that the fixed effects model is more appropriate than the random effects model 
(Verbeek, 2012). Nevertheless, the appropriateness of the fixed effects model will be further examined 
through statistical testing. Based on the theoretical framework of the fixed effects model, we formulate 
the impacts of SISGC and other potential factors on grassland condition in the following equation:  
ܩ௜௧ ൌ ݄௜ ൅ ෍ ܽ௬ ௜ܲ௬
ଶ଴ଵସ
௬ୀଶ଴ଵଵ
൅ ෍ ܾ௬ሺ ௜ܲ௬
ଶ଴ଵସ
௬ୀଶ଴ଵଵ
כ ܦ௜ሻ ൅ ܿଵ ௜ܵ௧ିଶ ൅ ෍ ݀௠ ௜ܶ௧௠
ଽ
௠ୀସ
൅ ݀ଵܶ ௜ܸ௧ ൅ ෍ ݁௠ܴ௜௧௠
ଽ
௠ୀସ
൅ ݁ଵܴ ௜ܸ௧ ൅ ଵ݂ ௧ܻ ൅ ݃ଵሺ ௧ܻ כ ܦ௜ሻ ൅ ᖡ௜௧ሺͳሻ 
where i and t indicate the ith county and year t, from 2001 to 2014. Grassland condition (ܩ௜௧), presented 
by NDVI, is employed as the dependent variable of equation (1). ௜ܲ௬ is a dummy variable to manifest 
whether county i implemented SISGC in the specific year y which involves the first year with SISGC 
(y=2011), the second year (y=2012), the third year (y=2013) and the fourth year (y=2014). The 
interaction term of SISGC ሺ ௜ܲ௬ሻ  and the pastoral or semi-pastoral attribute of county i ሺܦ௜ሻ  is 
considered.  
Besides the policy variables, other potential factors are controlled. For example, the livestock 
production and climate factor are prevalently discussed as the drivers that impact the grassland condition 
in the arid and semi-arid areas (e.g. Li et al., 2012; He et al., 2014). In this study, the real producer price 
of live sheep ( ௜ܵ௧) is used as the proxy variable of livestock production in the pastoral areas because of 
the limitations of the data. More specifically, the livestock population in the pastoral areas was under-
reported by herders due to the stocking rate regulation (Brown et al., 2008). Furthermore, in the 
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statistical data on the meat output of the pastoral areas of Inner Mongolia, no distinction is made between 
outputs from extensive grazing, and outputs from industrial raising and intensive animal husbandry. 
Since sheep is the animal which is most often raised by local herders (Zhang et al., 2012), the real 
producer price of live sheep with a two-year lag ( ௜ܵ௧ିଶ) is used to indicate the situation of livestock 
production in the empirical model. In this regard, the price is exogenously decided by the global market 
of China, and the two-year lag is considered as the timespan during which local herders adjust their 
sheep population to respond to the changes in sheep price. According to information from our household 
survey in Inner Mongolia, the timespan is around two years because it covers the breeding period of 
breeders; herders then reserve more new lambs in order to expand their sheep population during the 
next production stage. The climate factor is elaborated by the monthly average temperature ( ௜ܶ௧୫) and 
precipitation (ܴ௜௧௠ ) during the growing season of grass, including the six months from April to 
September with m=4 to 9 (Zhao and Guo, 2009), and the variance of annual average temperature (ܶ ௜ܸ௧) 
and precipitation (ܴ ௜ܸ௧). The annual variance is presented by the standard deviations of monthly average 
temperature and precipitation in all twelve months of each year. In addition, time trend ( ௧ܻ) is included 
considering the impact of factors that change with time, such as the development of intensive animal 
husbandry and the increasing area of artificial grass for grassland restoration. The interaction term of 
time trend and the pastoral or semi-pastoral attribute of county i ሺ ௧ܻ כ ܦ௜ሻ is also considered in order to 
explore whether there are differences in the grassland condition with time change between pastoral and 
semi-pastoral counties. Finally, the factors, such as elevation, slope, soil type, distance to the provincial 
capital etc., that reflect the heterogeneity of grasslands and do not change over time are treated as time-
invariant (fixed) factors in the model, and are denoted by ݄௜ in equation (1). ܽ௬, ܾ௬, ܿଵ, ݀௠, ݀ଵ, ݁௠, ݁ଵ, 
ଵ݂ and ݃ଵ are the coefficients of the independent variables and ᖡ࢏࢚ is the random error term. The specific 
definition of these variables is stated in table 5.2. 
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Table 5.2 Variable definitions and their expected signs in the model 
Variables Variable definition Unit Expected signs 
ܩ௜௧ NDVI of county i in year t na Dependent 
variable 
௜ܲ௬ =1 if county i implemented SISGC in year y 
(y=2011, 2012, 2013 and 2014), =0 otherwise 
na + 
ܦ௜ =1 if county i is a pastoral county, =0 
otherwise 
na na† 
௜ܵ௧ The ratio of real producer price of live sheep 
in county i between year t and year 2001 
na - 
௜ܶ௧௠ The average temperature of county i in month 
m of year t (m=4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9) 
Degrees Celsius +/- 
ܶ ௜ܸ௧ The temperature variation of county i in year t Degrees Celsius +/- 
ܴ௜௧௠ The total precipitation of county i in month m 
of year t (m=4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9) 
Millimeters + 
ܴ ௜ܸ௧ The precipitation variation of county i in year 
t 
Millimeters +/- 
௧ܻ Year t na + 
Note: † indicates that ܦ௜ is included in the interaction terms of ( ௜ܲ௬ כ ܦ௜) and ( ௧ܻ כ ܦ௜). The text presents 
the expected signs of ( ௜ܲ௬ כ ܦ௜) and ( ௧ܻ כ ܦ௜) 
According to the existing literature, we propose the expected signs of the explanatory variables on 
grassland condition in table 5.2. Given that the government reports and most of academic findings 
present that SISGC has improved the grassland condition of Inner Mongolia (Li et al., 2014; Ministry 
of Agriculture of China, 2016), we expect positive coefficients for ௜ܲ௬ in each year when SISGC was 
implemented. The expected signs of the interaction terms (ܦ௜ כ ௜ܲ௬) in our estimations are ambiguous 
because it is uncertain whether the effectiveness of SISGC is better in the pastoral counties than in the 
semi-pastoral counties or vice versa. Additionally, the real producer price of live sheep ( ௜ܵ௧) is expected 
to have negative effects on the grassland condition because higher prices stimulate more livestock 
production that may result in excessive grazing pressure and further lead to grassland degradation 
(Zhang et al., 2014). The expected signs of monthly average temperature ( ௜ܶ௧௠) in the growing season 
are ambiguous because the high temperature facilitates plant growth as well as the evaporation of the 
ground surfaces and the evapotranspiration from the vegetation (Deng et al., 2013), and fast evaporation 
and evapotranspiration have negative effects on plant growth in the arid and semi-arid areas. Given that 
precipitation is considered as the crucial factor in improving grassland condition in the arid and semi-
arid areas (Li and Zhang, 2009), we expect positive coefficients for ܴ௜௧௠ in the model. The expected 
signs of the annual variation in temperature (ܶ ௜ܸ௧) and precipitation (ܴ ௜ܸ௧) are ambiguous as the uneven 
distribution of climate has uncertain effects on grass growth. Time variable ( ௧ܻ) is expected to have 
positive effects on grassland condition. For instance, the development of intensive animal husbandry is 
supposed to replace extensive grazing and further reduce the use and damage of natural grasslands. 
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Furthermore, the interaction term of time variable and the attribute of county i ሺ ௧ܻ כ ܦ௜ሻ is expected to 
have a negative coefficient because the pastoral counties experienced less intensive animal husbandry 
than the semi-pastoral counties (Waldron et al., 2010). 
In addition, we expect that these explanatory variables may have different effects in different types of 
counties, especially for counties that have a different initial grassland condition. It is suggested that the 
effectiveness of large-scale ecological conservation programs has been heterogeneous in different 
regions even under the same policy context with incentive measures (Lv et al., 2015). The 54 counties 
in the sample are therefore divided over two groups based on the NDVI of each county in 2001. This 
results in 27 counties in the low NDVI group and 27 counties in the high NDVI group. NDVI of the 
low NDVI group in 2001 ranges from 0.074 to 0.427, and the mean is 0.254. The range of NDVI in the 
high NDVI group in 2001 is between 0.453 and 0.836, and the mean is 0.614. The fixed effects model 
(equation (1)) will be conducted separately for three groups of counties: all counties; low NDVI counties; 
high NDVI counties. 
5.2.5 Descriptive statistics for the variables 
Table 5.3 shows the characteristics of the variables included in the fixed effects model. The overall 
mean of NDVI (ܩ௜௧) is 0.477 for all 54 counties from 2001 to 2014, 0.314 for the 27 low NDVI counties, 
and 0.641 for the 27 high NDVI counties. Because all counties implemented SISGC in 2011, therefore 
the mean value of ௜ܲଶ଴ଵଵover 14 years is 0.071. The mean value of ܦ௜ כ ௜ܲଶ଴ଵଵ (0.044) indicates that the 
percentage of samples from the pastoral counties in 2011 (33) is 4.4% of the total observations (756). 
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Table 5.2 Variable definitions and their expected signs in the model 
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ܩ௜௧ NDVI of county i in year t na Dependent 
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of year t (m=4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9) 
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ܴ ௜ܸ௧ The precipitation variation of county i in year 
t 
Millimeters +/- 
௧ܻ Year t na + 
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5.3 Results 
5.3.1 Model results 
The Hausman test is employed to determine whether the fixed effects model is more appropriate 
than the random effects model. The Hausman test rejected the null hypothesis at p<0.05, 
indicating that the fixed effects model is more appropriate for our estimation.  
Table 5.4 Estimated results of the fixed effects model 
 All counties Low NDVI counties High NDVI counties 
Variable Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t 
௜ܲଶ଴ଵଵ 0.042*** 2.83 0.025 0.81 0.056** 2.60 
௜ܲଶ଴ଵଶ 0.130*** 7.36 0.153*** 5.46 0.110*** 3.74 
௜ܲଶ଴ଵଷ 0.189*** 7.33 0.210*** 3.96 0.185*** 4.07 
௜ܲଶ଴ଵସ 0.150*** 4.91 0.163*** 3.14 0.141*** 3.24 
ܦ௜ כ ௜ܲଶ଴ଵଵ 0.016 1.20 0.035 1.23 0.008 0.64 
ܦ௜ כ ௜ܲଶ଴ଵଶ 0.018 1.24 0.016 0.81 0.022 0.88 
ܦ௜ כ ௜ܲଶ଴ଵଷ 0.012 0.78 0.014 0.43 0.016 0.61 
ܦ௜ כ ௜ܲଶ଴ଵସ 0.010 0.62 0.026 1.29 0.014 0.64 
௜ܵ௧ିଶ -0.110*** -5.11 -0.161*** -3.94 -0.065* -2.04 
௜ܶ௧ସ -0.001 -1.02 0.001 0.34 -0.001 -0.71 
௜ܶ௧ହ -0.008*** -3.17 -0.001 -0.46 -0.015*** -4.91 
௜ܶ௧଺ -0.007*** -3.66 -0.003 -0.72 -0.010*** -3.78 
௜ܶ௧଻ -0.005 -1.52 -0.011** -2.64 0.003 0.57 
௜ܶ௧଼ -0.006*** -2.83 -0.008*** -3.14 -0.001 -0.17 
௜ܶ௧ଽ 0.0003 0.09 -0.001 -0.27 -0.0003 -0.05 
ܶ ௜ܸ௧ -0.001 -0.59 -0.004** -2.69 0.009*** 2.85 
ܴ௜௧ସ -0.0002 -1.21 -0.0001 -0.68 -0.0001 -0.88 
ܴ௜௧ହ 0.0003*** 3.07 0.001*** 3.04 0.0001 0.96 
ܴ௜௧଺ -0.00001 -0.09 0.0001 0.73 -0.0001 -0.84 
ܴ௜௧଻ -0.0001 -0.94 -0.000005 -0.03 -0.0001 -0.60 
ܴ௜௧଼ 0.00005 0.57 0.0002** 2.11 0.0001 0.72 
ܴ௜௧ଽ 0.0001 1.23 0.0004*** 2.79 -0.00003 -0.26 
ܴ ௜ܸ௧ -0.0001 -0.30 -0.001* -1.74 0.0002 0.34 
௧ܻ 0.005*** 2.61 0.012*** 3.96 -0.003 -1.24 
௧ܻ כ ܦ௜ -0.003* -1.69 -0.004 -1.10 -0.003 -0.90 
Constant 1.085 10.02 0.985*** 6.36 1.039*** 5.51 
ܴଶ 0.3913  0.4483  0.5156  
Observations 648  324  324  
Note: *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. 
Table 5.4 presents the estimated results of the fixed effects model for the three groups of 
counties. In the group of all counties, the coefficients of the variables about SISGC in each year 
are significant and positive. Specifically, the significant coefficient of ୧ଶ଴ଵଵ  indicates that 
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5.3 Results 
5.3.1 Model results 
The Hausman test is employed to determine whether the fixed effects model is more appropriate 
than the random effects model. The Hausman test rejected the null hypothesis at p<0.05, 
indicating that the fixed effects model is more appropriate for our estimation.  
Table 5.4 Estimated results of the fixed effects model 
 All counties Low NDVI counties High NDVI counties 
Variable Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t 
௜ܲଶ଴ଵଵ 0.042*** 2.83 0.025 0.81 0.056** 2.60 
௜ܲଶ଴ଵଶ 0.130*** 7.36 0.153*** 5.46 0.110*** 3.74 
௜ܲଶ଴ଵଷ 0.189*** 7.33 0.210*** 3.96 0.185*** 4.07 
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Table 5.4 presents the estimated results of the fixed effects model for the three groups of 
counties. In the group of all counties, the coefficients of the variables about SISGC in each year 
are significant and positive. Specifically, the significant coefficient of ୧ଶ଴ଵଵ  indicates that 
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NDVI increases by 0.042 in the first year of SISGC when the effects of other potential factors 
on NDVI are controlled. Similarly, NDVI increases by 0.13 until the second year of SISGC, 
0.189 until the third year, and 0.15 until the fourth year. The effectiveness of SISGC is 
accumulated year by year. Therefore, the effectiveness of SISGC on NDVI in the first year is 
increased by 0.042, 0.088 for the second year and 0.059 for the third year. It is remarkable that 
the effectiveness of SISGC in the fourth year is -0.039, although the accumulated effectiveness 
of SISGC on NDVI is a 0.15 increase by then. The interaction terms of SISGC in each year and 
pastoral attribute of the county are not significant, which indicates that there are no significant 
differences in the impacts of SISGC on NDVI between pastoral counties and semi-pastoral 
counties. With respect to the effects of other potential factors, the variable of the real producer 
price of live sheep presents significant and negative impacts on NDVI. It indicates that a 1% 
increase in the real producer price in year t-2 relative to the price in 2001 causes a decrease of 
0.11 in NDVI when the factors of SISGC, climate, time trend and time-invariant heterogeneity 
between counties remain constant. Moreover, the temperature in May, June and August has 
significant and negative effects on NDVI. This is explained through the increasing temperature 
causing faster evaporation from the ground surfaces and evapotranspiration from the vegetation, 
and allowing more pests and mice to breed in the arid and semi-arid areas, which are 
significantly detrimental to grassland condition in the growing season (Li, 2009; Li et al., 2013). 
Precipitation in May, on the other hand, has significant and positive effects. Abundant 
precipitation is beneficial to the restoration of grassland condition (Li and Zhang, 2009). The 
grassland condition is improved slowly with the factors that change with time trend, and the 
effects of time variance on grassland condition are stronger in the semi-pastoral counties than 
in the pastoral counties.  
Comparing the model results between the groups of low NDVI counties and high NDVI 
counties, the coefficient of the variable of SISGC in the first year is not significant in the group 
of low NDVI counties. This may be explained by the lagged implementation of SISGC in the 
low NDVI counties considering that these counties are not first regions for initiating ecological 
construction programs and are usually located in the relatively remote areas. However, the 
coefficients of the variables of SISGC in the second, third and fourth years are larger in the 
group of low NDVI counties than in the group of high NDVI counties. This indicates that 
SISGC has stronger impacts on the grassland conservation in the low NDVI counties than in 
the high NDVI counties. This result is consistent with the implementation planning of SISGC, 
namely, grazing bans that provide higher subsidies and implement more strict constraints for 
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grazing are conducted in the areas with more severe degradation or inferior grassland condition. 
Interestingly, the significant and negative coefficient of the real producer price indicates that a 
1% increase causes a 0.161 decrease in NDVI in the low NDVI counties, but only a 0.065 
decrease in NDVI in the high NDVI counties. Market forces seem to have a stronger impact in 
the counties with worse initial grassland condition. Similarly, climate changes seem to have 
more impact in the counties with worse initial grassland condition. 
5.3.2 Comparison between the estimated results and actual grassland condition 
Figure 5.2 depicts the estimated NDVI based on the significant coefficients of the variables of 
SISGC in the model including all counties. The mean value of actual NDVI in the period 2001-
2010 is used as the initial value. The actual NDVI is drawn from the mean value of NDVI of 
the 54 counties in the periods 2001-2010, 2011, 2012, 2013 and 2014. 
 
Figure 5.2 Comparison between the estimated NDVI and actual NDVI 
Sources: The data of actual NDVI is derived from the data set of NASA’s Earth Science Data 
Systems Program 
The estimated NDVI and actual NDVI in each year of SISGC are larger than the initial value. 
Comparing the estimated NDVI and actual NDVI in figure 5.2, it shows that the actual NDVI 
is clearly lower than the estimated NDVI during the years of SISGC. The differences between 
the actual and estimated grassland condition are attributed to the other potential factors that 
offset the effectiveness of SISGC, including the producer price and climate factors which 
showed significant coefficients in the model results. For instance, data showed that the producer 
price continuously increased in the period 2011 to 2014 from 1.48 times to 2.54 times the 
producer price in 2001. Although the large increase in the producer price cannot impact upon 
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grassland condition directly, strong market forces may stimulate herders to raise much more 
livestock. Increased grazing pressure following the large increase in the producer price induces 
significantly negative impacts on the grassland condition that reduces or neutralises the positive 
impacts stemming from SISGC, with the result that the actual grassland condition under the 
SISGC is not as good as expected.  
5.4 Discussion 
The effectiveness of SISGC with first an increasing and then a decreasing trend is in line with 
the results of existing research that questioned the failed implementation and ineffective 
management measures of Ecological Construction Programs (Bao and Chen, 1997; Waldron et 
al., 2010). For example, it is suggested that top-down management entails high supervision 
costs, making the implementation of the Ecological Construction Programs difficult to sustain 
for a long period effectively (Li and Zhang, 2009; Waldron et al., 2010). In our case, the local 
governments, who follow the instructions of the national government as planned at the 
beginning of SISGC, encountered increasing supervision costs when the producer price of live 
sheep soared especially in the third and fourth years of SISGC which prompted local herders to 
gain more economic benefits by increasing illegal grazing. It thus may incur the implementation 
of SISGC failure during the later years of SISGC. With respect to the ineffective management 
measures, it has been proved that grassland is in a better condition, including plant species 
diversity and herbage mass, during the early years of the permanent grazing ban, while there is 
a subsequent decline or level-off during its later years (Yang et al., 2005; Zhang et al., 2015). 
The ecological explanation for this is that annual and biennial vegetation could invade during 
the early years of permanent grazing ban, which would increase species richness. However, the 
subsequent recovery of dominant species increases their prevalence and further leads to a 
decrease in biodiversity in the next years (Bao and Chen, 1997). Considering that the permanent 
grazing ban is widely employed in SISGC, the fact that the grassland condition showed a 
gradual increase at first and then decreased under the impact of SISGC may correspond to this 
process of ecological succession. 
In addition, we would like to point out several limitations of our research. Firstly, the four years 
of SISGC which we studied may not be long enough to estimate the changing trend of its 
effectiveness on grassland condition. Secondly, we used dummy variables to present the status 
of SISGC in our model due to data limitations. Indicators that involve specific differences of 
SISGC among counties, such as grassland areas under SISGC, amount of subsidies and 
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enforcement strength of each county, would be more meaningful for estimating the 
effectiveness of policy intervention than the dummy variables. In our case, because all of the 
counties in the sample have participated in SISGC since 2011, the dummy variables of SISGC 
do not distinguish the specific differences of implementation of SISGC between counties and 
between years, and only the differences between before and after SISGC are presented. 
Moreover, we considered SISGC as a single policy, rather than investigating the results of its 
two specific regulations, deterministic stocking rates and permanent grazing bans, separately. 
Our research thus only presented the general result of SISGC. Although we showed that SISGC 
has a stronger impact in low NDVI counties, the impacts of specific measures need to be 
explored more thoroughly. Finally, our empirical model does not allow disentangling the 
impacts of other Ecological Construction Programs that were mainly implemented before 
SISGC started, such as the Conversion of Cropland to Forest and Grassland Program, Returning 
Grazing to Grassland Program, or the Program to Combat Desertification around Beijing and 
Tianjin.   
5.5 Conclusions 
This paper began by sketching a review about the policy interventions for grassland protection 
in China, involving the national Grassland Law and a series of Ecological Construction 
Programs. And then we took the latest Ecological Construction Program (SISGC) as an example 
to examine its effectiveness for grassland conservation in the extensive pastoral areas over the 
long term. The grassland condition was presented by the NDVI, rendered by remote sensing 
technology. The situation of SISGC was defined by dummy variables, which presented the 
situation of each year with SISGC. The fixed effects model was used to control for the factors 
that obscure the relationships between grassland condition and SISGC, including livestock 
production, climate factor, time trend and time-invariant heterogeneity between counties. Based 
on the data of 54 sample counties in the pastoral areas of Inner Mongolia from 2001 to 2014, 
the empirical model results provided quantitative evidence that grassland condition has been 
generally improved under the auspices of SISGC. The comparison between the actual NDVI 
and the estimated results show that the actual grassland condition is worse than the estimated 
results when other factors are assumed constant. One explanation for this is that the 
effectiveness of SISGC on grassland condition is offset by the impact of other potential factors, 
such as producer price and climate changes. Moreover, the impact of SISGC on the grassland 
condition is stronger in the low NDVI counties, while the offset from producer price and climate 
factors is more pronounced in these counties as well. In conclusion, our research findings are 
5101 
 
grassland condition directly, strong market forces may stimulate herders to raise much more 
livestock. Increased grazing pressure following the large increase in the producer price induces 
significantly negative impacts on the grassland condition that reduces or neutralises the positive 
impacts stemming from SISGC, with the result that the actual grassland condition under the 
SISGC is not as good as expected.  
5.4 Discussion 
The effectiveness of SISGC with first an increasing and then a decreasing trend is in line with 
the results of existing research that questioned the failed implementation and ineffective 
management measures of Ecological Construction Programs (Bao and Chen, 1997; Waldron et 
al., 2010). For example, it is suggested that top-down management entails high supervision 
costs, making the implementation of the Ecological Construction Programs difficult to sustain 
for a long period effectively (Li and Zhang, 2009; Waldron et al., 2010). In our case, the local 
governments, who follow the instructions of the national government as planned at the 
beginning of SISGC, encountered increasing supervision costs when the producer price of live 
sheep soared especially in the third and fourth years of SISGC which prompted local herders to 
gain more economic benefits by increasing illegal grazing. It thus may incur the implementation 
of SISGC failure during the later years of SISGC. With respect to the ineffective management 
measures, it has been proved that grassland is in a better condition, including plant species 
diversity and herbage mass, during the early years of the permanent grazing ban, while there is 
a subsequent decline or level-off during its later years (Yang et al., 2005; Zhang et al., 2015). 
The ecological explanation for this is that annual and biennial vegetation could invade during 
the early years of permanent grazing ban, which would increase species richness. However, the 
subsequent recovery of dominant species increases their prevalence and further leads to a 
decrease in biodiversity in the next years (Bao and Chen, 1997). Considering that the permanent 
grazing ban is widely employed in SISGC, the fact that the grassland condition showed a 
gradual increase at first and then decreased under the impact of SISGC may correspond to this 
process of ecological succession. 
In addition, we would like to point out several limitations of our research. Firstly, the four years 
of SISGC which we studied may not be long enough to estimate the changing trend of its 
effectiveness on grassland condition. Secondly, we used dummy variables to present the status 
of SISGC in our model due to data limitations. Indicators that involve specific differences of 
SISGC among counties, such as grassland areas under SISGC, amount of subsidies and 
102 
 
enforcement strength of each county, would be more meaningful for estimating the 
effectiveness of policy intervention than the dummy variables. In our case, because all of the 
counties in the sample have participated in SISGC since 2011, the dummy variables of SISGC 
do not distinguish the specific differences of implementation of SISGC between counties and 
between years, and only the differences between before and after SISGC are presented. 
Moreover, we considered SISGC as a single policy, rather than investigating the results of its 
two specific regulations, deterministic stocking rates and permanent grazing bans, separately. 
Our research thus only presented the general result of SISGC. Although we showed that SISGC 
has a stronger impact in low NDVI counties, the impacts of specific measures need to be 
explored more thoroughly. Finally, our empirical model does not allow disentangling the 
impacts of other Ecological Construction Programs that were mainly implemented before 
SISGC started, such as the Conversion of Cropland to Forest and Grassland Program, Returning 
Grazing to Grassland Program, or the Program to Combat Desertification around Beijing and 
Tianjin.   
5.5 Conclusions 
This paper began by sketching a review about the policy interventions for grassland protection 
in China, involving the national Grassland Law and a series of Ecological Construction 
Programs. And then we took the latest Ecological Construction Program (SISGC) as an example 
to examine its effectiveness for grassland conservation in the extensive pastoral areas over the 
long term. The grassland condition was presented by the NDVI, rendered by remote sensing 
technology. The situation of SISGC was defined by dummy variables, which presented the 
situation of each year with SISGC. The fixed effects model was used to control for the factors 
that obscure the relationships between grassland condition and SISGC, including livestock 
production, climate factor, time trend and time-invariant heterogeneity between counties. Based 
on the data of 54 sample counties in the pastoral areas of Inner Mongolia from 2001 to 2014, 
the empirical model results provided quantitative evidence that grassland condition has been 
generally improved under the auspices of SISGC. The comparison between the actual NDVI 
and the estimated results show that the actual grassland condition is worse than the estimated 
results when other factors are assumed constant. One explanation for this is that the 
effectiveness of SISGC on grassland condition is offset by the impact of other potential factors, 
such as producer price and climate changes. Moreover, the impact of SISGC on the grassland 
condition is stronger in the low NDVI counties, while the offset from producer price and climate 
factors is more pronounced in these counties as well. In conclusion, our research findings are 
103 
 
that the Ecological Construction Programs such as SISGC are effective for grassland 
conservation, but that the effectiveness on grassland protection is reduced or neutralised by 
other socio-economic and climate factors. For future policy design, an improvement in the 
Ecological Construction Programs should take into account the potential offsetting forces from 
other factors related to market and climate conditions.  
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6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
6.1 Introduction 
China is faced with grassland degradation, rapid increases in demand for livestock products and 
high levels of poverty among rural households. This dissertation outlines China’s grassland 
policies and studies the outcomes of the policy interventions for grassland systems in Inner 
Mongolia. More specifically, this thesis focuses on evaluating the effects of the land tenure 
reform and Ecological Construction Programs. These policy evaluations essentially show the 
outcomes of the government-driven transformation of traditional pastoralism and differ from 
other existing research that has been concerned with the internal process of pastoralism 
transformation (e.g. Mwangi, 2007).  
To date, the transformation of pastoralism has widely been employed by governments around 
the world by developing sedentarisation instead of nomadism, privatisation of grasslands 
instead of common use, intensification instead of extensive grazing, commercialisation of 
livestock systems instead of subsistence, determinative stocking rate instead of opportunistic 
strategies with stochastic stocking rates, to name a few (Homewood, 1995; Li and Zhang, 2009). 
Although plenty of studies have discussed the pros and cons of these pastoralism transformation 
programs from the perspective of ecology, sociology, and other fields (e.g. Suttie et al., 2005; 
Mwangi, 2007; Li and Zhang, 2009; Hua and Squires, 2015), there is a lack of literature based 
on large-scale areas and long-term observation to provide empirical evidence for scientific 
debate. This study employs panel data involving extensive pastoral areas and spanning several 
decades to quantify the ecological and economic outcomes of the pastoralism transformation in 
Inner Mongolia, China. Specifically, the impact of land tenure reform represents the outcomes 
of grassland privatisation instead of communal tenure. The effectiveness of Ecological 
Construction Programs presents the outcomes of current management systems on the grasslands, 
such as the grazing ban and deterministic stocking rate instead of stochastic stocking rates. 
Moreover, the preference for grasslands by stakeholders reflects the perception of grassland 
resource users on the pastoralism transformation. The conceptual framework for our research 
is based on Ostrom’s Social-Ecological Systems (SESs) framework (Ostrom, 2007; 2009). 
Chapters 2 through 5 address four specific research questions.  
Chapter 2 starts with studying the perceptions of users on grassland use under the current policy 
interventions. The specific research question is, what are the individual and social optima of 
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rural land allocation by stakeholders: among cultivated land, grassland, forest and other rural 
land? It is answered by quantifying the preference of different stakeholders over rural land 
allocation, and thereby reflects the different interests of different stakeholders over grassland 
use. Chapters 3, 4 and 5 focus on estimating the outcomes of policy interventions targeting the 
grasslands. Chapter 3 addresses the question, what is the impact of land tenure reform on the 
grassland condition? It first outlines the process of land tenure reform in the pastoral areas of 
China and then investigates the changes in grassland quantity and quality that are caused by the 
reform. Chapter 4 answers the question, what is the impact of the land tenure reform on 
livestock production? It presents the economic outcome of the land tenure reform by exploring 
the effects of the reform on the livestock population and meat output. Chapter 5 focuses on the 
question, what is the impact of Ecological Construction Programs on grassland conservation? 
It estimates the ecological outcome of one typical Ecological Construction Program (the 
Subsidy and Incentive System for Grassland Conservation).  
This final chapter recaps the main findings of each chapter, presents the contribution to the 
existing scientific debates and draws lessons for policy improvement. It concludes with the 
research limitation and recommendations for future research. 
6.2 Synthesis of research findings 
6.2.1 Different preference on grassland use by different stakeholders 
The individual optima of rural land allocation reveal the different preferences of different 
stakeholders for grassland use. The social optima illustrate a possible trade-off among 
stakeholders over grassland use. The comparisons between individual optima, social optima 
and actual allocation reflect the conflicts over grassland use among different stakeholders. In 
our case study, the optima of ecological and economic authorities for desirable grassland areas 
are within the range of the social optimum, whereas herders prefer more and farmers prefer less 
grassland than the social optimum. In addition, the actual area of grassland already exceeds the 
upper range of social optima, implying the further need to reduce the grassland area for the sake 
of social welfare. This finding appears to contradict the prevailing policy direction of grassland 
conservation that attempts to expand the grassland area. 
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6.2.2 Grassland privatisation is a significant reason to cause grassland degradation in a 
long term 
Land tenure reform in the pastoral areas of China engages in privatising use rights of grasslands 
(Banks et al., 2003). The impact of land tenure reform on the grassland ecosystem reflects the 
ecological effectiveness of grassland privatisation. The results of this research prove that 
grassland privatisation has a significant and negative impact on the condition of the grasslands. 
More specifically, private use causes the reduction of the total grassland area and leads to the 
degradation of dense and moderate grasslands into sparse grassland in the long run. As such, 
we observe “a tragedy of privatisation” (Guelke, 2003; Li and Huntsinger, 2011), as opposed 
to the well-known “tragedy of the commons”.   
6.2.3 Grassland privatisation puts a ceiling on the livestock production of pastoral areas, 
but it promotes the development of livestock productivity 
The implementation of land tenure reform is shown to have significant and negative effects on 
the increase in livestock production. That is, land tenure reform that refers to the privatisation 
of grassland use rights puts a ceiling on livestock production. This may be a possible reason for 
why the reform has not been implemented as successfully in the grasslands as in cropland of 
China. However, land reform in itself is unable to offset the impact of other factors that 
stimulate the increase in livestock production in practice. Moreover, the constraining effect of 
land tenure reform on livestock production steadily decreases following the initial 
implementation of the reform and ultimately disappears. Furthermore, the constraining effect 
of land tenure reform is stronger on the increase of livestock population than on that of meat 
output, indicating that land tenure reform improves livestock productivity. 
6.2.4 Ecological Construction Programs have significant impacts on preventing 
grassland degradation 
A series of Ecological Construction Programs have been initiated for grassland conservation in 
the 2000s. This research provides quantitative evidence that the condition of grasslands has 
improved significantly under the auspices of Ecological Construction Programs, specifically 
under the program of Subsidy and Incentive System for Grassland Conservation (SISGC). 
However, the ecological effectiveness of the Ecological Construction Programs is offset to 
some extent by other socio-economic and climate factors, such as market conditions and climate 
change. This may explain why the actual condition of the grasslands is not as good as had been 
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rural land allocation by stakeholders: among cultivated land, grassland, forest and other rural 
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expected. In addition, the case of SISGC shows that the impact of Ecological Construction 
Programs on grassland conservation is stronger in the counties with worse initial grassland 
condition, while the effects of market conditions and climate factors were also more pronounced 
in these counties. Finally, the effectiveness of SISGC is shown to experience an initial 
increasing but subsequently decreasing trend in the years since SISGC is first implemented.  
In summary, the findings of the research presented in chapters 2 to 5 suggest that the 
transformation of traditional pastoralism through policy intervention impacts the grassland 
system significantly and complexly. For instance, the outcomes of grassland privatisation (i.e. 
land tenure reform) have two different sides. On the one side, it causes further grassland 
degradation, but on the other, it is beneficial to the development of animal husbandry in pastoral 
areas by controlling excessive growth of the livestock population while prompting livestock 
productivity. Moreover, Ecological Construction Programs that mainly rely on the control of 
livestock grazing for grassland conservation has led to an improvement in the grassland 
conditions, but this effect is offset to some extent by other socio-economic and climate factors. 
6.3 Contribution to scientific debates 
6.3.1 The tragedy of the commons versus the tragedy of privatisation 
The concept of the tragedy of the commons has long been part of the conventional wisdom in 
ecology, economics and political science (McEvoy 1987). It contends that resource degradation 
is inevitable unless the commons are either privatised or maintained as common land with clear 
rights of entry and use (Hardin 1968). Similarly, the theorem of property rights proposes a clear 
assignment of property rights as a precondition for economically efficient resource allocation 
and environmental sustainability (Coase 1960). Moreover, privatisation is expected to increase 
agricultural productivity and the wise use and conservation of resources, because the 
transferability of rights under private property arrangements is supposed to ensure that 
resources end up with the most productive users (Mwangi, 2007). As such, some scholars and 
policy makers have repeatedly identified traditional pastoralism as an irrational, ecologically 
destructive and economically inefficient system (Homewood, 1995; Kamara et al., 2005; Ho 
and Azadi, 2010). 
However, Hardin’s theory of the tragedy of the commons and Coase’s theorem of property 
rights have been rejected by pastoral specialists, who found that these theoretical findings 
provided a poor guide toward the sustainable use and management of grasslands (Feeny et al. 
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1990; Behnke 1994; Sneath 1998). Some new arguments have arisen in support of traditional 
pastoralism, emphasising mobility, flexibility and reciprocity of grassland use, which conforms 
to the attribute of grassland resources with strong temporal variability and spatial heterogeneity 
(Fernandez-Gimenez and Le Febre, 2006). It is argued that traditional pastoralism could 
maintain ecosystem stability and biological diversity in terms of the sustainable use of 
grasslands (Fernandez-Gimenez and Le Febre, 2006; Fan et al., 2015). In particular, the 
communal tenure of traditional pastoralism buffers change and uncertainty in grasslands, 
allowing pastoralists to maintain a relatively reliable flow of resources from a relatively 
unreliable environment (Roe et al. 1998). Indeed, traditional pastoralism has developed flexible 
institutions that enable the persistence of production on such patchy and unpredictable low-
productivity environments for centuries (Fernandez-Gimenez and Le Febre, 2006; Li and 
Huntsinger, 2011).  
Recently, the literature has increasing interests in the common property regime of grasslands, 
especially considering the benefits of mobility, flexibility and reciprocity of grassland use, such 
as mutual aid, pooled labour as well as access to water resources, medicinal herbs and natural 
shelters, which potentially maintain the ecological and economic resilience of the grassland 
systems (Cao et al., 2013). In contrast, the exclusionary land tenure and pasture enclosure are 
suggested to be counterproductive to improve grassland systems because they threaten the 
integrity of ecological systems of arid and semi-arid areas, particularly impeding mobility and 
resource access in times of disaster (Mwangi, 2007; Galvin 2009). In this regard, the tragedy of 
privatisation is put forward (Guelke 2003; Li and Huntsinger 2011), in contrast to the well-
known tragedy of the commons. In addition, grassland privatisation reduces the amount of land 
available for livestock grazing, further leading to a reduction in the number of livestock that an 
individual can potentially own, ultimately resulting in poverty Mwangi (2007). Some scholars 
suggested that the highly spatial heterogeneity of grassland resources leads to dramatically 
inequitable assignments, especially the forage quality and water access, which may cause severe 
conflicts over grassland use (Yan et al., 2005). The other negative social consequences of the 
implementation of grassland privatisation include increased labour burdens for each household 
and the loss of labour economies of scale (Yan et al., 2005; Cao et al., 2013). 
Given these arguments over traditional pastoralism, especially regarding property rights and 
use rights, Chapters 3 and 4 of this research provide the empirical analysis on the ecological 
and economic impacts of the transformation of grassland use rights in China. Chapter 3 shows 
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that grassland privatisation causes grassland degradation in pastoral areas. Chapter 4 finds that 
grassland privatisation places a ceiling on the livestock production of pastoral areas, while it 
stimulates the development of livestock productivity. Hence, this research supports the idea of 
a tragedy of privatisation, drawing from the negative ecological outcomes of privatisation. 
Nevertheless, grassland privatisation is beneficial to the development of local animal husbandry 
considering the effects of controlling excessive growth of the livestock population and 
prompting livestock productivity, showing that grassland privatisation can stimulate herders to 
increase efforts to improve the output per animal, instead of increasing the number of animals. 
6.3.2 Deterministic stocking rates versus stochastic stocking rates 
The control of the livestock population has been the most widespread approach to halting 
grassland degradation in China, Africa and other parts of the world since overgrazing became 
a concern in the 2000s (Vetter, 2005). However, a debate around the validity of the control of 
the livestock population for preventing grassland degradation in the arid and semi-arid areas 
has emerged, often referred to as a debate between the equilibrium model and the non-
equilibrium model (e.g. Clements, 1916; Ho, 2001; Vetter, 2005). The equilibrium model, or 
Clementsian succession theory (Clements, 1916), advocates the stability and predictability of 
grasslands, which stresses the importance of biotic feedbacks such as density-dependent 
regulation of livestock population and the feedback of livestock density on vegetation 
composition, cover and productivity (Ho, 2001; Vetter, 2005). In other words, the equilibrium 
model suggests that the stocking rate is predictable and deterministic, and grassland degradation 
occurs if the carrying capacity25 is exceeded due to overstocking. The use and management of 
grasslands based on the equilibrium model therefore focus on deterministic and low stocking 
rates, i.e. controlling the livestock population for grassland conservation. 
In contrast, the non-equilibrium model advocates that the grassland condition in the arid and 
semi-arid areas are primarily driven by stochastic abiotic factors which result in highly variable 
and unpredictable primary production, particularly due to the factor of precipitation (Ho, 2001). 
The argument carried further implies that grassland degradation is part of a natural process of 
vegetation decline and growth in response to precipitation (Ho, 2001). The grassland use and 
management based on the non-equilibrium model claims that the livestock population has 
negligible feedback on the vegetation as the number of animals is kept below equilibrium 
densities by frequent droughts, and that grassland degradation as a result of overgrazing is thus 
                                                 
25 Carrying capacity indicates that grazing pressure is counterbalanced by the natural regeneration of plants. 
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unlikely (Sullivan and Rohde, 2002). As such, the non-equilibrium model embraces 
opportunistic strategies with high and stochastic stocking rates in which the number of livestock 
is maximised according to the availability of forage, and grassland degradation is not caused 
by overgrazing. 
The debates over grassland management between the equilibrium model and the non-
equilibrium model eventually are reflected in the question of whether the livestock population 
can be allowed to increase without the threaten of grassland degradation (Vetter, 2005). The 
Chinese policy interventions provide an outstanding example of managing grasslands based on 
the equilibrium model. It is believed that overgrazing is the main cause of grassland degradation, 
therefore the control of the livestock population has been employed for grassland conservation. 
Chapter 5 of this research investigates the ecological outcomes of the policy intervention of 
deterministic stocking rates and grazing bans in Inner Mongolia, China. It suggests that control 
of the livestock population improves the grassland condition significantly in the arid and semi-
arid areas of China in the short term. However, there are some doubts over the long term, as the 
effectiveness of grassland conservation measures appears to decrease in later years. As such, 
this research agrees that grassland management based on the equilibrium model might be 
effective for grassland conservation in the arid and semi-arid pastoral areas temporarily, but 
that the non-equilibrium model may be more valid for long-term strategies. 
6.3.3 Top-down intervention versus bottom-up intervention 
The debate over concrete uses and management strategies for natural resources is still ongoing: 
in particular, whether a top-down or a bottom-up approach can best achieve conservation goals 
(Oestreicher et al., 2009; Mauerhofer, 2011). The top-down approach assumes that legislation 
and policies set explicit aims and objectives, providing a blueprint that is then directly translated 
into action on the ground (Urwin and Jordan, 2008). Top-down intervention generally follows 
a decision by government authorities and policy makers. Although such official acts in the 
public interest are considered capable of designing optimal rules to govern resource use for an 
entire region, this prescription is not supported by empirical research (Ostrom, 1999). The top-
down approach has been criticised as leading to poor compliance with statutory law and limited 
local community participation in monitoring and enforcing natural resource conservation 
regulations (Hartter and Ryan, 2010). Hence, top-down resource management strategies have 
been linked to marginalising poor populations and exacerbating natural resource depletion 
(Oestreicher et al., 2009).  
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A bottom-up approach that aims to guide self-organisation towards desirable states (Ball and 
Helbing, 2012), recognises the decisions and strategies of local resource users in managing 
resources (Castella et al., 2007). It has been suggested that sustainable natural resource 
management directives must be initiated from the grassroots level, where the problems and 
solutions are perceived as local (Hartter and Ryan, 2010). Research in multiple disciplines has 
found that some top-down policy interventions accelerate resource destruction, whereas self-
organisation by some resource users has been successful in resource conservation (Ostrom, 
2009). Field studies also have found that local resource users, with or without the assistance of 
external authorities, have created a wide diversity of institutional arrangements for coping with 
common-pool resources26 (Ostrom, 1999). Moreover, a series of relatively autonomous, self-
organised resource governance systems might do a better job of regulating small common-pool 
resources than a single central authority. A decentralised, polycentric, bottom-up approach, 
involving multiple institutions instead of a single global one, may provide better conditions 
both for cooperation to thrive and for ensuring the maintenance of such institutions 
(Vasconcelos et al., 2013). Local resource users, who share moral and ethical standards for how 
to behave in the groups they form, face lower transaction costs in reaching agreements and 
lower costs of monitoring (Ostrom, 2009). In terms of grassland management, Sneath (1998) 
showed that the grasslands under central government management in China and Russia are 
associated with more degradation than those under traditional, self-organised group-property 
regimes in Mongolia. 
Scholars have increasingly embraced the bottom-up, self-organised approach to policy 
intervention. The research cases by Schoon (2008) found that the bottom-up approach increases 
cooperation and coordination at the operational level, but that top-down approach can generate 
successful cooperation at higher levels of governance. Policy interventions in grassland 
conservation in China have generally been conducted via a top-down approach, starting with 
explicit aims and quotas that are distributed from the central government to the provinces, 
followed by subsequent distribution down through counties, townships, and finally to 
participating villages (Bennett, 2008). This is criticised because of the lack of sufficient 
consultation with local communities and rural households to identify their needs and learn the 
local constraints (Bennett, 2008). Chapter 5 focuses on investigating the ecological outcome of 
top-down interventions into grassland conservation in China. The research results reveal that 
                                                 
26 A common-pool resource, such as an irrigation system, a fishing ground, a forest, or open access grasslands, is 
a natural or man-made resource, from which it is difficult to exclude or limit users once the resource is provided, 
where one person’s consumption of resource units makes those units unavailable to others (Ostrom et al., 1994). 
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the policy intervention impacts grassland condition significantly and positively, but the 
effectiveness on grassland conservation is not as good as expected because of the 
counterbalancing effect of other factors. In this regard, the policy improvement of grassland 
conservation in China could consider more bottom-up self-organisation interventions that 
involve learning about local market forces, climate conditions, and so on.  
6.3.4 The one-size-fits-all versus tailor-made policies for resource governance 
Scholars have tended to develop simple theoretical models to analyse aspects of resource 
problems and to prescribe universal solutions for resource use (Ostrom, 2009). Governmental 
agencies often impose one-size-fits-all policy for resource governance. However, the universal 
policy solution frequently fails (Pritchett and Woolcock, 2004; Ostrom, 2009). In particular, 
national government agencies are often unsuccessful in their efforts to design effective and 
uniform sets of rules to regulate important common-pool resources across a broad domain 
(Ostrom, 1999).  
In the case of China, land tenure reform started with the Household Production Responsibility 
System in cropland areas in the late 1970s and spread to the pastoral areas by the early 1980s. 
The reform intended to reallocate communal land to peasant households. In the cropland areas, 
the household-based use rights system was established rapidly, and 94.2% of rural households 
had adopted the system by the end of 1983 (Lin, 1987; Banks et al., 2003). Chinese scholars 
showed that this reform of cropland use rights created millions of smallholders with relative 
autonomy over land use decisions and crop selection (Tilt, 2008). Moreover, the household-
based farming system improved the incentive structure for agricultural production when 
monitoring was difficult within the commune system (Lin, 1987). This assignment of cropland 
resulted in the growth of agricultural output and income in the reform period.  
However, in the pastoral areas, the implementation of the land tenure reform is not as successful 
as was the case in the cropland areas. The assignment of grassland use rights was implemented 
slowly and was still in progress after 30 years of efforts, and a second round of reform to 
accelerate the implementation in the 1990s. The adoption of actual private use by individual 
households evidently lagged behind the assignment of formal use rights by governments. The 
research results in Chapter 3 showed that the land tenure reform was detrimental to the 
grassland ecosystem, although it is beneficial to the development of the animal husbandry 
system of pastoral areas according to the research results in Chapter 4. The conclusion can be 
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26 A common-pool resource, such as an irrigation system, a fishing ground, a forest, or open access grasslands, is 
a natural or man-made resource, from which it is difficult to exclude or limit users once the resource is provided, 
where one person’s consumption of resource units makes those units unavailable to others (Ostrom et al., 1994). 
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the policy intervention impacts grassland condition significantly and positively, but the 
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research results in Chapter 3 showed that the land tenure reform was detrimental to the 
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system of pastoral areas according to the research results in Chapter 4. The conclusion can be 
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made that the land tenure reform that seemed suitable for managing cropland resources may not 
fit the management of grassland resources. This result is in line with the research finding that 
individual property may not be suitable for most pastoral settings in which resource productivity 
is variable due to environmental variability (Mwangi, 2007). 
With respect to resource conservation, the Chinese government initiated a series of ecological 
programs for ecological restoration and resource development in its forest sector in the late 
1990s, including the Natural Forest Protection Program, the Sloping Land Conversion Program, 
the Desertification Combating Program around Beijing and Tianjin, the Shelterbelt 
Development Program, and the Wildlife Conservation and Nature Reserve Development 
Program (Liu et al., 2010). Plenty of scholars have shown that these ecological programs for 
forest conservation have significant and positive impacts on improving resource conditions as 
well as increasing rural households’ income (e.g. Liu et al., 2010; Mullan et al., 2010). 
Following these ecological programs for forest conservation, a series of programs have been 
initiated to protect the grasslands of China, especially during the 2000s. In general, sowing 
grass and reducing grazing (such as with a grazing ban) are imposed as key components for 
grassland conservation, which coincide with the main measures of planting trees and restricting 
logging (such as with a logging ban) for forest conservation (Mullan et al., 2010). Chapter 5 of 
this research shows that the effectiveness of the large-scale ecological programs differs across 
different regions with the same policy context. In addition, Chapter 2 of this research shows 
that different stakeholders have divergent preferences in different types of rural land. Given 
these research results, it is evident that there is no one-size-fits-all policy for the governance of 
cropland, grassland and forest land, as well as for the interests of different stakeholders. In this 
case, tailor-made policies that take into account the specific circumstances, such as the resource 
types and stakeholders, are needed for resource governance.                          
6.4 Policy implications 
With severe grassland degradation, high population pressure and increased production 
requirements, the sustainable use and management of grasslands, which enables the 
maintenance of productive capacity without compromising the ecological interests of human 
communities and the ecosystem itself, are essential. An increasing number of scholars support 
the model of traditional pastoralism as one approach for sustainable grassland use, due to its 
advantages of mobility, flexibility and reciprocity that fit grassland use for heterogeneously 
distributed resources. In this respect, some have suggested abolishing the existing grassland 
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privatisation, tearing down wire fences between the patches, repealing the deterministic 
stocking rates and further resuming nomadism (Wu and Du, 2008). However, there has also 
been criticism of traditional pastoralism as being incapable of coping with the rapidly increasing 
population pressure and economic demands relying on finite grassland resources, because 
traditional pastoralism is primarily subsistence-oriented. In other words, traditional pastoralism 
may only operate well during the phases of low economic demand and minimal environmental 
degradation. As such, it is important to transform the traditional pastoralism into a model that 
can adapt to contemporary socio-economic conditions.  
The case of Inner Mongolia presents lessons for the improvement of the government-driven 
transformation of traditional pastoralism in arid and semi-arid pastoral areas. In particular, it 
shows that the assignment of grassland use rights to individual households has negative impacts 
on improving the grassland condition. On the other hand, the privatised use rights have put a 
ceiling on the livestock production of pastoral areas, while it promotes the development of 
livestock productivity. Some scholars have mentioned that the household is not an efficient unit 
for meeting the demands of large-scale animal husbandry, and household-based privatisation 
has provided a rapid increase in livestock production costs in the pastoral areas of China (Li et 
al., 2014). Admittedly, the cooperative use of grasslands on a large scale offers the opportunity 
to benefit from the maximum heterogeneity in the landscape. Given the status quo of 
privatisation implemented in pastoral societies, a possible solution is to stimulate the local 
community toward cooperative use and management of grassland resources based on the 
existing privatised property rights or use rights of grasslands. In this regard, the privatisation of 
grassland property rights or use rights could be viewed as a precondition for guaranteeing stable 
cooperation. The cooperative households who reach an agreement are encouraged to remove 
their fences and pool their grassland resource in order to provide a better match for forage and 
water availability. Besides the grassland resource, other agricultural inputs like labour and 
capital could be pooled for efficient distribution as well. Economies of scale in production and 
the exclusion of outsiders are also important (Mwangi, 2007). The proposal of cooperative use 
is in line with the research findings of Mwangi (2007) that showed how parcel re-aggregation 
can offer promise for ecosystem sustainability as well as for the economic sustainability of 
African grasslands.  
In addition, a wide diversity of institutional arrangements for grassland use are needed, 
considering the heterogeneity in grassland resources per se and the different socio-economic 
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and cultural backgrounds of pastoral societies, instead of extending the same policy measures 
designed for crop-farming areas to pastoral areas. This study has found that the same land tenure 
reform had different policy effectiveness on grassland and cropland. Especially some 
unintended effects were observed on grassland systems, which suggest the need to clarify the 
different attributes between grassland systems and cropland systems before transforming the 
property rights or use rights of grasslands. Clearly, the top-down decision by central 
governments for resource management makes it difficult to consider all of the specific attributes 
of each resource at local levels, but it is advocated that resource users who understand the local 
Social-Ecological Systems (SESs) well are able to use the resource more efficiently through 
self-organisation and self-crafted institutions (e.g. Ostrom, 1999; Baerlein et al., 2015). Users 
that have full autonomy at the collective-choice level to craft and enforce some of their own 
rules, also confront lower transaction costs (Ostrom, 2009). As such, it is recommended to 
create specific institutional agreements for grassland use by local communities. This bottom-
up self-organisation management would have the advantage of relatively complete information 
for developing efficient use of grasslands, which specifically takes into account the highly 
variable topography of grasslands, strongly spatial and temporal heterogeneity of grassland 
resources, traditional knowledge about grassland use and production, and other important 
factors (Yan et al., 2005; Wu and Du, 2008; Fernandez-Gimenez et al., 2012). 
Theoretically, cooperative use of grasslands among neighbouring households could conform to 
the theory of “common pool resources” which involves self-organisation by the local 
community in efforts to achieve a sustainable Social-Ecological System (Ostrom, 2009). 
Nevertheless, cooperative use of grasslands and bottom-up self-organisation management 
should undergo further research concerning internal organisation, transaction costs, etc. 
Moreover, although the self-organisation by local herders is predominantly suggested as a 
localised management model, the assistance of external authorities plays an important role in 
balancing the various needs of the whole society. The long-term sustainability of rules devised 
at a SES level depends on monitoring and enforcement, without being overruled by government 
policies (Ostrom, 2009). As such, a combination of top-down and bottom-up approaches is 
perhaps the most effective approach to be considered. The study by Fernandez-Gimenez et al. 
(2012) also demonstrated that the strengthening of adaptive capacity and resilience of grassland 
systems requires joint efforts and improved communication between the government and local 
communities. 
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6.5 Limitations and recommendations for future research 
To conclude, I would like to point out a number of limitations of this study and challenges for 
future research. First, I follow Ostrom (2007)’s recommendation that the problems linked to 
SESs require serious study of complex, multivariable, nonlinear, cross-scale and changing 
systems, and that more knowledge about specific variables of SESs, the interactions between 
variables and dynamics of SESs need to be explored more deeply. More specifically, in Chapter 
2, we assume four categories of rural land, four stakeholder types and three scenarios to simplify 
the reality of land allocation in the SES. For further research, the more components and the 
more complicated interactions between the components of rural land allocation linked SESs 
need to be considered. Moreover, chapters 3, 4 and 5 present general outcomes of the policy 
interventions in grassland systems, whereas the interaction between grassland condition and 
livestock production is a significant aspect to be studied more concretely.  
With regard to the complex SESs of grasslands, our research provides preliminary outcomes of 
governance system to grassland system at county-level. An interesting avenue for future 
research is to understand the specific impacts of policy interventions at the household-level, 
such as the costs and benefits that herders faced during the policy interventions. Further 
research would be to explore this in more detail, for example: what changes herders adopted in 
order to adapt to the government-driven transformation of traditional pastoralism; how herders 
adjusted their grassland use and livestock production patterns coping with the increasing 
population, the growing demand for livestock products and the grassland degradation; what is 
the resilience of pastoral societies in the changing natural and social environment. Moreover, 
our research focuses on the pastoral areas of Inner Mongolia, which is a typical region for 
studying the SESs of grasslands of China. However, the crop-farming areas that also include 
some permanent grassland have more complicated SESs and more serious grassland 
degradation than the pastoral areas, and thus even more problems to be addressed. The same 
research questions that are addressed in this study for the pastoral areas would be also 
interesting for those crop farming areas, such as the dynamics of their grassland ecosystem, 
livestock production and household livelihoods under the changing social, economic and 
political settings. Moreover, the accuracy of Chinese livestock statistics is questionable 
(Waldron et al., 2007). The standardisation of data collection on livestock population and meat 
output must be improved, especially regarding the production of rural households. Given more 
reliable data on livestock production, the scepticism over the existence and extent of 
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overgrazing would be dissected, which would significantly contribute to the debates between 
the equilibrium model and non-equilibrium model for arid and semi-arid areas. 
Last but not least, cooperative use of grasslands on a large scale and bottom-up self-organisation 
management are considered possible solutions for policy improvement in this research, but 
more empirical analysis is required to testify to their validity and investigate the possibility of 
implementation. There are no simple solutions to complex governance problems (Ostrom, 
2007). As such, we call for more research to learn about the SESs of grasslands based on the 
same framework introduced by Ostrom, in order to develop broader and more integrated 
insights into SESs. A large number of government-driven transformations of traditional 
pastoralism are under way in Africa, Asia and other regions. The quest to better understand the 
approaches and paths of these transformations is an important part of ensuring the sustainability 
of grassland SESs around the world.  
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Appendixes 
Appendix 2-A: Derivation of the individually optimal allocation of land 
For the individual optimal allocation of land, each stakeholder type i ሺ ൌ ͳǡ ʹ͵Ͷ 
representing four stakeholder types, including the herders, the farmers, the ecological public 
authorities and economic public authorities) maximizes its utility function by choosing the 
amounts of land for different purposes. That is: 
ܯܣܺ ௜ܷ ൌ ݈௖௨௟ሺ௜ሻ௔೔ ݈௥௔௡ሺ௜ሻ௕೔ ݈௙௢௥ሺ௜ሻ௖೔ ݈௢௧௛ሺ௜ሻௗ೔ ǡሺʹܣǤ ͳሻ 
Subject to: 
݈௖௨௟ሺ௜ሻ ൅ ݈௥௔௡ሺ௜ሻ ൅ ݈௙௢௥ሺ௜ሻ ൅ ݈௢௧௛ሺ௜ሻ ൌ ܮǡሺʹܣǤ ʹሻ 
ݓ݄݁ݎ݁݈௖௨௟ሺ௜ሻǡ ݈௥௔௡ሺ௜ሻǡ ݈௙௢௥ሺ௜ሻǡ ݈௢௧௛ሺ௜ሻ ൒ ͲǢ Ͳ ൑ ܽ௜ǡ ܾ௜ǡ ܿ௜ǡ ݀௜ ൑ ͳǢܽ௜ ൅ ܾ௜ ൅ ܿ௜ ൅ ݀௜ ൌ ͳ 
The logarithmic transformation of the utility function gives: 
ݑ௜ ൌ ݈݊ ௜ܷ ൌ ܽ௜݈݈݊௖௨௟ሺ௜ሻ ൅ ܾ௜݈݈݊௥௔௡ሺ௜ሻ ൅ ܿ௜݈݈݊௙௢௥ሺ௜ሻ ൅ ݀௜݈݈݊௢௧௛ሺ௜ሻǤሺʹܣǤ ͵ሻ 
The Lagrange function is then: 
 ܮݑ௜ ൌ ܽ௜݈݈݊௖௨௟ሺ௜ሻ ൅ ܾ௜݈݈݊௥௔௡ሺ௜ሻ ൅ ܿ௜݈݈݊௙௢௥ሺ௜ሻ ൅ ݀௜݈݈݊௢௧௛ሺ௜ሻ 
൅ ߣ൫ܮ െ ݈௖௥௢ሺ௜ሻ െ ݈௥௔௡ሺ௜ሻ െ ݈௙௢௥ሺ௜ሻ െ ݈௢௧௛ሺ௜ሻ൯ሺʹܣǤ Ͷሻ 
Taking the partial derivations of  ୧ with respect to each variable, and setting the first order 
condition gives: 
߲ܮݑ௜
߲݈௖௨௟ሺ௜ሻ ൌ
ܽ௜
݈௙௔௥ሺ௜ሻ െ ߣ ൌ ͲǡሺʹܣǤ ͷሻ 
߲ܮݑ௜
߲݈௥௔௡ሺ௜ሻ ൌ
ܾ௜
݈௥௔௡ሺ௜ሻ െ ߣ ൌ ͲǡሺʹܣǤ ͸ሻ 
߲ܮݑ௜
߲݈௙௢௥ሺ௜ሻ ൌ
ܿ௜
݈௙௢௥ሺ௜ሻ െ ߣ ൌ ͲǡሺʹܣǤ ͹ሻ 
߲ܮݑ௜
߲݈௢௧௛ሺ௜ሻ ൌ
݀௜
݈௢௧௛ሺ௜ሻ െ ߣ ൌ ͲǤሺʹܣǤ ͺሻ 
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Appendixes 
Appendix 2-A: Derivation of the individually optimal allocation of land 
For the individual optimal allocation of land, each stakeholder type i ሺ ൌ ͳǡ ʹ͵Ͷ 
representing four stakeholder types, including the herders, the farmers, the ecological public 
authorities and economic public authorities) maximizes its utility function by choosing the 
amounts of land for different purposes. That is: 
ܯܣܺ ௜ܷ ൌ ݈௖௨௟ሺ௜ሻ௔೔ ݈௥௔௡ሺ௜ሻ௕೔ ݈௙௢௥ሺ௜ሻ௖೔ ݈௢௧௛ሺ௜ሻௗ೔ ǡሺʹܣǤ ͳሻ 
Subject to: 
݈௖௨௟ሺ௜ሻ ൅ ݈௥௔௡ሺ௜ሻ ൅ ݈௙௢௥ሺ௜ሻ ൅ ݈௢௧௛ሺ௜ሻ ൌ ܮǡሺʹܣǤ ʹሻ 
ݓ݄݁ݎ݁݈௖௨௟ሺ௜ሻǡ ݈௥௔௡ሺ௜ሻǡ ݈௙௢௥ሺ௜ሻǡ ݈௢௧௛ሺ௜ሻ ൒ ͲǢ Ͳ ൑ ܽ௜ǡ ܾ௜ǡ ܿ௜ǡ ݀௜ ൑ ͳǢܽ௜ ൅ ܾ௜ ൅ ܿ௜ ൅ ݀௜ ൌ ͳ 
The logarithmic transformation of the utility function gives: 
ݑ௜ ൌ ݈݊ ௜ܷ ൌ ܽ௜݈݈݊௖௨௟ሺ௜ሻ ൅ ܾ௜݈݈݊௥௔௡ሺ௜ሻ ൅ ܿ௜݈݈݊௙௢௥ሺ௜ሻ ൅ ݀௜݈݈݊௢௧௛ሺ௜ሻǤሺʹܣǤ ͵ሻ 
The Lagrange function is then: 
 ܮݑ௜ ൌ ܽ௜݈݈݊௖௨௟ሺ௜ሻ ൅ ܾ௜݈݈݊௥௔௡ሺ௜ሻ ൅ ܿ௜݈݈݊௙௢௥ሺ௜ሻ ൅ ݀௜݈݈݊௢௧௛ሺ௜ሻ 
൅ ߣ൫ܮ െ ݈௖௥௢ሺ௜ሻ െ ݈௥௔௡ሺ௜ሻ െ ݈௙௢௥ሺ௜ሻ െ ݈௢௧௛ሺ௜ሻ൯ሺʹܣǤ Ͷሻ 
Taking the partial derivations of  ୧ with respect to each variable, and setting the first order 
condition gives: 
߲ܮݑ௜
߲݈௖௨௟ሺ௜ሻ ൌ
ܽ௜
݈௙௔௥ሺ௜ሻ െ ߣ ൌ ͲǡሺʹܣǤ ͷሻ 
߲ܮݑ௜
߲݈௥௔௡ሺ௜ሻ ൌ
ܾ௜
݈௥௔௡ሺ௜ሻ െ ߣ ൌ ͲǡሺʹܣǤ ͸ሻ 
߲ܮݑ௜
߲݈௙௢௥ሺ௜ሻ ൌ
ܿ௜
݈௙௢௥ሺ௜ሻ െ ߣ ൌ ͲǡሺʹܣǤ ͹ሻ 
߲ܮݑ௜
߲݈௢௧௛ሺ௜ሻ ൌ
݀௜
݈௢௧௛ሺ௜ሻ െ ߣ ൌ ͲǤሺʹܣǤ ͺሻ 
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Combining (2A.5) to (2A.8) gives:  
ܽ௜
݈௖௨௟ሺ௜ሻ ൌ
ܾ௜
݈௥௔௡ሺ௜ሻ ൌ
ܿ௜
݈௙௢௥ሺ௜ሻ ൌ
݀௜
݈௢௧௛ሺ௜ሻ ǡሺʹܣǤ ͻሻ 
Or : 
ܽ௜݈௥௔௡ሺ௜ሻ ൌ ܾ௜݈௖௨௟ሺ௜ሻǡ ܽ௜݈௙௢௥ሺ௜ሻ ൌ ܿ௜݈௖௨௟ሺ௜ሻǡ ܽ௜݈௢௧௛ሺ௜ሻ ൌ ݀௜݈௖௨௟ሺ௜ሻǤሺʹܣǤ ͳͲሻ 
Combining (A2) with (A9)ǡ ݓ݁݄ܽݒ݁ǣ 
ܽ௜
݈௖௨௟ሺ௜ሻ ൌ
ܽ௜
ܮ െ ݈௥௔௡ሺ௜ሻ െ ݈௙௢௥ሺ௜ሻ െ ݈௢௧௛ሺ௜ሻ ǡሺʹܣǤ ͳͳሻ 
Rearrange (A10) and (A11) combined with ܽ௜ ൅ ܾ௜ ൅ ܿ௜ ൅݀௜ ൌ ͳǡݓ݁݋ܾݐܽ݅݊ǣ 
݈௖௨௟ሺ௜ሻ଴ ൌ ܽ௜ ൈ ܮǡሺʹܣǤ ͳʹሻ 
݈௥௔௡ሺ௜ሻ଴ ൌ ܾ௜ ൈ ܮǡሺʹܣǤ ͳ͵ሻ 
݈௙௢௥ሺ௜ሻ଴ ൌ ܿ௜ ൈ ܮǡሺʹܣǤ ͳͶሻ 
݈௢௧௛ሺ௜ሻ଴ ൌ ݀௜ ൈ ܮǡሺʹܣǤ ͳͷሻ 
This completes the proof of equation (3) to (6) in the main text of Chapter 2. 
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Appendix 2-B: Derivation of the socially optimal allocation of land 
For the social optimal allocation of land, maximizing the social welfare is: 
MAX ܹ ൌ ς ௜ܷఉ೔ସ௜ୀଵ ǡሺʹܤǤ ͳሻ 
Subject to: 
݈௖௨௟ሺ௦ሻ ൅ ݈௥௔௡ሺ௦ሻ ൅ ݈௙௢௥ሺ௦ሻ ൅ ݈௢௧௛ሺ௦ሻ ൌ ܮǡሺʹܤǤ ʹሻ 
ݓ݄݁ݎ݁෍ߚ௜
ସ
௜ୀଵ
ൌ ͳǡ Ǥ ߚ௜ ൒ Ͳǡ Ͳ ൑ ܽ௜ǡ ܾ௜ǡ ܿ௜ǡ ݀௜ ൑ ͳǢ݈௖௨௟௦ǡ ݈௥௔௡௦ǡ ݈௙௢௥௦ǡ ݈௢௧௛௦ ൒ ͲǢ෍ߚ௜
ସ
௜ୀଵ
ൌ ͳܽ݊݀ߚ௜ ൒ Ͳ 
Plugging  equation (2A.1) into (2B.1), we obtain: 
ܹ ൌ ቀ݈௖௨௟ሺ௦ሻ௔భ ݈௥௔௡ሺ௦ሻ௕భ ݈௙௢௥ሺ௦ሻ௖భ ݈௢௧௛ሺ௦ሻௗభ ቁ
ఉభ כ ቀ݈௖௨௟ሺ௦ሻ௔మ ݈௥௔௡ሺ௦ሻ௕మ ݈௙௢௥ሺ௦ሻ௖మ ݈௢௧௛ሺ௦ሻௗమ ቁ
ఉమ
כ ቀ݈௖௨௟ሺ௦ሻ௔య ݈௥௔௡ሺ௦ሻ௕య ݈௙௢௥ሺ௦ሻ௖య ݈௢௧௛ሺ௦ሻௗయ ቁ
ఉయ
כ ቀ݈௖௨௟ሺ௦ሻ௔ర ݈௥௔௡ሺ௦ሻ௕ర ݈௙௢௥ሺ௦ሻ௖ర ݈௢௧௛ሺ௦ሻௗర ቁ
ఉర ሺʹܤǤ ͵ሻ 
The logarithmic transformation of the social welfare function is: 
ݓ ൌ ݈ܹ݊ ൌ ߚଵ݈݊ ቀ݈௖௨௟ሺ௦ሻ௔భ ݈௥௔௡ሺ௦ሻ௕భ ݈௙௢௥ሺ௦ሻ௖భ ݈௢௧௛ሺ௦ሻௗభ ቁ ൅ ߚଶ݈݊ ቀ݈௖௨௟ሺ௦ሻ௔మ ݈௥௔௡ሺ௦ሻ௕మ ݈௙௢௥ሺ௦ሻ௖మ ሻቁ
൅ ߚଷ݈݊ ቀ݈௖௨௟ሺ௦ሻ௔య ݈௥௔௡ሺ௦ሻ௕య ݈௙௢௥ሺ௦ሻ௖య ݈௢௧௛ሺ௦ሻௗయ ቁ
൅ ߚସ݈݊ ቀ݈௖௨௟ሺ௦ሻ௔ర ݈௥௔௡ሺ௦ሻ௕ర ݈௙௢௥ሺ௦ሻ௖ర ݈௢௧௛ሺ௦ሻௗర ቁ
 ሺʹܤǤ Ͷሻ 
The Lagrange function is then: 
ܮݓ ൌ ߚଵ݈݊ ቀ݈௖௨௟ሺ௦ሻ௔భ ݈௚௥௔ሺ௦ሻ௕భ ݈௙௢௥ሺ௦ሻ௖భ ݈௢௧௛ሺ௦ሻௗభ ቁ ൅ ߚଶ݈݊ ቀ݈௖௨௟ሺ௦ሻ௔మ ݈௥௔௡ሺ௦ሻ௕మ ݈௙௢௥ሺ௦ሻ௖మ ݈௢௧௛ሺ௦ሻௗమ ቁ
൅ ߚଷ݈݊ ቀ݈௖௨௟ሺ௦ሻ௔య ݈௥௔௡ሺ௦ሻ௕య ݈௙௢௥ሺ௦ሻ௖య ݈௢௧௛ሺ௦ሻௗయ ቁ ൅ ߚସ݈݊ ቀ݈௖௨௟ሺ௦ሻ௔ర ݈௥௔௡ሺ௦ሻ௕ర ݈௙௢௥ሺ௦ሻ௖ర ݈௢௧௛ሺ௦ሻௗర ቁ

൅ ߣ൫ܮ െ ݈௖௨௟ሺ௦ሻ െ ݈௥௔௡ሺ௦ሻ െ ݈௙௢௥ሺ௦ሻ െ ݈௢௧௛ሺ௦ሻ൯ሺʹܤǤ ͷሻ 
Taking the partial derivations of Lw with respect to each variable, and setting the first order 
condition gives: 
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Combining (2A.5) to (2A.8) gives:  
ܽ௜
݈௖௨௟ሺ௜ሻ ൌ
ܾ௜
݈௥௔௡ሺ௜ሻ ൌ
ܿ௜
݈௙௢௥ሺ௜ሻ ൌ
݀௜
݈௢௧௛ሺ௜ሻ ǡሺʹܣǤ ͻሻ 
Or : 
ܽ௜݈௥௔௡ሺ௜ሻ ൌ ܾ௜݈௖௨௟ሺ௜ሻǡ ܽ௜݈௙௢௥ሺ௜ሻ ൌ ܿ௜݈௖௨௟ሺ௜ሻǡ ܽ௜݈௢௧௛ሺ௜ሻ ൌ ݀௜݈௖௨௟ሺ௜ሻǤሺʹܣǤ ͳͲሻ 
Combining (A2) with (A9)ǡ ݓ݁݄ܽݒ݁ǣ 
ܽ௜
݈௖௨௟ሺ௜ሻ ൌ
ܽ௜
ܮ െ ݈௥௔௡ሺ௜ሻ െ ݈௙௢௥ሺ௜ሻ െ ݈௢௧௛ሺ௜ሻ ǡሺʹܣǤ ͳͳሻ 
Rearrange (A10) and (A11) combined with ܽ௜ ൅ ܾ௜ ൅ ܿ௜ ൅݀௜ ൌ ͳǡݓ݁݋ܾݐܽ݅݊ǣ 
݈௖௨௟ሺ௜ሻ଴ ൌ ܽ௜ ൈ ܮǡሺʹܣǤ ͳʹሻ 
݈௥௔௡ሺ௜ሻ଴ ൌ ܾ௜ ൈ ܮǡሺʹܣǤ ͳ͵ሻ 
݈௙௢௥ሺ௜ሻ଴ ൌ ܿ௜ ൈ ܮǡሺʹܣǤ ͳͶሻ 
݈௢௧௛ሺ௜ሻ଴ ൌ ݀௜ ൈ ܮǡሺʹܣǤ ͳͷሻ 
This completes the proof of equation (3) to (6) in the main text of Chapter 2. 
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Appendix 2-B: Derivation of the socially optimal allocation of land 
For the social optimal allocation of land, maximizing the social welfare is: 
MAX ܹ ൌ ς ௜ܷఉ೔ସ௜ୀଵ ǡሺʹܤǤ ͳሻ 
Subject to: 
݈௖௨௟ሺ௦ሻ ൅ ݈௥௔௡ሺ௦ሻ ൅ ݈௙௢௥ሺ௦ሻ ൅ ݈௢௧௛ሺ௦ሻ ൌ ܮǡሺʹܤǤ ʹሻ 
ݓ݄݁ݎ݁෍ߚ௜
ସ
௜ୀଵ
ൌ ͳǡ Ǥ ߚ௜ ൒ Ͳǡ Ͳ ൑ ܽ௜ǡ ܾ௜ǡ ܿ௜ǡ ݀௜ ൑ ͳǢ݈௖௨௟௦ǡ ݈௥௔௡௦ǡ ݈௙௢௥௦ǡ ݈௢௧௛௦ ൒ ͲǢ෍ߚ௜
ସ
௜ୀଵ
ൌ ͳܽ݊݀ߚ௜ ൒ Ͳ 
Plugging  equation (2A.1) into (2B.1), we obtain: 
ܹ ൌ ቀ݈௖௨௟ሺ௦ሻ௔భ ݈௥௔௡ሺ௦ሻ௕భ ݈௙௢௥ሺ௦ሻ௖భ ݈௢௧௛ሺ௦ሻௗభ ቁ
ఉభ כ ቀ݈௖௨௟ሺ௦ሻ௔మ ݈௥௔௡ሺ௦ሻ௕మ ݈௙௢௥ሺ௦ሻ௖మ ݈௢௧௛ሺ௦ሻௗమ ቁ
ఉమ
כ ቀ݈௖௨௟ሺ௦ሻ௔య ݈௥௔௡ሺ௦ሻ௕య ݈௙௢௥ሺ௦ሻ௖య ݈௢௧௛ሺ௦ሻௗయ ቁ
ఉయ
כ ቀ݈௖௨௟ሺ௦ሻ௔ర ݈௥௔௡ሺ௦ሻ௕ర ݈௙௢௥ሺ௦ሻ௖ర ݈௢௧௛ሺ௦ሻௗర ቁ
ఉర ሺʹܤǤ ͵ሻ 
The logarithmic transformation of the social welfare function is: 
ݓ ൌ ݈ܹ݊ ൌ ߚଵ݈݊ ቀ݈௖௨௟ሺ௦ሻ௔భ ݈௥௔௡ሺ௦ሻ௕భ ݈௙௢௥ሺ௦ሻ௖భ ݈௢௧௛ሺ௦ሻௗభ ቁ ൅ ߚଶ݈݊ ቀ݈௖௨௟ሺ௦ሻ௔మ ݈௥௔௡ሺ௦ሻ௕మ ݈௙௢௥ሺ௦ሻ௖మ ሻቁ
൅ ߚଷ݈݊ ቀ݈௖௨௟ሺ௦ሻ௔య ݈௥௔௡ሺ௦ሻ௕య ݈௙௢௥ሺ௦ሻ௖య ݈௢௧௛ሺ௦ሻௗయ ቁ
൅ ߚସ݈݊ ቀ݈௖௨௟ሺ௦ሻ௔ర ݈௥௔௡ሺ௦ሻ௕ర ݈௙௢௥ሺ௦ሻ௖ర ݈௢௧௛ሺ௦ሻௗర ቁ
 ሺʹܤǤ Ͷሻ 
The Lagrange function is then: 
ܮݓ ൌ ߚଵ݈݊ ቀ݈௖௨௟ሺ௦ሻ௔భ ݈௚௥௔ሺ௦ሻ௕భ ݈௙௢௥ሺ௦ሻ௖భ ݈௢௧௛ሺ௦ሻௗభ ቁ ൅ ߚଶ݈݊ ቀ݈௖௨௟ሺ௦ሻ௔మ ݈௥௔௡ሺ௦ሻ௕మ ݈௙௢௥ሺ௦ሻ௖మ ݈௢௧௛ሺ௦ሻௗమ ቁ
൅ ߚଷ݈݊ ቀ݈௖௨௟ሺ௦ሻ௔య ݈௥௔௡ሺ௦ሻ௕య ݈௙௢௥ሺ௦ሻ௖య ݈௢௧௛ሺ௦ሻௗయ ቁ ൅ ߚସ݈݊ ቀ݈௖௨௟ሺ௦ሻ௔ర ݈௥௔௡ሺ௦ሻ௕ర ݈௙௢௥ሺ௦ሻ௖ర ݈௢௧௛ሺ௦ሻௗర ቁ

൅ ߣ൫ܮ െ ݈௖௨௟ሺ௦ሻ െ ݈௥௔௡ሺ௦ሻ െ ݈௙௢௥ሺ௦ሻ െ ݈௢௧௛ሺ௦ሻ൯ሺʹܤǤ ͷሻ 
Taking the partial derivations of Lw with respect to each variable, and setting the first order 
condition gives: 
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߲ܮݓ
߲݈௖௨௟ሺ௦ሻ ൌ
σ ߚ௜ܽ௜ସ௜ୀଵ
݈௖௨௟ሺ௦ሻ െ ߣ ൌ ͲǡሺʹܤǤ ͸ሻ 
߲ܮݓ
߲݈௥௔௡ሺ௦ሻ ൌ
σ ߚ௜ܾ௜ସ௜ୀଵ
݈௥௔௡ሺ௦ሻ െ ߣ ൌ ͲǡሺʹܤǤ ͹ሻ 
߲ܮݓ
߲݈௙௢௥ሺ௦ሻ ൌ
σ ߚ௜ܿ௜ସ௜ୀଵ
݈௙௢௥ሺ௦ሻ െ ߣ ൌ ͲǡሺʹܤǤ ͺሻ 
߲ܮݓ
߲݈௢௧௛ሺ௦ሻ ൌ
σ ߚ௜݀௜ସ௜ୀଵ
݈௢௧௛ሺ௦ሻ െ ߣ ൌ ͲǡሺʹܤǤ ͻሻ 
Combining (B6) to (B9) gives:  
σ ߚ௜ܽ௜ସ௜ୀଵ
݈௖௨௟ሺ௦ሻ ൌ
σ ߚ௜ܾ௜ସ௜ୀଵ
݈௥௔௡ሺ௦ሻ ൌ
σ ߚ௜ܿ௜ସ௜ୀଵ
݈௙௢௥ሺ௦ሻ ൌ
σ ߚ௜݀௜ସ௜ୀଵ
݈௢௧௛ሺ௦ሻ ǡሺʹܤǤ ͳͲሻ 
Or: 
෍ߚ௜ܽ௜
ସ
௜ୀଵ
݈௥௔௡ሺ௦ሻ ൌ෍ߚ௜ܾ௜
ସ
௜ୀଵ
݈௙௔௥ሺ௦ሻǡሺʹܤǤ ͳͳሻ 
෍ߚ௜ܽ௜
ସ
௜ୀଵ
݈௙௢௥ሺ௦ሻ ൌ ෍ߚ௜ܿ௜
ସ
௜ୀଵ
݈௙௔௥ሺ௦ሻǡሺʹܤǤ ͳʹሻ 
෍ߚ௜ܽ௜
ସ
௜ୀଵ
݈௢௧௛ሺ௦ሻ ൌ෍ߚ௜݀௜
ସ
௜ୀଵ
݈௙௔௥ሺ௦ሻǤሺʹܤǤ ͳ͵ሻ 
Combining (B2) with (B10)ǡ ݓ݁݄ܽݒ݁ǣ 
σ ߚ௜ܽ௜ସ௜ୀଵ
݈௖௨௟ሺ௦ሻ ൌ
σ ߚ௜ܽ௜ସ௜ୀଵ
ܮ െ ݈௥௔௡ሺ௦ሻ െ ݈௙௢௥ሺ௦ሻ െ ݈௢௧௛ሺ௦ሻ ǡሺʹܤǤ ͳͶሻ 
Plugሺܤͳͳሻሺܤͳʹሻܽ݊݀ሺܤͳ͵ሻ݅݊ݐ݋ሺܤͳͶሻǡ ݓ݁݋ܾݐܽ݅݊ǣ 
݈௖௨௟ሺ௦ሻכ ൌ
σ ߚ௜ܽ௜ସ௜ୀଵ
σ ߚ௜ܽ௜ସ௜ୀଵ ൅ σ ߚ௜ܾ௜ସ௜ୀଵ ൅ σ ߚ௜ܿ௜ସ௜ୀଵ ൅ σ ߚ௜݀௜ସ௜ୀଵ
ܮǡሺʹܤǤ ͳͷሻ 
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݈௥௔௡ሺ௦ሻכ ൌ
σ ߚ௜ܾ௜ସ௜ୀଵ
σ ߚ௜ܽ௜ସ௜ୀଵ ൅ σ ߚ௜ܾ௜ସ௜ୀଵ ൅ σ ߚ௜ܿ௜ସ௜ୀଵ ൅ σ ߚ௜݀௜ସ௜ୀଵ
ܮǡሺʹܤǤ ͳ͸ሻ 
݈௙௢௥ሺ௦ሻכ ൌ
σ ߚ௜ܿ௜ସ௜ୀଵ
σ ߚ௜ܽ௜ସ௜ୀଵ ൅ σ ߚ௜ܾ௜ସ௜ୀଵ ൅ σ ߚ௜ܿ௜ସ௜ୀଵ ൅ σ ߚ௜݀௜ସ௜ୀଵ
ܮǡሺʹܤǤ ͳ͹ሻ 
݈௢௧௛ሺ௦ሻכ ൌ
σ ߚ௜݀௜ସ௜ୀଵ
σ ߚ௜ܽ௜ସ௜ୀଵ ൅ σ ߚ௜ܾ௜ସ௜ୀଵ ൅ σ ߚ௜ܿ௜ସ௜ୀଵ ൅ σ ߚ௜݀௜ସ௜ୀଵ
ܮǡሺʹܤǤ ͳͺሻ 
Since  σ ߚ௜ܽ௜ସ௜ୀଵ ൅ σ ߚ௜ܾ௜ସ௜ୀଵ ൅ σ ߚ௜ܿ௜ସ௜ୀଵ ൅ σ ߚ௜݀௜ସ௜ୀଵ ൌ ͳ 
We have: 
݈௖௨௟ሺ௦ሻכ ൌ ܮ ൈ෍ߚ௜ܽ௜
ସ
௜ୀଵ
ሺʹܤǤ ͳͻሻ 
݈௥௔௡ሺ௦ሻכ ൌ ܮ ൈ෍ߚ௜ܾ௜
ସ
௜ୀଵ
ሺʹܤǤ ʹͲሻ 
݈௙௢௥ሺ௦ሻכ ൌ ܮ ൈ෍ߚ௜ܿ௜
ସ
௜ୀଵ
ሺʹܤǤ ʹͳሻ 
݈௢௧௛ሺ௦ሻכ ൌ ܮ ൈ෍ߚ௜݀௜
ସ
௜ୀଵ
ሺʹܤǤ ʹʹሻ 
This completes the proof of equation (9) to (12) in the main text of Chapter 2. 
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߲ܮݓ
߲݈௖௨௟ሺ௦ሻ ൌ
σ ߚ௜ܽ௜ସ௜ୀଵ
݈௖௨௟ሺ௦ሻ െ ߣ ൌ ͲǡሺʹܤǤ ͸ሻ 
߲ܮݓ
߲݈௥௔௡ሺ௦ሻ ൌ
σ ߚ௜ܾ௜ସ௜ୀଵ
݈௥௔௡ሺ௦ሻ െ ߣ ൌ ͲǡሺʹܤǤ ͹ሻ 
߲ܮݓ
߲݈௙௢௥ሺ௦ሻ ൌ
σ ߚ௜ܿ௜ସ௜ୀଵ
݈௙௢௥ሺ௦ሻ െ ߣ ൌ ͲǡሺʹܤǤ ͺሻ 
߲ܮݓ
߲݈௢௧௛ሺ௦ሻ ൌ
σ ߚ௜݀௜ସ௜ୀଵ
݈௢௧௛ሺ௦ሻ െ ߣ ൌ ͲǡሺʹܤǤ ͻሻ 
Combining (B6) to (B9) gives:  
σ ߚ௜ܽ௜ସ௜ୀଵ
݈௖௨௟ሺ௦ሻ ൌ
σ ߚ௜ܾ௜ସ௜ୀଵ
݈௥௔௡ሺ௦ሻ ൌ
σ ߚ௜ܿ௜ସ௜ୀଵ
݈௙௢௥ሺ௦ሻ ൌ
σ ߚ௜݀௜ସ௜ୀଵ
݈௢௧௛ሺ௦ሻ ǡሺʹܤǤ ͳͲሻ 
Or: 
෍ߚ௜ܽ௜
ସ
௜ୀଵ
݈௥௔௡ሺ௦ሻ ൌ෍ߚ௜ܾ௜
ସ
௜ୀଵ
݈௙௔௥ሺ௦ሻǡሺʹܤǤ ͳͳሻ 
෍ߚ௜ܽ௜
ସ
௜ୀଵ
݈௙௢௥ሺ௦ሻ ൌ ෍ߚ௜ܿ௜
ସ
௜ୀଵ
݈௙௔௥ሺ௦ሻǡሺʹܤǤ ͳʹሻ 
෍ߚ௜ܽ௜
ସ
௜ୀଵ
݈௢௧௛ሺ௦ሻ ൌ෍ߚ௜݀௜
ସ
௜ୀଵ
݈௙௔௥ሺ௦ሻǤሺʹܤǤ ͳ͵ሻ 
Combining (B2) with (B10)ǡ ݓ݁݄ܽݒ݁ǣ 
σ ߚ௜ܽ௜ସ௜ୀଵ
݈௖௨௟ሺ௦ሻ ൌ
σ ߚ௜ܽ௜ସ௜ୀଵ
ܮ െ ݈௥௔௡ሺ௦ሻ െ ݈௙௢௥ሺ௦ሻ െ ݈௢௧௛ሺ௦ሻ ǡሺʹܤǤ ͳͶሻ 
Plugሺܤͳͳሻሺܤͳʹሻܽ݊݀ሺܤͳ͵ሻ݅݊ݐ݋ሺܤͳͶሻǡ ݓ݁݋ܾݐܽ݅݊ǣ 
݈௖௨௟ሺ௦ሻכ ൌ
σ ߚ௜ܽ௜ସ௜ୀଵ
σ ߚ௜ܽ௜ସ௜ୀଵ ൅ σ ߚ௜ܾ௜ସ௜ୀଵ ൅ σ ߚ௜ܿ௜ସ௜ୀଵ ൅ σ ߚ௜݀௜ସ௜ୀଵ
ܮǡሺʹܤǤ ͳͷሻ 
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݈௥௔௡ሺ௦ሻכ ൌ
σ ߚ௜ܾ௜ସ௜ୀଵ
σ ߚ௜ܽ௜ସ௜ୀଵ ൅ σ ߚ௜ܾ௜ସ௜ୀଵ ൅ σ ߚ௜ܿ௜ସ௜ୀଵ ൅ σ ߚ௜݀௜ସ௜ୀଵ
ܮǡሺʹܤǤ ͳ͸ሻ 
݈௙௢௥ሺ௦ሻכ ൌ
σ ߚ௜ܿ௜ସ௜ୀଵ
σ ߚ௜ܽ௜ସ௜ୀଵ ൅ σ ߚ௜ܾ௜ସ௜ୀଵ ൅ σ ߚ௜ܿ௜ସ௜ୀଵ ൅ σ ߚ௜݀௜ସ௜ୀଵ
ܮǡሺʹܤǤ ͳ͹ሻ 
݈௢௧௛ሺ௦ሻכ ൌ
σ ߚ௜݀௜ସ௜ୀଵ
σ ߚ௜ܽ௜ସ௜ୀଵ ൅ σ ߚ௜ܾ௜ସ௜ୀଵ ൅ σ ߚ௜ܿ௜ସ௜ୀଵ ൅ σ ߚ௜݀௜ସ௜ୀଵ
ܮǡሺʹܤǤ ͳͺሻ 
Since  σ ߚ௜ܽ௜ସ௜ୀଵ ൅ σ ߚ௜ܾ௜ସ௜ୀଵ ൅ σ ߚ௜ܿ௜ସ௜ୀଵ ൅ σ ߚ௜݀௜ସ௜ୀଵ ൌ ͳ 
We have: 
݈௖௨௟ሺ௦ሻכ ൌ ܮ ൈ෍ߚ௜ܽ௜
ସ
௜ୀଵ
ሺʹܤǤ ͳͻሻ 
݈௥௔௡ሺ௦ሻכ ൌ ܮ ൈ෍ߚ௜ܾ௜
ସ
௜ୀଵ
ሺʹܤǤ ʹͲሻ 
݈௙௢௥ሺ௦ሻכ ൌ ܮ ൈ෍ߚ௜ܿ௜
ସ
௜ୀଵ
ሺʹܤǤ ʹͳሻ 
݈௢௧௛ሺ௦ሻכ ൌ ܮ ൈ෍ߚ௜݀௜
ସ
௜ୀଵ
ሺʹܤǤ ʹʹሻ 
This completes the proof of equation (9) to (12) in the main text of Chapter 2. 
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Appendix 2-C: Questionnaires and results of Analytic Hierarchy Process 
Appendix 2-C1: Questionnaires of Analytic Hierarchy Process 
1. Which is your stakeholder type in rural land allocation? 
a. Herder 
b. Farmer 
c. Economic authorities 
d. Ecological authorities 
 
2. Comparing the economic benefit and ecological benefit of rural land, which one 
concerning the efficient allocation of rural land is more important for you, and how 
much important? 
Economic benefit                                                                                        Ecological benefit 
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
3. Comparing the cultivated land and grassland, which one concerning the economic 
benefit is more beneficial to you, and how many benefits? 
Cultivated land                                                                                                         Grassland  
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
4. Comparing the cultivated land and forest land, which one concerning the economic 
benefit is more beneficial to you, and how many benefits? 
Cultivated land                                                                                                      Forest land   
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
5. Comparing the cultivated land and other rural land, which one concerning the 
economic benefit is more beneficial to you, and how many benefits? 
Cultivated land                                                                                              Other rural land  
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
6. Comparing the grassland and forest land, which one concerning the economic benefit 
is more beneficial to you, and how many benefits? 
Grassland                                                                                                              Forest land  
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
7. Comparing the grassland and other rural land, which one concerning the economic 
benefit is more beneficial to you, and how many benefits? 
Grassland                                                                                                       Other rural land  
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
  
140 
 
8. Comparing the forest land and other rural land, which one concerning the economic 
benefit is more beneficial to you, and how many benefits? 
Forest land                                                                                                      Other rural land  
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
9. Comparing the cultivated land and grassland, which one concerning the ecological 
benefit is more beneficial to you, and how many benefits? 
Cultivated land                                                                                                         Grassland  
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
10. Comparing the cultivated land and forest land, which one concerning the ecological 
benefit is more beneficial to you, and how many benefits? 
Cultivated land                                                                                                       Forest land   
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
11. Comparing the cultivated land and other rural land, which one concerning the 
ecological benefit is more beneficial to you, and how many benefits? 
Cultivated land                                                                                               Other rural land  
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
12. Comparing the grassland and forest land, which one concerning the ecological benefit 
is more beneficial to you, and how many benefits? 
Grassland                                                                                                               Forest land  
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
13. Comparing the grassland and other rural land, which one concerning the ecological 
benefit is more beneficial to you, and how many benefits? 
Grassland                                                                                                        Other rural land  
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
14. Comparing the forest land and other rural land, which one concerning the 
ecological benefit is more beneficial to you, and how many benefits? 
Forest land                                                                                                      Other rural land  
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Note: other rural land indicates land used for raising animals, agricultural facilities, agricultural 
roads, pit-ponds, fishponds, irrigation, drying grains and forming ridges among croplands. 
For above scoring in paired comparisons, the following Fundamental Scale is used to make 
judgments:1= Equal; 2=Between Equal and Moderate; 3=Moderate; 4=Between Moderate and 
Strong;5=Strong; 6=Between Strong and Very Strong; 7=Very Strong; 8=Between Very Strong 
and Extreme; 9=Extreme 
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Appendix 2-C2: Results of Analytic Hierarchy Process 
Based on the data from above questionnaires, we employ Super Decisions software to calculate 
every stakeholder’s preference on four types of rural land. And then we take the average value 
of all representatives of each stakeholder type to represent each stakeholder type’s decision in 
allocation of rural land.  
Table 2-C1 Values of ܽଵǡ ܾଵǡ ܿଵ݀ଵ (herders) 
 Weights for interviewees in the herder type 
Alternatives Cultivated land 
(ܽଵ) 
Grassland 
(ܾଵ) 
Forest land 
(ܿଵ) 
Other rural land 
(݀ଵ) 
1 0.1377 0.6311 0.1032 0.1279 
2 0.1207 0.6529 0.1120 0.1145 
3 0.1232 0.5577 0.1877 0.1314 
4 0.2252 0.5715 0.1381 0.0651 
5 0.1730 0.5388 0.1653 0.1230 
6 0.2014 0.5049 0.2174 0.0763 
7 0.2781 0.4993  0.1336 0.0890 
8 0.1836 0.3494 0.2909 0.1760 
9 0.2409 0.5294 0.1372 0.0925 
10 0.2464 0.4913 0.1615 0.1007 
11 0.1907 0.5105 0.1716 0.1271 
12 0.2679 0.5079 0.1565 0.0676 
13 0.1254 0.6754 0.1069 0.0923 
14 0.3548 0.4256 0.1487 0.0708 
15 0.2573 0.4838 0.1779 0.0811 
Average 0.2084  0.5286 0.1606 0.1024 
Variance 0.0046 0.0070 0.0023 0.0009 
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Table 2-C2 Values of ܽଶǡ ܾଶǡ ܿଶ݀ଶ (farmers) 
 Weights for interviewees in the farmer type 
Alternatives Cultivated land (ܽଶ) 
Grassland 
(ܾଶ) 
Forest land 
(ܿଶ) 
Other rural land 
(݀ଶ) 
1 0.4873 0.2432 0.2003 0.0692 
2 0.3031 0.4334 0.1906 0.0729 
3 0.4909 0.1336 0.2824 0.0932 
4 0.4564 0.2182 0.2531 0.0723 
5 0.5433 0.1180 0.2527 0.0859 
6 0.4681 0.2129 0.2324 0.0866 
7 0.3800 0.2071 0.2929 0.1200 
8 0.4695 0.2701 0.1813 0.0790 
9 0.4768 0.3130 0.1466 0.0636 
10 0.5239 0.1900 0.1831 0.1030 
11 0.3352 0.4396 0.1739 0.0513 
12 0.4853 0.1285 0.2944 0.0918 
13 0.3750 0.3639 0.1942 0.0669 
14 0.3661 0.3595 0.2215 0.0529 
15 0.3146 0.4114 0.2041 0.0699 
Average 0.4317 0.2695 0.2202 0.0786 
Variance 0.0061  0.0123 0.0021 0.0003 
 
Table 2-C3 Values of ܽଷǡ ܾଷǡ ܿଷ݀ଷ (ecological authorities) 
 Weights for interviewees in the ecological authorities type 
Alternatives Cultivated land (ܽଷ) 
Grassland 
(ܾଷ) 
Forest land 
(ܿଷ) 
Other rural land 
(݀ଷ) 
1 0.1867 0.3099 0.3808 0.1227 
2 0.1963 0.3318 0.3740 0.0979 
3 0.1685 0.3894 0.3647 0.0774 
4 0.2507 0.2620 0.4008 0.0865 
5 0.1985 0.3178 0.3836 0.1000 
6 0.2718 0.2930 0.3438 0.0915 
Average 0.2121 0.3173 0.3746 0.0960 
Variance 0.0016 0.0018 0.0004 0.0002 
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Table 2-C3 Values of ܽଷǡ ܾଷǡ ܿଷ݀ଷ (ecological authorities) 
 Weights for interviewees in the ecological authorities type 
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Table 2-C4 Values of ܽସǡ ܾସǡ ܿସ݀ସ (economic authorities) 
 Weights for interviewees in the ecological authorities type 
Alternatives Cultivated land (ܽସ) 
Grassland 
(ܾସ) 
Forest land 
(ܿସ) 
Other rural land 
(݀ସ) 
1 0.5768 0.1787 0.1082 0.1364 
2 0.4479 0.3403 0.0848 0.1271 
3 0.4815 0.2614 0.1194 0.1377 
4 0.3849 0.2982 0.1183 0.1986 
5 0.3246 0.4247 0.1374 0.1133 
6 0.3669 0.3768 0.1242 0.1321 
Average 0.4304 0.3133 0.1154 0.1409 
Variance 0.0083 0.0076 0.0003 0.0009 
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Appendix 2-D: Estimation of parameter ࢼ࢏ 
Table 2-D1 Data for welfare weights ߚ௜ 
Item Unit Value 
Population of farmers Person  168514 
Farmer’s net income in 2012 RMB per capita 6730  
Farmers’ total income Million RMB 1134.10 
Population of herders Person  2986 
Herder’s net income in 2012 RMB per capita 7898  
Herders’ total income Million RMB 23.58  
Ecological expenditure in 2012 Million RMB 118.96  
Rural ecological expenditure share   % 70 
Ecological expenditure on rural area  Million RMB 83.3 
Economic expenditure in 2012  Million RMB 1109.42  
Rural population share   % 81.2 
Economic expenditure on rural area Million RMB 900.8  
Source:  Statistical Bureau, Tai Pusi County in 2012. 
 
Table 2-D2 Value of ߚ௜ based on income distribution and labour force of stakeholder types 
 Herders 
(ߚଵ) 
Farmers 
(ߚଶ) 
Ecological 
public 
authorities (ߚଷ) 
Economic 
public 
authorities (ߚସ) 
 
Total 
Income  in 2012 
(million RMB) 
23.58 1134.099 83.3 900.8 2158.669 
Income 
distribution(Ⱦ୧) 
0.0110 0.5295 0.0389 0.4206 1 
Labour force in 
each stakeholder 
type  in 2012 
1962 55665 200 6601 64428 
Labour force  
distribution(Ⱦ୧) 
0.0304 0.8640 0.0031 0.1025 1 
Source:  Statistical Bureau, Tai Pusi County in 2012. 
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Table 2-C4 Values of ܽସǡ ܾସǡ ܿସ݀ସ (economic authorities) 
 Weights for interviewees in the ecological authorities type 
Alternatives Cultivated land (ܽସ) 
Grassland 
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Forest land 
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Other rural land 
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3 0.4815 0.2614 0.1194 0.1377 
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Appendix 4-A: Descriptive statistics of the model variables 
Table 4-A1 Descriptive statistics of the model variables 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations 
݈݋݃ሺ ௜ܵ௧ሻ 0.36 0.54 -1.5927 3.14 1080 
݈݋݃ሺܥ௜௧ሻ -0.05 0.49 -2.08 2.93 1080 
݈݋݃ሺ ௜ܷ௧ሻ 1.02 0.81 -0.50 4.23 1080 
݈݋݃ሺܨ௜௧ሻ 1.05 0.79 -2.00 4.17 1080 
݈݋݃ሺܴ௜௧ିଵሻ -1.13 3.30 -4.61 3.26 1080 
ͳ ሺܴ௜௧ିଵΤ ሻ 46.69 49.80 0.04 10028 1080 
݈݋݃ሺܯ௜௧ିଵሻ 0.05 0.41 -0.53 0.66 1035 
݈݋݃ሺܤ௜௧ିଵሻ 0.12 0.50 -0.45 1.13 1035 
݈݋݃ሺ ௜ܶ௧ିଵሻ -0.03 0.06 -0.23 0.10 1035 
݈݋݃ሺܩ௜௧ିଵሻ -0.28 0.42 -2.40 0.01 1035 
௧ܻ 12.50 6.93 129 24 1080 
௜ܲ כ ௧ܻ 7.50 8.14 0 24 1080 
 
  
                                                 
27 The logarithm of any positive number less than 1 is negative.   
28 ͳ ሺܴ௜௧ିଵΤ ሻ has the max value of 100 because we assigned a small original value (0.01) to ܴ௜௧ିଵ. In this case, it 
indicates ܴ௜௧ିଵ equals to 0. 
29 Year 1985 equals 1, 1986 equals 2, etc. 
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Appendix 4-B: The model specification with quadratic term 
With respect to the specification of our models, we use the quadratic term instead of the 
reciprocal of land tenure reform variable. That is, ͳ ሺܴ௜௧ିଵΤ ሻ is replaced by ሾ݈݋݃ሺܴ௜௧ିଵሻሿଶ, as 
every equation in below. Comparing table 4.3 with table 4-B1, and figure 4.9 with figure 4-B1, 
model results for these two types of specification are almost the same, which indicates the 
model specification is reliable and the model results are robust. 
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Appendix 4-A: Descriptive statistics of the model variables 
Table 4-A1 Descriptive statistics of the model variables 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations 
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indicates ܴ௜௧ିଵ equals to 0. 
29 Year 1985 equals 1, 1986 equals 2, etc. 
146 
 
Appendix 4-B: The model specification with quadratic term 
With respect to the specification of our models, we use the quadratic term instead of the 
reciprocal of land tenure reform variable. That is, ͳ ሺܴ௜௧ିଵΤ ሻ is replaced by ሾ݈݋݃ሺܴ௜௧ିଵሻሿଶ, as 
every equation in below. Comparing table 4.3 with table 4-B1, and figure 4.9 with figure 4-B1, 
model results for these two types of specification are almost the same, which indicates the 
model specification is reliable and the model results are robust. 
݈݋݃ሺ ௜ܵ௧ሻ ൌ ݏ௜ ൅ ܽଵ݈݋݃ሺܴ௜௧ିଵሻ ൅ ܽଶሾ݈݋݃ሺܴ௜௧ିଵሻሿଶ ൅ ܽଷ݈݋݃ሺܯ௜௧ିଵሻ ൅ ܽସ݈݋݃ሺ ௜ܶ௧ିଵሻ
൅ ܽହ݈݋݃ሺܩ௜௧ିଵሻ ൅ ܽ଺ ௧ܻ ൅ ܽ଻ ௜ܲ כ ௧ܻ ൅ ᖡ௜௧ሺͶܤǤ ͳሻ 
݈݋݃ሺܥ௜௧ሻ ൌ ݃௜ ൅ ܾଵ݈݋݃ሺܴ௜௧ିଵሻ ൅ ܾଶሾ݈݋݃ሺܴ௜௧ିଵሻሿଶ ൅ ܾଷ݈݋݃ሺܤ௜௧ିଵሻ ൅ ܾସ݈݋݃ሺ ௜ܶ௧ିଵሻ
൅ ܾହ݈݋݃ሺܩ௜௧ିଵሻ ൅ ܾ଺ ௧ܻ ൅ ܾ଻ ௜ܲ כ ௧ܻ ൅ Ɋ௜௧ሺͶܤǤ ʹሻ 
݈݋݃ሺ ௜ܷ௧ሻ ൌ ݑ௜ ൅ ܿଵ݈݋݃ሺܴ௜௧ିଵሻ ൅ ܿଶሾ݈݋݃ሺܴ௜௧ିଵሻሿଶ ൅ ܿଷ݈݋݃ሺܯ௜௧ିଵሻ ൅ ܿସ݈݋݃ሺ ௜ܶ௧ିଵሻ
൅ ܿହ݈݋݃ሺܩ௜௧ିଵሻ ൅ ܿ଺ ௧ܻ ൅ ܿ଻ ௜ܲ כ ௧ܻ ൅ ߣ௜௧ሺͶܤǤ ͵ሻ 
݈݋݃ሺܨ௜௧ሻ ൌ ௜݂ ൅ ݀ଵ݈݋݃ሺܴ௜௧ିଵሻ ൅ ݀ଶሾ݈݋݃ሺܴ௜௧ିଵሻሿଶ ൅ ݀ଷ݈݋݃ሺܤ௜௧ିଵሻ ൅ ݀ସ݈݋݃ሺ ௜ܶ௧ିଵሻ
൅ ݀ହ݈݋݃ሺܩ௜௧ିଵሻ ൅ ݀଺ ௧ܻ ൅ ݀଻ ௜ܲ כ ௧ܻ ൅ ߜ௜௧ሺͶܤǤ Ͷሻ
14
7 
 
Ta
bl
e 
4-
B
1 
M
od
el
 re
su
lts
 b
as
ed
 o
n 
Eq
s. 
(4
B
.1
)-
(4
B
.4
) 
V
ar
ia
bl
es
 
Sh
ee
p 
po
pu
la
tio
n 
m
od
el
 
݈݋݃
ሺ
௜ܵ௧ሻ
 
C
at
tle
 p
op
ul
at
io
n 
m
od
el
 
݈݋݃
ሺܥ
௜௧ሻ
 
M
ut
to
n 
ou
tp
ut
 m
od
el
 
݈݋݃
ሺ
௜ܷ௧ሻ
 
B
ee
f o
ut
pu
t m
od
el
 
݈݋݃
ሺܨ
௜௧ሻ
 
 
co
ef
fic
ie
nt
 
t 
co
ef
fic
ie
nt
 
t 
co
ef
fic
ie
nt
 
t 
co
ef
fic
ie
nt
 
t 
݈݋݃
ሺܴ
௜௧ି
ଵሻ 
-0
.1
3*
**
 
-6
.8
6 
-0
.0
6*
**
 
-3
.0
3 
-0
.0
7*
**
 
-3
.3
6 
-0
.0
4*
 
-1
.6
7 
ሾ݈݋
݃ሺ
ܴ ௜௧
ିଵ
ሻሿଶ
 
-0
.0
3*
**
 
-5
.8
0 
-0
.0
2*
**
 
-3
.3
8 
-0
.0
2*
**
 
-2
.9
7 
-0
.0
1*
 
-1
.9
1 
݈݋݃
ሺܯ
௜௧ି
ଵሻ 
0.
25
**
* 
3.
62
 
na
 
na
 
0.
08
 
1.
11
 
na
 
na
 
݈݋݃
ሺܤ
௜௧ି
ଵሻ 
na
 
na
 
0.
18
**
* 
3.
84
 
na
 
na
 
0.
19
**
* 
2.
96
 
݈݋݃
ሺ
௜ܶ௧ି
ଵሻ 
-0
.0
8 
-0
.1
9 
1.
54
**
* 
4.
12
 
-0
.6
4 
-1
.5
2 
0.
57
 
1.
10
 
݈݋݃
ሺܩ
௜௧ି
ଵሻ 
1.
06
**
 
2.
02
 
-0
.2
8 
-0
.5
8 
1.
60
**
* 
2.
90
 
0.
81
 
1.
17
 
௧ܻ 
0.
04
**
* 
8.
47
 
0.
01
**
* 
2.
68
 
0.
12
**
* 
22
.2
3 
0.
10
**
* 
17
.1
4 
௜ܲכ
௧ܻ 
-0
.0
01
 
-0
.3
8 
-0
.0
3*
**
 
-8
.2
2 
-0
.0
2*
**
 
-4
.3
8 
-0
.0
5*
**
 
-1
0.
39
 
C
on
st
an
t 
0.
31
**
 
1.
98
 
0.
10
 
0.
68
 
0.
21
 
1.
28
 
0.
47
**
 
2.
30
 
ܴଶ
 
0.
30
 
 
0.
12
 
 
0.
77
 
 
0.
60
 
 
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
 
10
35
 
10
35
 
10
35
 
10
35
 
148 
 
 
 
Figure 4-B1 Relationship between land tenure reform and livestock production based on the model 
results in table 4-B1 
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Summary  
 
Grasslands play a significant role in the global ecosystem, livestock production and millions of 
household livelihoods. However, grassland degradation has become a worldwide problem, and rural 
poverty has become exacerbated in some pastoral areas. The sustainable management and use of 
grasslands that maintain the productive and adaptive capacity of ecosystems while providing for the 
well-being of human communities are crucial concerns. In practice, various policy interventions have 
been initiated by governments all over the world to devote to grassland conservation, livestock 
production and improving local household livelihoods. This research aims to evaluate the effectiveness 
of the policy interventions for grassland ecosystems and livestock production in the pastoral areas of 
China. The conceptual framework for this research is based on Ostrom’s Social-Ecological Systems 
(SESs) framework. Four specific research questions are addressed. It is hoped that the research findings 
of this thesis can make a contribution to providing some references for policy development in light of 
the sustainable management and use of grasslands. 
China has around 392 million hectares of grasslands, accounting for 12% of the world’s grasslands and 
41.7% of the national land area. The study about China’s grassland system and its grassland policies 
could provide significant views to understand the grasslands of this world. Inner Mongolia, that includes 
the typical pastoral areas of China, is employed as the specific research region. The impacts of China’s 
grassland policies on the grassland systems are dissected based on the methodology of econometrics, 
welfare economics and institutional economics and data from remote sensing technology and socio-
economic survey. More specifically, the major policy interventions for the governance of grasslands in 
China include the land tenure reform during the 1980s-1990s and a series of Ecological Construction 
Programs occurring mainly after the year 2000. The former aims at privatizing use rights of grasslands 
to individual households and displacing traditional common use. The latter mainly concerns grassland 
conservation through employing grazing bans and deterministic stocking rates. The effectiveness of 
these policy interventions is investigated through estimating their impact on grassland condition and 
livestock production. The empirical analysis about policy impacts is conducted in chapter 3, 4 and 5, 
based on panel data that spans several decades. In addition, a case study based on a county in the eco-
fragile area is conducted in chapter 2 to study the preference for different types of rural land by different 
stakeholders, which mirrors the perception of resource users on grassland use under the social, economic 
and political settings. 
More in detail, chapter 2 analyses the divergence in preferences among different stakeholders over the 
allocation of four types of rural land: cultivated land, grassland, forest and other land. Considering the 
heterogeneity of stakeholders that are concerned with land-use decisions, four types of stakeholders are 
150 
 
distinguished, namely, ecological authorities, economic authorities, herders and farmers. The diverging 
preferences of these four stakeholder types over the different types of land use were quantified using 
the Analytic Hierarchy Process. Weights for each stakeholder type were derived for three scenarios: 
equal weights, weights based on income distribution and weights based on labour force distribution. 
Welfare analysis was employed then to determine the individual optimal allocation by maximising the 
utility function of each stakeholder type. Social optimal allocation was derived by maximising the social 
welfare function, which is the weighted sum of individual utilities. Tai Pusi County, located in an eco-
fragile area of northern China, was taken as a case to present the empirical analysis. Individual optima 
revealed the degree of divergences among stakeholders, and the social optima revealed the optimal 
allocation based on social welfare. The research results provide insights on how to achieve an efficient 
allocation of rural land, balancing the ecological and economic benefits of different stakeholders from 
different types of land. As such, the desirable area of grasslands for different users as well as for the 
whole society is revealed, which further reflects the conflicts of different stakeholders on grassland use.  
Prior to the policy intervention of assigning the grasslands to individual households, grazing was mobile 
and flexible in China, which allowed herders and their animals to roam over forage and water resources. 
Since the start of the land tenure reform in the pastoral areas of China in the 1980s, grassland use rights 
have increasingly been assigned to individual households and subsequently more grasslands have been 
in private use. On the other hand, most of the grasslands in China have experienced severe degradation 
after the reform. Chapter 3 aims at examining whether land tenure reform plays a significant role in 
grassland degradation, i.e. the impact of grassland privatisation on grassland condition. It first outlines 
the process of land tenure reform in the pastoral areas of China over time and then investigates the 
changes in grassland condition that are caused by the reform. Grassland condition is presented by 
grassland quantity and quality using spatial information based on remote sensing. The timing of the 
assignment of grassland use rights and the timing of the actual adoption of private use by households 
differ among counties, which allows to disentangle the impact of the land tenure reform at county-level. 
A fixed effects model that controls for the factors of climate, agricultural activity and environmental 
heterogeneity is used to conduct the empirical analysis, based on a dataset involving 60 counties of 
Inner Mongolia between 1985 and 2008. The model results show that the private use of grasslands 
following the land tenure reform causes the reduction of the total grassland area and leads to the 
degradation of dense and moderate grasslands into sparse grasslands in the long run. These results point 
to the existence of “a tragedy of privatisation”, as opposed to the well-known “tragedy of the commons”.  
Chapter 4 aims at understanding whether land tenure reform has played a role in the changes in livestock 
production of pastoral areas, i.e. the impact of grassland privatisation on local animal husbandry. This 
objective is investigated based on county-level data for Inner Mongolia between 1985 and 2008. The 
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grassland quantity and quality using spatial information based on remote sensing. The timing of the 
assignment of grassland use rights and the timing of the actual adoption of private use by households 
differ among counties, which allows to disentangle the impact of the land tenure reform at county-level. 
A fixed effects model that controls for the factors of climate, agricultural activity and environmental 
heterogeneity is used to conduct the empirical analysis, based on a dataset involving 60 counties of 
Inner Mongolia between 1985 and 2008. The model results show that the private use of grasslands 
following the land tenure reform causes the reduction of the total grassland area and leads to the 
degradation of dense and moderate grasslands into sparse grasslands in the long run. These results point 
to the existence of “a tragedy of privatisation”, as opposed to the well-known “tragedy of the commons”.  
Chapter 4 aims at understanding whether land tenure reform has played a role in the changes in livestock 
production of pastoral areas, i.e. the impact of grassland privatisation on local animal husbandry. This 
objective is investigated based on county-level data for Inner Mongolia between 1985 and 2008. The 
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changes in livestock production over time are examined by analysing data on changes in livestock 
population and meat output. The descriptive analysis shows that livestock production increased at a 
higher speed in the crop farming areas, but the development of livestock productivity was faster in the 
pastoral areas. In the empirical analysis, we employed a fixed effects model to disentangle the effects 
of land tenure reform on livestock production from factors related to market forces, grassland condition, 
technology development and environmental heterogeneity. The model results reveal that the 
implementation of land tenure reform had significant and negative effects on the increase in livestock 
production, although the total livestock production actually increased over the research period. This 
shows that land reform in itself is unable to offset the impact of other factors that accelerate the increase 
in livestock production. Moreover, the constraining effect of land tenure reform on the increase in 
livestock production decreases with the years of implementing land tenure reform and ultimately 
disappears. Remarkably, the constraining effect of land tenure reform is stronger on the increase of 
livestock population than that of meat output. This indicates that land tenure reform has led to an 
improvement in livestock productivity. In conclusion, land tenure reform puts a ceiling on livestock 
production, which could be a possible reason why it has been difficult to implement the reform on 
grasslands. However, the reform has improved the livestock productivity of pastoral areas. 
A series of Ecological Construction Programs have been initiated to protect the condition of grasslands 
in China during recent decades. However, grassland degradation is still severe and conditions have not 
been restored as intended. Chapter 5 investigates the effectiveness of Ecological Construction Programs 
for protecting the grassland condition in the extensive pastoral areas of China. One Ecological 
Construction Program that has been implemented widely on the grasslands, specifically the Subsidy and 
Incentive System for Grassland Conservation (SISGC), is taken as the concrete example for policy 
evaluation. The Normalized Difference Vegetation Index (NDVI), measured with remote sensing 
technology, is used to quantify the grassland condition between 2001 and 2014. With data from 54 
counties in the pastoral areas of Inner Mongolia, we estimate the impact of SISGC on the grassland 
condition. A fixed effects model is employed to control for livestock production, climate, time trends 
and environmental heterogeneity. The model results provide quantitative evidence that the condition of 
the grasslands has improved significantly due to SISGC, but that the effectiveness of SISGC was offset 
to some extent by other socio-economic and climate factors, such as increased producer prices and high 
temperatures. This may explain why the actual grassland degradation has not been prevented as 
effectively as was expected. In addition, the impact of SISGC was stronger in counties with a worse 
initial grassland condition. Furthermore, the effects of producer prices and climate changes were also 
more pronounced in these counties. 
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Chapter 6 concludes this research with the main findings as well as the contribution to the existing 
scientific debates. Moreover, policy implications are suggested based on the findings of this research. 
It is finalised with the research limitation and recommendations for future research. 
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